Author: Eileen Norcross Publisher: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 1009027026 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 128
Book Description
Public pensions in the United States face an impending funding crisis in the wake of the financial crisis and the COVID-19 recession. Many cities and states will struggle to meet these growing obligations without major cuts in government services, reneging on pension promises, or raising taxes. This Element examines the development of the pension crisis through the lens of political economy. We analyze the knowledge and incentive problems inherent in the institutional structure, governance, and accounting of public pensions. We conclude by offering several institutional, governance, and reporting reforms to address the pension funding crisis.
Author: Evelyne Huber Publisher: Conran Octopus ISBN: Category : Latin America Languages : en Pages : 66
Book Description
Since pension schemes-along with health care and education-absorb the largest amount of social expenditure in all countries, their reform has a potentially major impact both on the fiscal situation of the state and on the life chances of citizens who stand to win or lose from new arrangements. This makes pension reform a highly controversial issue; and, except for the addition of new programmes and benefits, major restructuring of existing pension systems has been extremely rare in advanced industrial democracies. It was also rare in Latin America before the 1980s and 1990s. But there has been a great deal of experimentation within the region during the past decade. This paper examines the larger economic, social and political context of Latin American pension reform and compares experiences in different countries of the region with options available in Western European societies during the same period. The authors argue that the type of pension reform undertaken in Latin America has been an integral part of the structural adjustment programmes pursued by Latin American governments, under the guidance of international financial institutions (IFIs). Although there was a range of possible remedies to the problems of pension systems in different Latin American countries, neo-liberal reformers and the international financial institutions preferred privatization over all others. They claimed that privatization would be superior to other kinds of reform in ensuring the financial viability of pension systems, making them more efficient, establishing a closer link between contributions and benefits and promoting the development of capital markets-thus increasing savings and investment. And they were able to push through some of their suggestions for reform in spite of considerable opposition from pensioners, trade unions and opposition political parties. Interestingly enough, their pressure proved least effective in the more democratic countries of the region. In Costa Rica, for example, citizens preferred to reform the public system-eliminating the last pockets of privilege for public sector workers and ensuring that new levels of contribution would be adequate to provide minimum benefits for the aged and infirm. In Uruguay, citizens forced a public referendum, through which they rejected a proposal for privatization. At a later stage, they did permit the introduction of private investment accounts, but not at the cost of eliminating the public programme. In Argentina and Peru, after the legislature refused to authorize partial privatization, this was eventually pushed through by presidential decree. Only in Chile and Mexico has there been a complete shift to private pension funds-but, in both cases, influential sectors of the elite, including the military, have been allowed to keep their previous, publicly managed group funds. Looking at the only privatized pension system in existence long enough to allow for some assessment of its consequences-that of Chile-the authors find that many of the claims made by supporters of privatization are not substantiated by the evidence. The first discrepancy between neo-liberal predictions and the reality of Chilean pension reform has to do with efficiency. All previous claims to the contrary, private individual accounts have proven more expensive to manage than collective claims. In fact, according to the Inter-American Development Bank, by the mid-1990s administration of the Chilean system was the most expensive in Latin America. The second disproved claim involves yield. When administrative costs are discounted, privately held and administered pension funds in Chile show an average annual real return of 5.1 per cent between 1982 and 1998. Furthermore high fees and commissions-charged at a flat rate on all accounts-have proven highly regressive. When levied against a relatively modest retirement account, for example, these standard fees reduced the amount available to the account holder by approximately 18 per cent. When applied to the deposit of an individual investing 10 times more, the reduction was slightly less than 1 per cent. The third discrepancy involves competition. Although it was assumed that efficiency within the private pension fund industry would be associated with renewed competitiveness-while the public pension system represented monopoly-the private sector has in fact become highly concentrated. The three largest pension fund administrators in Chile handle 70 per cent of the insured. And to reduce advertising costs, public regulators are limiting the number of transfers among companies that any individual can make. A fourth unfulfilled promise of privatization in Chile has to do with expansion of coverage. It was assumed that the existence of private accounts would increase incentives for people to take part in the pension sc heme, but in fact this has not happened. Coverage and compliance rates have remained virtually constant. A fifth major claim was that the conversion of the public pension system into privately held and administered accounts would strengthen capital markets, savings and investment. But a number of studies have recently concluded that, at best, this effect has been marginal. And finally, the dimension of gender equity within a fully privatized pension scheme is being subjected to increasing scrutiny. Women typically earn less money and work fewer years than men. Therefore, since pension benefits in private systems are strictly determined by the overall amount of money contributed to them, women are likely to receive considerably lower benefits. Public pension systems, in contrast, have the possibility of introducing credits for childcare that reduce this disadvantage. Sweden is an example of countries that have embarked on this course. In the latter part of the paper, Huber and Stephens widen their comparative framework to include recent pension reforms in advanced industrial countries. There, where economic crisis was not as severe and where pressure from international financial institutions was not significant, much broader options for reform were available. In fact, although long-established systems were under stress, no developed country opted for complete privatization. Complex measures were taken to strengthen the funding base of national pension systems, including changes in investment procedures and changes in rules for calculating pension benefits. Reforms also increased retirement age, as well as the number of years required to qualify for a full pension. But even the most thoroughgoing reforms retained a central role for public schemes in ensuring old-age benefits. In conclusion, the authors consider steps that can be taken to craft pension reforms with more desirable results than those obtained to date in Latin America. They recommend measures that address the problem of an aging population by increasing the ability of each generation to pay for its own pensions-rather than relying primarily on the contributions of preceding generations of insured workers. Pension payments should be invested in a variety of financial instruments and benefits must ultimately be related to the yields obtained. Such a strategy does not require introduction of privately managed, individually held, investment funds. On the contrary, risk is lessened by relying instead on collectively managed funds, in which accounts can either be identified with individuals or-more equitably-with generations of contributors. Reformed public pension systems should also contain minimum "citizenship pensions" that guarantee subsistence income in old age to all individuals as a matter of right. Such a measure, financed from general tax revenue rather than from personal contributions, is not beyond the means of medium income countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. In fact, some Nordic countries introduced citizenship pensions when their GNP per capita was lower than that of most Latin American countries today.
Author: Anke Hassel Publisher: Routledge ISBN: 1000710998 Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 272
Book Description
The Political Economy of Pension Financialisation addresses – for numerous countries – how and why pension reforms have come to rely more on financial markets, how public policy reacted to financial crises, and regulatory variation. The book demonstrates how the process of pension financialisation reveals that pension policy is not only a social policy that affects retirement income, but also a financial policy that impacts savings rates, corporate finance and the economy. The chapters shed light on pre-funded private pensions as one key component of financialisation, as they turn savings into investments via financial services providers. Readers will also see how pension financialisation and the broader financialisation of the economy are here to stay, despite negative developments during and after the financial crisis. A systematic and comparative overwiew of the financialisation of pensions, The Political Economy of Pension Financialisation is ideal for scholars and postgradues working on Political Economy, Public Policy and Finance. This book was originally published as a special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy.
Author: Riddhi Mehta-Neugebauer Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
Over the past decade, alternative assets such as private equity have been growing rapidly, twice as fast as the growth in public markets. Private equity’s growth has significant consequences for our economy and our ability to hold corporate power accountable. Through a combination of high levels of debt and other people’s institutional capital, private equity is able to acquire and operate a growing percentage of our economy, with very little skin in the game – all of which can raise concerns about the rise of business power and the societal structures in place to contest its growth. One avenue in which private equity’s business power could be challenged is through labor’s retirement capital. Depending on the specific constellation of constituents represented on a pension fund’s investment board and the power imbalance associated with that structure, concerns about headline, political, and reputational risks can expand the set of conventional market factors that challenge private equity investment allocation – or further investment privatization – and hold the industry accountable. This dissertation presents an analysis that speaks to private equity’s growing power and explores ways in which that power can be contested. The first paper showcases how private equity’s own business model, that relies on debt and opacity, facilitates the strengthening of its extractive business power. Empirical examples within the energy sector trace how these mechanisms operate through three levels of private equity’s extraction – through the extraction of natural resources, the extraction of labor’s retirement capital, and the extraction of a company’s value through rent-seeking behaviors. The latter two papers focus on the role of public pension funds as not only private equity’s largest investors, but also as key arenas for contestation. The second paper explores how the power dynamics and preferences within the public pension fund investment board, between plan participant and financial elite trustees, impacts the capital growth of private equity. I adopt a mixed-methods approach that uses compositional covariates to model the effects of board composition and pension fund sector on the probability of investment privatization as well as the portfolio share invested in alternative assets across 82 U.S. state-level public pension funds from 2001 to 2017. The results suggest that increasing participant trustee representation, particularly on those investment boards associated with more social movement unions (public-sector and teachers’ investment boards) can curtail investment privatization, whereas increasing elite trustee representation on the same investment boards, can spur investment privatization. This effect is clearest when investment boards are contending whether to privatize investment, rather than how much they will allocate to alternative assets. The third paper takes a more structural approach and explores how the power dynamics within the state – both through alliances between labor unions and gubernatorial partisanship as well as broader social mobilizations – impact private equity’s capital allocation from public pension funds. Using tobit models of over 80 state-level public pension funds, again between 2001 and 2017, the findings suggests that after the Occupy Wall Street mobilization, there was a partisan difference between pension fund investment privatization, compared to before Occupy. The findings suggest that pension funds in states with Democratic governors and high union strength tended to reduce investment privatization. Whereas pension funds in states with Republican governors and high union strength were associated with increasing investment privatization of public funds.
Author: Berthold U. Wigger Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 3540248013 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 169
Book Description
This book contains material that I have presented in seminars at the Universities of Bochum, Mannheim, Munich, Salerno, and Southern California at Los Angeles, the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna, the Max-Planck-Institute for Demographic Research in Rostock, and on various international meetings and conferences. In preparing and revising the material I have benefited from comments, discussions, and advice from several colleagues. I had particularly close and friendly collaboration with Alexander Kemnitz and Robert von Weizsicker to whom I am very grateful. I am also grateful to Michele Boldrin, Axel Borsch-Supan, Friedrich Breyer, Karen Feist, Tullio Jappelli, Leo Kaas, Marco Pagano, Gerhard Schwooiauer, Carl Christian von Weizsacker, and Wolfgang Wiegard for their comments and suggestions. Finally, I would like to thank the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft for financial support. Mannheim, January 2002 Berthold U. Wigger Contents 1. Introduction ... 1 2. Public Pensions and Economic Growth: The Basic Framework . . 5 2. 1. The Analytical Elements 7 2. 1. 1. The Individuals 7 2. 1. 2. The Firms 10 2. 1. 3. The Public Pension Program 11 2. 1. 4. The Competitive Equilibrium 12 2. 2. Productivity Growth 13 2. 3. Allocative Efficiency 19 2. 4. Public Pension Reform 25 Appendix 2 ... 30 3. The Allocative Role of Intergenerational Transfers in Endogenous Growth Economies 33 3. 1. Investment Externalities, Intergenerational Transfers, and Pareto-improvements ... 35 Contents x 3. 1. 1. A Subsidy to Private Savings 35 3. 1. 2. A Pareto-Improving Policy 38 3. 2.
Author: Edward Ludwig Glaeser Publisher: ISBN: Category : Economics Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
Why are public-sector workers so heavily compensated with pensions and other non-pecuniary benefits? In this paper, we present a political economy model of shrouded compensation in which politicians compete for taxpayers' and public employees' votes by promising compensation packages, but some voters cannot evaluate every aspect of compensation. If pension packages are "shrouded," meaning that public-sector workers better understand their value than ordinary taxpayers, then compensation will be inefficiently back-loaded. In equilibrium, the welfare of public-sector workers could be improved, holding total public sector costs constant, if they received higher wages and lower pensions. Central control over dispersed municipal pensions has two offsetting effects on pension generosity: more state-level media attention helps taxpayers better understand pension costs, which reduces pension generosity; but a larger share of public sector workers will live within the jurisdiction, which increases pension generosity. We discuss pension arrangements in two decentralized states (California and Pennsylvania) and two centralized states (Massachusetts and Ohio) and find that in these cases, centralization appears to have modestly reduced pension arrangements; but, as the model suggests, this finding is unlikely to be universal.
Author: Katharina Müller Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing ISBN: Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 248
Book Description
This volume contains the findings of the research project "Institutional Change in Social Security: Pension Reforms in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic," which was completed in early 1999. Muller, a research fellow with the Frankfurt Institute for Transformation Studies at the European University Viadrina, examines the partial privatization path that Poland and Hungary chose, and compares their Latin American-styled methods to those of the Czech Republic (which fall well within the boundaries of the Bismarckian-Beveridgean pension traditions). In particular, she looks at which structural-institutional and actor-related factors account for radial pension reform. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
Author: Eileen Norcross
Author: John Myles
Author: Ping Lung Hsin
Author: Evelyne Huber
Author: Dashle Gunn Kelley
Author: Anke Hassel
Author: Riddhi Mehta-Neugebauer
Author: Berthold U. Wigger
Author: Edward Ludwig Glaeser
Author: Katharina Müller