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Author: Monica Espinosa Blasco Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 27
Book Description
In our study we focus on the determinants of reputation and, in particular, on the relation between the quality of annual report disclosures of companies and their reputation. We try to bring together two strands of literature: the literature on corporate reputation and the literature on corporate disclosures. Using data on corporate reputation and on quality of annual report disclosures for a sample of Spanish companies, we test the hypothesis that annual report disclosure quality is a crucial determinant of corporate reputation. After controlling for other possible determinants, especially size, we find significant evidence in favour of our hypothesis. Firms with a better annual report disclosure score are more likely to be rated among the top 50 national companies in terms of corporate reputation. Moreover the disclosure score positively affects the reputation score.
Author: Monica Espinosa Blasco Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 27
Book Description
In our study we focus on the determinants of reputation and, in particular, on the relation between the quality of annual report disclosures of companies and their reputation. We try to bring together two strands of literature: the literature on corporate reputation and the literature on corporate disclosures. Using data on corporate reputation and on quality of annual report disclosures for a sample of Spanish companies, we test the hypothesis that annual report disclosure quality is a crucial determinant of corporate reputation. After controlling for other possible determinants, especially size, we find significant evidence in favour of our hypothesis. Firms with a better annual report disclosure score are more likely to be rated among the top 50 national companies in terms of corporate reputation. Moreover the disclosure score positively affects the reputation score.
Author: Katharina Hombach Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 70
Book Description
We study the reputational costs of targeted disclosure regulation - disclosure requirements aimed at policy objectives outside of securities regulators' traditional missions. This emerging type of disclosure regulation empowers civil society to deter firms' illicit actions. Our setting is the SEC's extraction payments disclosure rule, which requires oil and gas firms to publish details about their payments to host governments. Consistent with reputational costs imposed on affected firms, our event-study results document that the rule's negative effect on firm value is stronger where greater reputational risk makes firms more vulnerable to public pressure. Our qualitative field evidence suggests that reputational costs arise because the required disclosures facilitate pressure groups' campaigning. These findings are robust to several alternative explanations and research design choices.
Author: Wenhao Zhang Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
We study a model of strategic disclosure where a decision maker consults an expert of uncertain types about the state and then chooses between two actions according to his expected state and realized private preference. The expert may be an honest type who discloses whatever information observed, or a strategic type who prefers the decision maker take the higher action and discloses information strategically towards this purpose, while also valuing a reputation for being honest. The unique equilibrium involves an interim interval where the strategic expert mixes between disclosure and concealment, along with regions of complete concealment and disclosure. A higher weight attached to reputational concern by the strategic expert encourages more disclosure and results in higher expert reputation when no information is revealed. Reduction in ability to find news and increase in the measure of honest expert could worsen the strategic expert's disclosure incentive. The latter suggests that the decision maker does not necessarily benefit from a greater amount of honest expert.
Author: Radhika Lunawat Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper examines experimentally the reputation building role of disclosure in an investment / trust game. It provides experimental evidence in support of sequential equilibrium behavior in a finitely repeated investment / trust game where information asymmetry raises the possibility of voluntary disclosure. I define two regimes, namely disclosure regime and no-disclosure regime and it is only in the disclosure regime that such disclosure of private information is a possibility. I compare investment levels across two regimes and find the startling result that investment is lower in disclosure regime. I find that this lower investment is attributable to the fact that the prior probability with which an investor in the disclosure regime believes that a manager is trustworthy is significantly lower than the prior probability with which an investor in the no-disclosure regime believes that a manager is trustworthy. I introduce a two-stage experimental design to homogenize prior beliefs about managers' trustworthiness and find that after such homogenization, investment is higher in disclosure.
Author: Jenna Stites Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
Drawing on stakeholder, reputation, signaling, path dependence and communication theories, this dissertation examines the relationship between social and environmental signaling and firm reputation. In particular, it examines how signals sent by firms, firm partnerships, third parties and the media regarding corporate social and environmental responsibility (CSER) interact with a firm's history of social and environmental actions to impact the firm's CSER-specific reputation as well as its general reputation. The results suggest that firm self-disclosure lowers the general reputation of firms with strong CSER histories, whereas it enhances the general reputation of firms with weak CSER histories. Additionally, forming CSER-oriented partnerships increases general reputation for firms regardless of CSER history. On the other hand, receipt of third-party awards only increases general reputation for firms with a history of CSER strengths. In terms of CSER-specific reputation, however, CSER history appears to be the only important predictor. These results present several theoretical contributions and managerial implications.
Author: Panel on Data Access for Research Purposes Publisher: National Academies Press ISBN: 9780309100120 Category : Computers Languages : en Pages : 142
Book Description
Policy makers need information about the nation—ranging from trends in the overall economy down to the use by individuals of Medicare—in order to evaluate existing programs and to develop new ones. This information often comes from research based on data about individual people, households, and businesses and other organizations, collected by statistical agencies. The benefit of increasing data accessibility to researchers and analysts is better informed public policy. To realize this benefit, a variety of modes for data access— including restricted access to confidential data and unrestricted access to appropriately altered public-use data—must be used. The risk of expanded access to potentially sensitive data is the increased probability of breaching the confidentiality of the data and, in turn, eroding public confidence in the data collection enterprise. Indeed, the statistical system of the United States ultimately depends on the willingness of the public to provide the information on which research data are based. Expanding Access to Research Data issues guidance on how to more fully exploit these tradeoffs. The panel’s recommendations focus on needs highlighted by legal, social, and technological changes that have occurred during the last decade.
Author: Omri Ben-Shahar Publisher: Princeton University Press ISBN: 0691161704 Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 239
Book Description
How mandated disclosure took over the regulatory landscape—and why it failed Perhaps no kind of regulation is more common or less useful than mandated disclosure—requiring one party to a transaction to give the other information. It is the iTunes terms you assent to, the doctor's consent form you sign, the pile of papers you get with your mortgage. Reading the terms, the form, and the papers is supposed to equip you to choose your purchase, your treatment, and your loan well. More Than You Wanted to Know surveys the evidence and finds that mandated disclosure rarely works. But how could it? Who reads these disclosures? Who understands them? Who uses them to make better choices? Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider put the regulatory problem in human terms. Most people find disclosures complex, obscure, and dull. Most people make choices by stripping information away, not layering it on. Most people find they can safely ignore most disclosures and that they lack the literacy to analyze them anyway. And so many disclosures are mandated that nobody could heed them all. Nor can all this be changed by simpler forms in plainer English, since complex things cannot be made simple by better writing. Furthermore, disclosure is a lawmakers' panacea, so they keep issuing new mandates and expanding old ones, often instead of taking on the hard work of writing regulations with bite. Timely and provocative, More Than You Wanted to Know takes on the form of regulation we encounter daily and asks why we must encounter it at all.
Author: Poh-Sun Seow Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 34
Book Description
Regulators have increased the disclosure requirements of top executives as part of corporate governance reform. This study examines how trust arising from a firm's corporate reputation will interact with top executive compensation disclosure to influence investor judgments. This study used a 2 X 2 between subjects experimental design, with corporate reputation (good versus bad) and pay ratio (high versus low) as independent variables to test the hypotheses. The key findings show that if the firm with a good corporate reputation discloses a high pay ratio, participants punished the good reputation firm more than the bad reputation firm, demonstrating a negative violation of expectations. On the other hand, if the firm with a bad corporate reputation discloses a low pay ratio, participants rewarded the bad reputation firm more than the good reputation firm, demonstrating a positive violation of expectations. The results of this study may be limited by its particular circumstances of corporate reputation and compensation disclosure, making generalizations of the findings to other settings difficult.
Author: Monica Espinosa Blasco
Author: Monica Espinosa Blasco
Author: Mónica Espinosa
Author: Katharina Hombach
Author: Wenhao Zhang
Author: Cary A. Deck
Author: Radhika Lunawat
Author: Jenna Stites
Author: Panel on Data Access for Research Purposes
Author: Omri Ben-Shahar
Author: Poh-Sun Seow