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Author: Jeff M. Moore Publisher: CreateSpace ISBN: 9781497395701 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 476
Book Description
This book describes Thai counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies, operations, and tactics for three wars ranging from 1965-present. Some of its highlights: - Provides an insider's view of 50 years of Thai national security and Irregular Warfare (IW) decision-making in a way that no book has previously done - Profiles the war against communist insurgents (1965-85); southern separatists (1980-1998); and southern separatists/Islamist jihadists (2004-present/2014) - Discuses major Thai defense and political personalities and the impact of their leadership - Contains lessons RE: strategizing and executing IW/COIN, including successes and failures - Covers military, political, and economic operations in detail - Based on IW monitoring and operations planning model devised by the author - Especially relevant for America's "Asia pivot" and understanding Thailand, Southeast Asia, and China
Author: Jeff M. Moore Publisher: CreateSpace ISBN: 9781497395701 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 476
Book Description
This book describes Thai counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies, operations, and tactics for three wars ranging from 1965-present. Some of its highlights: - Provides an insider's view of 50 years of Thai national security and Irregular Warfare (IW) decision-making in a way that no book has previously done - Profiles the war against communist insurgents (1965-85); southern separatists (1980-1998); and southern separatists/Islamist jihadists (2004-present/2014) - Discuses major Thai defense and political personalities and the impact of their leadership - Contains lessons RE: strategizing and executing IW/COIN, including successes and failures - Covers military, political, and economic operations in detail - Based on IW monitoring and operations planning model devised by the author - Especially relevant for America's "Asia pivot" and understanding Thailand, Southeast Asia, and China
Author: Jeff Moore Publisher: Muir Analytics ISBN: 9780415836463 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 208
Book Description
This book describes the Thai way of counterinsurgency (COIN). The Thai have successfully fought and defeated two insurgencies in the past, and they are currently fighting another. The first war, which was country wide, was against communist insurgents from 1965-85. The second was on Thailand's southernmost border against a hodgepodge of separatists and criminal groups that touted everything from increased political participation, to secession, to jihad. The third and current insurgency, also on the southern border, fights for a separate state under the banner of Pattani nationalism, Malay racism, and jihad. This movement makes extensive use of terrorism by regularly targeting civilians. Why is the Thai way of COIN relevant? America and its allies – including Thailand – could use the lessons to improve their COIN doctrine. Since America's retooling of its COIN methods because of its involvement in theaters such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Philippines, the government has done scores of COIN studies in pursuit of lessons learned. One of the biggest was the U.S. Army and Marine Corps COIN manual. These studies included Vietnam, Ireland, Malaysia, Algeria, the Philippines, China, ancient Persia, Lebanon, Spain, and Haiti. The manual didn't outwardly cite examples from Thailand's successful COINs despite their value. Second, this book explains Thai national security issues and decision making in intricate detail. This is critically important to understand as America – and also the world – re-emphasizes focus on the Asia-Pacific region as of 2012. If we understand Thailand's defense priorities, both internal and external, then we can better engage it. The third reason the Thai way of COIN is relevant is it explains well the “how to” of COIN from the strategic to the operational, and in some cases the tactical. This book will be of much interest to students of counterinsurgency, SE Asian politics, strategic studies and security studies in general.
Author: Jeffrey M. Moore Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
The goal of this study is to ascertain how Thailand wages counterinsurgency (COIN). Thailand has waged two successful COINs in the past and is currently waging a third on its southern border. The lessons learned from Thailand's COIN campaigns could result in modern irregular warfare techniques valuable not only to Thailand and neighboring countries with similar security problems, but also to countries like the United States and the United Kingdom that are currently reshaping their irregular warfare doctrines in response to the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The first set of COIN lessons comes from Thailand's successful 1965-85 communist COIN. The second set comes from Bangkok's understudied 1980s-90s COIN against southern separatists. The third set comes from Thailand's current war against ethnic Malay separatists and radical Islamic insurgents attempting to secede and form a separate state called 'Patani Raya, ' among other names. Counterinsurgency is a difficult type of warfare for four reasons: (1) it can take years to succeed; (2) the battle space is poorly defined; (3) insurgents are not easily identifiable; and (4) war typically takes place among a civilian population that the guerrillas depend on for auxiliary support. Successful COINs include not only precise force application operations based on quality intelligence, but also lasting social and economic programs, political empowerment of the disenfranchised, and government acceptance of previously ignored cultural realities. Background: In 1965, communist insurgents, backed by the People's Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), began waging an insurgency against Thailand in order to overthrow its government and install a Marxist regime. The Thai government struggled, both politically and militarily, to contain the movement for years, but eventually, it prevailed. Its success was based on a combination of effective strategy and coordination, plus well-designed and run security, political, and economic programs, the latter nowadays called the 'three pillars of COIN, ' a phrase developed by David Kilcullen, a modern COIN theorist and practitioner. One of Bangkok's most successful initiatives was the CPM program (civil-military-police), which used a linked chain of local forces, police, and the military to not only provide security for villages, but also economic aid and administrative training to rural peoples. State political programs that undercut communist political programs backed by masterful diplomacy and a constant barrage of rural works helped erode the communist position. The 1980s-90s COIN against southern separatists followed similar lines. The far South's four border provinces, comprised of 80 percent ethnic Malay Muslims, had been in revolt on and off for decades since Bangkok annexed the area in 1902. Bangkok had waged haphazard COIN campaigns against rebel groups there for decades with mixed results. But after the successful communist COIN was up and running in 1980, Bangkok decided to apply similar ways and means to tackle the southern issue. The government divided its COIN operations into two components: a security component run by a task force called CPM-43, and a political-economic component run by the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center, or SB-PAC. SB-PAC also had a Special Branch investigative capacity. Combined, the 80s-90s southern COIN strategy relied on extensive military intelligence networks to curb violence, civilian administrators to execute local political reforms, and local politicians to apply traditional Malay and Muslim problem solving techniques to keep the peace. These programs worked well against the multitude of southern insurgent groups that conducted sporadic attacks against government and civilian targets while also running organized criminal syndicates. By the end of the 1990s, with a dose of Thailand's famed diplomacy and help from Malaysia's Special Branch, Bangkok defeated the southern separatists. In January 2004, however, a new separatist movement in southern Thailand emerged - one based on ethnic Malay separatism and radical Islam. It is a well-coordinated movement with effective operational expertise that attacks at a higher tempo than past southern rebel groups. It moreover strikes civilian targets on a regular basis, thereby making it a terrorist group. Overall, it dwarfs past southern movements regarding motivation and scale of violence. Thai officials think the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Coordinate, or BRN-C, leads the current rebellion, but there are several other groups that claim to also lead the fight. Members of the insurgency are nearly exclusively ethnic Malays and Muslims. The movement demonstrates radical Islamic tendencies thought its propaganda, indoctrination, recruitment, and deeds. It is a takfiri group that kills other Muslims who do not share its religious beliefs, so it wrote in its spiritual rebel guidebook, Fight for the Liberation of Patani. BRN-C seeks to separate the four southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Songkhla from Thailand in order to establish an Islamic republic. The separatists base their revolt on perceived military, economic, cultural, and religious subjugation going back to the early 1900s. And they have a point. The central government has, at different times in the past, indeed treated southerners with tremendous disdain and sometimes violence - especially those considered insurgents. But Bangkok has also instituted scores of economic and social aid programs in the south - mosque building, college scholarships, and medical aid, for example - so it has not been a continual anti-Muslim 'blood fest' as government detractors have painted it. Still the maltreatment, certainly many times less than yesteryear, has provided today's insurgents with ideological fodder for a steady stream of recruits and supporters. Combined with radical Islam, it has bonded the insurgents to a significant degree. Statistically, in the 2005-07-time frame, insurgents assassinated 1.09 people a day, detonated 18.8 bombs a month, and staged 12.8 arson attacks a month. In 2005, they conducted 43 raids and 45 ambushes. The militants target security forces, government civilians, and the local population. They have killed fellow Muslims and beheaded numerous Buddhist villagers. The insurgents' actions have crippled the South's education system, justice system, and commerce, and also have maligned Buddhist-Muslim relations. Overall, the separatists pose a direct threat to Thailand's south and an indirect threat to the rest of the country. Moreover, their radical Islamic overtones have potential regional and global terrorist implications. The Thai Government spent much of 2004 attempting to ascertain whether the high level of violence was, in fact, an insurgency. To begin with, the government, led by PM Thaksin Shinawatra, was puzzled by the fact that the separatists had not published a manifesto or approached Bangkok with a list of demands. By mid-2004, however, the insurgents had staged a failed, region-wide revolt, and their prolific leaflet and Internet propaganda campaign clearly demonstrated that a rebel movement was afoot. By fall 2005, the separatists had made political demands via the press, all of which centered on secession. By 2006, a coup against PM Thaksin succeeded and the military government that replaced him instituted a new COIN strategy for the south that by 2008 had reduced violence by about 40 percent. Some of the tenets of this new strategy were based on Thailand's past successful COIN strategies. Whether or not the government has concocted a winning strategy for the future, however, remains to be seen. This paper analyses these COIN campaigns through the COIN Pantheon, a conceptual model the author developed as an analytical tool. It is based on David Kilcullen's three pillars of COIN. The COIN Pantheon has as its base the concept of strategy, and then as the next edifice, coordination. Three pillars of security, politics, and economics rise from these to push against the insurgent edifice. The roof is the at-risk population. By researching the specifics of all these issues for the three COINs discussed here, the Thai way of COIN emerges. Then, by measuring these results against the tenets of COIN theorists David Galula, Sir Robert Thompson, and Kilcullen, the Thai Way of COIN is more clearly illuminated.
Author: Jeremy Black Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield ISBN: 1442256338 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 288
Book Description
This timely book offers a world history of insurgencies and of counterinsurgency warfare. Jeremy Black moves beyond the conventional Western-centric narrative, arguing that it is crucial to ground contemporary experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq in a global framework. Unlike other studies that begin with the American and French revolutions, this book reaches back to antiquity to trace the pre-modern origins of war within states. Interweaving thematic and chronological narratives, Black probes the enduring linkages between beliefs, events, and people on the one hand and changes over time on the other hand. He shows the extent to which power politics, technologies, and ideologies have evolved, creating new parameters and paradigms that have framed both governmental and public views. Tracing insurgencies ranging from China to Africa to Latin America, Black highlights the widely differing military and political dimensions of each conflict. He weighs how, and why, lessons were “learned” or, rather, asserted, in both insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare. At every stage, he considers lessons learned by contemporaries, the ways in which norms developed within militaries and societies, and their impact on doctrine and policy. His sweeping study of insurrectionary warfare and its counterinsurgency counterpart will be essential reading for all students of military history.
Author: Ruth Streicher Publisher: Cornell University Press ISBN: 1501751344 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 297
Book Description
Uneasy Military Encounters presents a historically and theoretically grounded political ethnography of the Thai military's counterinsurgency practices in the southern borderland, home to the greater part of the Malay-Muslim minority. Ruth Streicher argues that counterinsurgency practices mark the southern population as the racialized, religious, and gendered other of the Thai, which contributes to producing Thailand as an imperial formation: a state formation based on essentialized difference between the Thai and their others. Through a genealogical approach, Uneasy Military Encounters addresses broad conceptual questions of imperial politics in a non-Western context: How can we understand imperial policing in a country that was never colonized? How is "Islam" constructed in a state that is officially secular and promotes Buddhist tolerance? What are the (historical) dynamics of imperial patriarchy in a context internationally known for its gender pluralism? The resulting ethnography excavates the imperial politics of concrete encounters between the military and the southern population in the ongoing conflict in southern Thailand.
Author: Jeff M. Moore
Author: Jeff M. Moore
Author: Jeff Moore
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Author: Jeffrey M. Moore
Author: Roger Trinquier
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Author: Jeremy Black
Author: Ruth Streicher