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Author: Narantsetseg Amarsanaa Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 11
Book Description
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between managerial ownership and earnings management of listed Mongolian firms in 2009-2015. Most of the Mongolian enterprises were state-owned and state-controlled until the transition to free market economy. The stock exchange was established by privatizing those state-owned companies and was created managerial owners. Proxy of earnings management is defined by discretionary accruals. The managerial ownership is measured as the percentage of shareholder's shares directly or indirectly held by manager. A total of 122 Mongolian listed firms are chosen as a study sample and found that managerial ownership is negatively and significantly related to earnings management. This result is almost similar with previous literatures.
Author: Narantsetseg Amarsanaa Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 11
Book Description
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between managerial ownership and earnings management of listed Mongolian firms in 2009-2015. Most of the Mongolian enterprises were state-owned and state-controlled until the transition to free market economy. The stock exchange was established by privatizing those state-owned companies and was created managerial owners. Proxy of earnings management is defined by discretionary accruals. The managerial ownership is measured as the percentage of shareholder's shares directly or indirectly held by manager. A total of 122 Mongolian listed firms are chosen as a study sample and found that managerial ownership is negatively and significantly related to earnings management. This result is almost similar with previous literatures.
Author: Nanyan Dong Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
We investigate the governance effect of ownership structure on real earnings management (REM). Using a large sample of Chinese listed firms from 2003 to 2010, we provide empirical evidence that ownership structure significantly affects the level of REM. We find that the level of REM is positively associated with the ownership percentage of the largest shareholder, which means that firms with a more concentrated ownership structure are more prone to REM. We also find that the level of REM relates negatively to both the existence of state control and the percentage of managerial ownership, indicating that state control and managerial ownership help mitigate the incentives for REM. Our findings are robust to alternative research designs. Our study contributes to the research on the relationship between ownership structure and earnings management and promotes the understanding of REM in emerging economies.
Author: Nobuyuki Teshima Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 37
Book Description
This paper examines the relationship between managerial ownership and opportunistic managerial behavior relating to earnings management. Economics theory identifies two apparently conflicting effects of managerial ownership on managers' incentives: the incentive alignment effect and the management entrenchment effect. We construct a theoretical model demonstrating the two effects. This model suggests that as managerial ownership increases, earnings management decreases for both high and low levels of managerial ownership, while it increases for intermediate levels of managerial ownership if the sensitivity of the probability of managerial dismissal to the corporate performance is high enough and/or the manager's private benefit derived from managerial position is high enough. In a sample of Japanese firms, we find a significant nonmonotonic relationship between managerial ownership and discretionary accruals, consistent with our model.
Author: Juan Manuel San Martín-Reyna Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 17
Book Description
Purpose - This paper aims to examine the relationship between different types of shareholders that command share ownership, family, institutions or external blockholders and earnings management. In addition, it examines the effect of company size on earnings management.Design/methodology/approach - The sample includes 67 companies listed in the Mexican Stock Exchange for the period 2005-2015. The sample composition is quite industry-balanced. A cross-sectional version of the Jones model (1991) is to measure the earnings management. The GMM (generalized method of moments) model is also estimated.Findings - The results show that family and institutional ownership reduce the earnings management, but the impact is different depending on the company size.Research limitations/implications - The results show that there is a clear relationship between increasing participation of family and institutional investors and a reduction in earnings management. This is consistent with the literature that establishes that ownership is an effective regulatory mechanism that limits earnings management through closer supervision and involvement in management.Practical/implications - For companies' corporate governance and regulatory authorities, the results of this study may serve to improve the decision-making.Originality/value - This study shows that ownership structure can provide corporate governance in Mexican listed companies with different monitoring and control capacities to influence companies' strategies, particularly in relation to the discretion of earnings management.
Author: Sebastian Bos Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 33
Book Description
The paper examines the relationship between share ownership by boards of British stock exchange listed companies and accrual based earnings management. It provides the first empirical evidence that the relationship is impacted by UK Company Law and the institutional governance framework.We specifically model nonlinear relationships between the equity stakes owned by executive directors and discretionary accruals to account for managerial alignment-incentive and entrenchment at different levels of share ownership. To explain the nonlinear relationship, we discuss the UK institutional governance framework and highlight key regulatory thresholds. Piecewise linear regressions test the impact of these key regulatory thresholds on the earnings management-ownership relationship. We find that share ownership by executive directors has a significant impact on the level of discretionary accruals. The relationship is negative when the equity stakes of executive directors are below the 5% threshold of the ABI dilution limit and sections 376-378 of Companies Act 1985. Earnings management increases above 5% and below 10% of share ownership by executives. Once the 10% equity threshold of section 209 of Companies Act 1948 is reached, executive share ownership effectively mitigates accrual based earnings management. We find no evidence that equity ownership by non-executive directors mitigates earnings management practice of British companies.
Author: Nico Alexander Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 6
Book Description
Objective -The purpose of this research is to empirically examine the effect of corporate governance, ownership and tax aggressiveness on earnings management. Methodology/Technique -The population of this research consists of non-financial companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) between 2013 and 2015. This research uses 3 recent years and utilizes different variable that have not been used in prior research. The 67 samples were choose using a purposive sampling method. The hypotheses are tested using multiple regression analysis with the SPSS program, to investigate the influence of each independent variable on earnings management. Findings -The results show that the board of director have a positive influence on earnings management, while board independence, audit quality, managerial ownership, and tax aggressiveness have no influence on earnings management. Novelty -This research add value in the existing literature and empirically study the effect of the board of directors, independence of the board, audit quality, managerial ownership, and tax aggressiveness on earnings management. Type of Paper: Empirical.
Author: Cheong H. Yi Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 56
Book Description
Using a large sample of both publicly traded and privately held firms in Korea, this paper investigates whether, and how, the deviation of controlling shareholders' control from ownership, business group affiliation, and listing status differentially affect the extent of earnings management. Our results show the following: First, as the control-ownership disparity becomes larger, controlling shareholders tend to engage more in opportunistic earnings management to hide adverse consequences of their self-serving behavior. The result of our full-model regression reveals that an increase in the control-ownership wedge by 1% leads to an increase in the magnitude of (unsigned) discretionary accruals by 1.3% of lagged total assets, ceteris paribus. Second, we find that for our full model regression, the magnitude of (unsigned) discretionary accruals is greater for group-affiliated firms than non-affiliated firms by 0.8% of lagged total assets. This result suggests that business group affiliation provides controlling shareholders with more incentives and opportunities for earnings management. Finally, we find that for our full-model regression, the magnitude of (unsigned) discretionary accruals is greater for publicly traded firms than for privately held firms by 1.2% of lagged total assets. This result supports the notion that stock markets create incentives for public firms to manage reported earnings to satisfy the expectations of various market participants that are often expressed in earnings numbers.
Author: Jeong-Bon Kim Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
Using a large sample of both publicly traded and privately held firms in Korea, this paper investigates whether, and how, the deviation of controlling shareholders' control from ownership, business group affiliation, and listing status differentially affect the extent of earnings management. Our results show the following: First, as the control-ownership disparity becomes larger, controlling shareholders tend to engage more in opportunistic earnings management to hide adverse consequences of their self-serving behavior. The result of our full-model regression reveals that an increase in the control-ownership wedge by 1% leads to an increase in the magnitude of (unsigned) discretionary accruals by 1.3% of lagged total assets, ceteris paribus. Second, we find that for our full model regression, the magnitude of (unsigned) discretionary accruals is greater for group-affiliated firms than non-affiliated firms by 0.8% of lagged total assets. This result suggests that business group affiliation provides controlling shareholders with more incentives and opportunities for earnings management. Finally, we find that for our full-model regression, the magnitude of (unsigned) discretionary accruals is greater for publicly traded firms than for privately held firms by 1.2% of lagged total assets. This result supports the notion that stock markets create incentives for public firms to manage reported earnings to satisfy the expectations of various market participants that are often expressed in earnings numbers.
Author: Narantsetseg Amarsanaa
Author: Narantsetseg Amarsanaa
Author: Nanyan Dong
Author: Nobuyuki Teshima
Author: Juan Manuel San Martín-Reyna
Author: Sebastian Bos
Author: 劉俊廷
Author: Chi-Yih Yang
Author: Nico Alexander
Author: Cheong H. Yi
Author: Jeong-Bon Kim