Author: Doris Hildebrand
Publisher: Kluwer Law International B.V.
ISBN: 9041123288
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 146
Book Description
Since the EC Block Exemption Regulation (BER) went into force in June 2000, companies are required to undertake a self-assessment of the possible consequences of their vertical agreements that is, of agreements that arise in a channel of distribution between firms at different levels of trade or industry, i.e., between a manufacturer and wholesaler, between a supplier and customer, or between a licensor of technology and his licensee. Such an assessment can be extremely complex. Although the European Commission has issued regulatory guidelines to facilitate the self-assessment process, there can be little doubt that the in-depth analysis and guidance provided in this book will be greatly welcomed by business people and their counsel. Economic Analyses of Vertical Agreements clarifies the steps, tests, determinations, and evaluations entailed in assessing vertical agreements, especially when an individual examination under Article 81 EC Treaty is required (as it is for all companies with more than a 30% market share in a relevant market). Among the terms and factors thoroughly explained, from the various pertinent points of view, are the following: vertical restraints and their components;exclusive and selective distribution agreements;channel strategies;single branding;free rider rationale; and,the European structured rule of reason in Article 81 EC Treaty The presentation is particularly notable for its wide-ranging discussion of types of vertical restraints and combinations of vertical restraints and how each is impacted by the new vertical agreement rules. The author also discusses the relevant case law of the EC Courts. Companies doing business in Europe and their legal and economic advisers will find here an absorbingly detailed overview of requirements and procedures, a clear analysis against which to measure strategic choices, and an enormously useful handbook to consult at every turn for expert guidance through the assessment of their vertical agreements.
Economic Analyses of Vertical Agreements
Author: Doris Hildebrand
Publisher: Kluwer Law International B.V.
ISBN: 9041123288
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 146
Book Description
Since the EC Block Exemption Regulation (BER) went into force in June 2000, companies are required to undertake a self-assessment of the possible consequences of their vertical agreements that is, of agreements that arise in a channel of distribution between firms at different levels of trade or industry, i.e., between a manufacturer and wholesaler, between a supplier and customer, or between a licensor of technology and his licensee. Such an assessment can be extremely complex. Although the European Commission has issued regulatory guidelines to facilitate the self-assessment process, there can be little doubt that the in-depth analysis and guidance provided in this book will be greatly welcomed by business people and their counsel. Economic Analyses of Vertical Agreements clarifies the steps, tests, determinations, and evaluations entailed in assessing vertical agreements, especially when an individual examination under Article 81 EC Treaty is required (as it is for all companies with more than a 30% market share in a relevant market). Among the terms and factors thoroughly explained, from the various pertinent points of view, are the following: vertical restraints and their components;exclusive and selective distribution agreements;channel strategies;single branding;free rider rationale; and,the European structured rule of reason in Article 81 EC Treaty The presentation is particularly notable for its wide-ranging discussion of types of vertical restraints and combinations of vertical restraints and how each is impacted by the new vertical agreement rules. The author also discusses the relevant case law of the EC Courts. Companies doing business in Europe and their legal and economic advisers will find here an absorbingly detailed overview of requirements and procedures, a clear analysis against which to measure strategic choices, and an enormously useful handbook to consult at every turn for expert guidance through the assessment of their vertical agreements.
Publisher: Kluwer Law International B.V.
ISBN: 9041123288
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 146
Book Description
Since the EC Block Exemption Regulation (BER) went into force in June 2000, companies are required to undertake a self-assessment of the possible consequences of their vertical agreements that is, of agreements that arise in a channel of distribution between firms at different levels of trade or industry, i.e., between a manufacturer and wholesaler, between a supplier and customer, or between a licensor of technology and his licensee. Such an assessment can be extremely complex. Although the European Commission has issued regulatory guidelines to facilitate the self-assessment process, there can be little doubt that the in-depth analysis and guidance provided in this book will be greatly welcomed by business people and their counsel. Economic Analyses of Vertical Agreements clarifies the steps, tests, determinations, and evaluations entailed in assessing vertical agreements, especially when an individual examination under Article 81 EC Treaty is required (as it is for all companies with more than a 30% market share in a relevant market). Among the terms and factors thoroughly explained, from the various pertinent points of view, are the following: vertical restraints and their components;exclusive and selective distribution agreements;channel strategies;single branding;free rider rationale; and,the European structured rule of reason in Article 81 EC Treaty The presentation is particularly notable for its wide-ranging discussion of types of vertical restraints and combinations of vertical restraints and how each is impacted by the new vertical agreement rules. The author also discusses the relevant case law of the EC Courts. Companies doing business in Europe and their legal and economic advisers will find here an absorbingly detailed overview of requirements and procedures, a clear analysis against which to measure strategic choices, and an enormously useful handbook to consult at every turn for expert guidance through the assessment of their vertical agreements.
The Policy Implications of the Economic Analysis of Vertical Restraints
Author: Patrick Rey
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 60
Book Description
Recoge: 1. Introduction - 2. The Nature and impact of vertical restraints: What are vertical restraints? - 3. Economic interpretation of the legal framework - 4. Economic evaluation of vertical restraints - 5. Implications for competition policy towards vertical restraints - 6. Conclusion.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 60
Book Description
Recoge: 1. Introduction - 2. The Nature and impact of vertical restraints: What are vertical restraints? - 3. Economic interpretation of the legal framework - 4. Economic evaluation of vertical restraints - 5. Implications for competition policy towards vertical restraints - 6. Conclusion.
The Antitrust Paradox
Author: Robert Bork
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781736089712
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 536
Book Description
The most important book on antitrust ever written. It shows how antitrust suits adversely affect the consumer by encouraging a costly form of protection for inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses.
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781736089712
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 536
Book Description
The most important book on antitrust ever written. It shows how antitrust suits adversely affect the consumer by encouraging a costly form of protection for inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses.
Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in Ec Competition Policy
Author: Basav Sen
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 0788175203
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 97
Book Description
Reviews EU policy towards vertical restraints -- agree. between producers & distributors that can be used pro-competitively to promote market integration & efficient dist. or anti-competitively to block integration & competition. Addresses the structure of distribution, economic analysis of vertical restraints & the internal market, current procedures & institutional framework, current rules for vertical restraints, & advantages of the present system. Makes a comparison of community law with member state & third country laws applicable to vertical restraints, examines the results of fact finding, & presents options based on the study analysis.
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 0788175203
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 97
Book Description
Reviews EU policy towards vertical restraints -- agree. between producers & distributors that can be used pro-competitively to promote market integration & efficient dist. or anti-competitively to block integration & competition. Addresses the structure of distribution, economic analysis of vertical restraints & the internal market, current procedures & institutional framework, current rules for vertical restraints, & advantages of the present system. Makes a comparison of community law with member state & third country laws applicable to vertical restraints, examines the results of fact finding, & presents options based on the study analysis.
Antitrust Law
Author: Keith N. Hylton
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521793780
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 436
Book Description
Preface p. xi 1 Economics p. 1 I. Definitions p. 1 II. Perfect Competition Versus Monopoly p. 9 III. Further Topics p. 21 2 Law and Policy p. 27 I. Some Interpretation Issues p. 28 II. Enacting the Antitrust Law p. 30 III. What Should Antitrust Law Aim to Do? p. 40 3 Enforcement p. 43 I. Optimal Enforcement Theory p. 43 II. Enforcement Provision of the Antitrust Laws p. 47 Appendix p. 64 4 Cartels p. 68 I. Cartels p. 68 II. Conscious Parallelism p. 73 III. Conclusion p. 89 5 Development of Section 1 Doctrine p. 90 I. The Sherman Act Versus the Common Law p. 90 II. Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rule p. 104 III. Conclusion p. 112 6 Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rule p. 113 I. The Case for Price Fixing p. 113 II. Per-Se and Rule of Reason Analysis: Further Developments p. 116 III. Per-Se Versus Rule of Reason Tests: Understanding the Supreme Court's Justification for the Per-Se Rule p. 129 7 Agreement p. 132 I. The Development of Inference Doctrine p. 133 II. Rejection of Unilateral Contract Theory p. 140 8 Facilitating Mechanisms p. 144 I. Data Dissemination Cases p. 145 II. Basing Point Pricing and Related Practices p. 154 III. Basing Point Pricing: Economics p. 160 9 Boycotts p. 166 I. Pre-Socony p. 166 II. Post-Socony p. 170 III. Post-BMI/Sylvania p. 181 IV. Conclusion p. 184 10 Monopolization p. 186 I. Development of Section 2 Doctrine p. 186 II. Leveraging and Essential Facility Cases p. 202 III. Predatory Pricing p. 212 IV. Conclusion p. 228 11 Power p. 230 I. Measuring Market Power p. 230 II. Determinants of Market Power p. 235 III. Substitutability and the Relevant Market: Cellophane p. 237 IV. Multimarket Monopoly and the Relevant Market: Alcoa p. 239 V. Measuring Power: Guidelines p. 243 12 Attempts p. 244 I. The Swift Formula and Modern Doctrine p. 244 II. Dangerous Probability Requirement p. 248 13 Vertical Restraints p. 252 I. Resale Price Maintenance p. 252 II. Vertical Nonprice Restraints p. 262 III. Manufacturer Retains Title p. 267 IV. Agreement p. 270 14 Tying and Exclusive Dealing p. 279 I. Introduction p. 279 II. Early Cases p. 284 III. Development of Per-Se Rule p. 286 IV. Tension Between Rule of Reason Arguments and Per-Se Rule p. 295 V. Technological Tying p. 301 VI. Exclusive Dealing p. 303 Appendix p. 307 15 Horizontal Mergers p. 311 I. Reasons for Merging and Implications for Law p. 311 II. Horizontal Merger Law p. 317 III. Conclusion p. 330 Appendix p. 330 16 Mergers, Vertical and Conglomerate p. 333 I. Vertical Mergers p. 333 II. Conglomerate Mergers p. 344 III. Concluding Remarks p. 351 17 Antitrust and the State p. 352 I. Noerr-Pennington Doctrine p. 354 II. Parker Doctrine p. 371 III. Some Final Comments: Error Costs and Immunity Doctrines p. 375 Index p. 379.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521793780
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 436
Book Description
Preface p. xi 1 Economics p. 1 I. Definitions p. 1 II. Perfect Competition Versus Monopoly p. 9 III. Further Topics p. 21 2 Law and Policy p. 27 I. Some Interpretation Issues p. 28 II. Enacting the Antitrust Law p. 30 III. What Should Antitrust Law Aim to Do? p. 40 3 Enforcement p. 43 I. Optimal Enforcement Theory p. 43 II. Enforcement Provision of the Antitrust Laws p. 47 Appendix p. 64 4 Cartels p. 68 I. Cartels p. 68 II. Conscious Parallelism p. 73 III. Conclusion p. 89 5 Development of Section 1 Doctrine p. 90 I. The Sherman Act Versus the Common Law p. 90 II. Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rule p. 104 III. Conclusion p. 112 6 Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rule p. 113 I. The Case for Price Fixing p. 113 II. Per-Se and Rule of Reason Analysis: Further Developments p. 116 III. Per-Se Versus Rule of Reason Tests: Understanding the Supreme Court's Justification for the Per-Se Rule p. 129 7 Agreement p. 132 I. The Development of Inference Doctrine p. 133 II. Rejection of Unilateral Contract Theory p. 140 8 Facilitating Mechanisms p. 144 I. Data Dissemination Cases p. 145 II. Basing Point Pricing and Related Practices p. 154 III. Basing Point Pricing: Economics p. 160 9 Boycotts p. 166 I. Pre-Socony p. 166 II. Post-Socony p. 170 III. Post-BMI/Sylvania p. 181 IV. Conclusion p. 184 10 Monopolization p. 186 I. Development of Section 2 Doctrine p. 186 II. Leveraging and Essential Facility Cases p. 202 III. Predatory Pricing p. 212 IV. Conclusion p. 228 11 Power p. 230 I. Measuring Market Power p. 230 II. Determinants of Market Power p. 235 III. Substitutability and the Relevant Market: Cellophane p. 237 IV. Multimarket Monopoly and the Relevant Market: Alcoa p. 239 V. Measuring Power: Guidelines p. 243 12 Attempts p. 244 I. The Swift Formula and Modern Doctrine p. 244 II. Dangerous Probability Requirement p. 248 13 Vertical Restraints p. 252 I. Resale Price Maintenance p. 252 II. Vertical Nonprice Restraints p. 262 III. Manufacturer Retains Title p. 267 IV. Agreement p. 270 14 Tying and Exclusive Dealing p. 279 I. Introduction p. 279 II. Early Cases p. 284 III. Development of Per-Se Rule p. 286 IV. Tension Between Rule of Reason Arguments and Per-Se Rule p. 295 V. Technological Tying p. 301 VI. Exclusive Dealing p. 303 Appendix p. 307 15 Horizontal Mergers p. 311 I. Reasons for Merging and Implications for Law p. 311 II. Horizontal Merger Law p. 317 III. Conclusion p. 330 Appendix p. 330 16 Mergers, Vertical and Conglomerate p. 333 I. Vertical Mergers p. 333 II. Conglomerate Mergers p. 344 III. Concluding Remarks p. 351 17 Antitrust and the State p. 352 I. Noerr-Pennington Doctrine p. 354 II. Parker Doctrine p. 371 III. Some Final Comments: Error Costs and Immunity Doctrines p. 375 Index p. 379.
Handbook of Antitrust Economics
Author: Paolo Buccirossi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 716
Book Description
Experts examine the application of economic theory to antitrust issues in both the United States and Europe, discussing mergers, agreements, abuses of dominance, and the impact of market features. Over the past twenty years, economic theory has begun to play a central role in antitrust matters. In earlier days, the application of antitrust rules was viewed almost entirely in formal terms; now it is widely accepted that the proper interpretation of these rules requires an understanding of how markets work and how firms can alter their efficient functioning. The Handbook of Antitrust Economics offers scholars, students, administrators, courts, companies, and lawyers the economist's view of the subject, describing the application of newly developed theoretical models and improved empirical methods to antitrust and competition law in both the United States and the European Union. (The book uses the U.S. term “antitrust law” and the European “competition law” interchangeably, emphasizing the commonalities between the two jurisdictions.) After a general discussion of the use of empirical methods in antitrust cases, the Handbook covers mergers, agreements, abuses of dominance (or unilateral conducts), and market features that affect the way firms compete. Chapters examine such topics as analyzing the competitive effects of both horizontal and vertical mergers, detecting and preventing cartels, theoretical and empirical analysis of vertical restraints, state aids, the relationship of competition law to the defense of intellectual property, and the application of antitrust law to “bidding markets,” network industries, and two-sided markets. Contributors Mark Armstrong, Jonathan B. Baker, Timothy F. Bresnahan, Paulo Buccirossi, Nicholas Economides, Hans W. Friederiszick, Luke M. Froeb, Richard J. Gilbert, Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Paul Klemperer, Kai-Uwe Kuhn, Francine Lafontaine, Damien J. Neven, Patrick Rey, Michael H. Riordan, Jean-Charles Rochet, Lars-Hendrick Röller, Margaret Slade, Giancarlo Spagnolo, Jean Tirole, Thibaud Vergé, Vincent Verouden, John Vickers, Gregory J. Werden
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 716
Book Description
Experts examine the application of economic theory to antitrust issues in both the United States and Europe, discussing mergers, agreements, abuses of dominance, and the impact of market features. Over the past twenty years, economic theory has begun to play a central role in antitrust matters. In earlier days, the application of antitrust rules was viewed almost entirely in formal terms; now it is widely accepted that the proper interpretation of these rules requires an understanding of how markets work and how firms can alter their efficient functioning. The Handbook of Antitrust Economics offers scholars, students, administrators, courts, companies, and lawyers the economist's view of the subject, describing the application of newly developed theoretical models and improved empirical methods to antitrust and competition law in both the United States and the European Union. (The book uses the U.S. term “antitrust law” and the European “competition law” interchangeably, emphasizing the commonalities between the two jurisdictions.) After a general discussion of the use of empirical methods in antitrust cases, the Handbook covers mergers, agreements, abuses of dominance (or unilateral conducts), and market features that affect the way firms compete. Chapters examine such topics as analyzing the competitive effects of both horizontal and vertical mergers, detecting and preventing cartels, theoretical and empirical analysis of vertical restraints, state aids, the relationship of competition law to the defense of intellectual property, and the application of antitrust law to “bidding markets,” network industries, and two-sided markets. Contributors Mark Armstrong, Jonathan B. Baker, Timothy F. Bresnahan, Paulo Buccirossi, Nicholas Economides, Hans W. Friederiszick, Luke M. Froeb, Richard J. Gilbert, Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Paul Klemperer, Kai-Uwe Kuhn, Francine Lafontaine, Damien J. Neven, Patrick Rey, Michael H. Riordan, Jean-Charles Rochet, Lars-Hendrick Röller, Margaret Slade, Giancarlo Spagnolo, Jean Tirole, Thibaud Vergé, Vincent Verouden, John Vickers, Gregory J. Werden
Regulating Vertical Agreements
Author: Maria Fernanda Caporale Madi
Publisher: Kluwer Law International B.V.
ISBN: 9403526513
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 224
Book Description
Vertical agreements represent a variety of supply and distribution contracts involving different market players, such as suppliers of diverse inputs, manufacturers, distributors and retailers. They gain particular significance in a global economy where technological advances are dynamic and are changing all the time. Such agreements are signed among businesspeople on a daily basis, and antitrust experts around the world are often asked to advise on whether they have any negative impact on competition or whether they infringe antitrust law. Taking into consideration the complex economic impacts of these vertical alliances, and the different market conditions that firms face in a wide variety of situations, the author proposes an in-depth examination of the following topics: resale price-fixing; geo-blocking clauses; exclusive and selective distribution systems; the concept of ‘economic efficiency’ in the context of vertical restraints; self-assessment of potential anticompetitive effects and antitrust risks; ex post control of vertical restraints; digital economies and its policy impact; alternative enforcement models under various institutional frameworks; the role and influence of political pressure groups. The book offers very constructive theoretical and political insights at the frontier between the disciplines of Economics and Law. By comparing two world’s leading antitrust jurisdictions, this book explores the lessons to be learned from the legal rules in the European Union and in Brazil, considering their promises and drawbacks, and formulates policy recommendations.
Publisher: Kluwer Law International B.V.
ISBN: 9403526513
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 224
Book Description
Vertical agreements represent a variety of supply and distribution contracts involving different market players, such as suppliers of diverse inputs, manufacturers, distributors and retailers. They gain particular significance in a global economy where technological advances are dynamic and are changing all the time. Such agreements are signed among businesspeople on a daily basis, and antitrust experts around the world are often asked to advise on whether they have any negative impact on competition or whether they infringe antitrust law. Taking into consideration the complex economic impacts of these vertical alliances, and the different market conditions that firms face in a wide variety of situations, the author proposes an in-depth examination of the following topics: resale price-fixing; geo-blocking clauses; exclusive and selective distribution systems; the concept of ‘economic efficiency’ in the context of vertical restraints; self-assessment of potential anticompetitive effects and antitrust risks; ex post control of vertical restraints; digital economies and its policy impact; alternative enforcement models under various institutional frameworks; the role and influence of political pressure groups. The book offers very constructive theoretical and political insights at the frontier between the disciplines of Economics and Law. By comparing two world’s leading antitrust jurisdictions, this book explores the lessons to be learned from the legal rules in the European Union and in Brazil, considering their promises and drawbacks, and formulates policy recommendations.
Post-Chicago Developments in Antitrust Law
Author: Antonio Cucinotta
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 9781843767039
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 364
Book Description
This work offers a critical evaluation of the Chicago approach to antitrust. The authors discuss the economic foundations of competition policy and the different ways in which both American and European competition law does - or does not - take account of economic insights.
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 9781843767039
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 364
Book Description
This work offers a critical evaluation of the Chicago approach to antitrust. The authors discuss the economic foundations of competition policy and the different ways in which both American and European competition law does - or does not - take account of economic insights.
Resale Price Maintenance and the Law
Author: Christy Kollmar
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
ISBN: 1000858502
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 290
Book Description
The question of how to properly enforce against RPM has been a contentious debate for decades on both sides of the Atlantic. The catalyst is the acceptance that RPM can generate both anti-competitive effects and pro-competitive efficiencies that need to be properly balanced to ensure against Type I/Type II errors and to create viable legislation. Part I focuses on 100 years of US origins and the current legal approach to VR enforcement, which reveals the precedent responsible for the transition between per se illegality and the rule of reason thresholds at the federal level. Nine anti-competitive and 19 pro-competitive theoretical models are also introduced to clearly demonstrate the true nonconsensus existent between economists as to whether RPM is deleterious enough to justify a stringent approach to RPM regulation. Part II closely examines the EU origins and current legal structure, where RPM has maintained its hardcore by-object designation pursuant to Art. 101(1) TFEU with the consequence of having no safe harbours, no applicability of the De Minimus Doctrine, an onerous negative rebuttable presumption, non-severability of the agreement and almost no chance of obtaining an exemption under Art. 101(3). This is exacerbated by the EC’s lack of guidance on how to prove all conditions necessary for an Art. 101(3) exemption and when a vertical arrangement actually escapes Art. 101(1) applicability. The aim of this book is to examine the economic models, historical origins and legal structures of the US/EU regimes to develop proposals on how to modify the EU’s current legal structure to ensure proper enforcement of RPM behaviour that actually enhances legal certainty through a more aligned approach at the national level. Part III proposes five solutions which scrutinise the concepts of appreciability, hardcore and by-object restraints, to implement modifications to EU’s current legal framework to ensure RPM receives reasonable and equitable treatment in line with economic theory.
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
ISBN: 1000858502
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 290
Book Description
The question of how to properly enforce against RPM has been a contentious debate for decades on both sides of the Atlantic. The catalyst is the acceptance that RPM can generate both anti-competitive effects and pro-competitive efficiencies that need to be properly balanced to ensure against Type I/Type II errors and to create viable legislation. Part I focuses on 100 years of US origins and the current legal approach to VR enforcement, which reveals the precedent responsible for the transition between per se illegality and the rule of reason thresholds at the federal level. Nine anti-competitive and 19 pro-competitive theoretical models are also introduced to clearly demonstrate the true nonconsensus existent between economists as to whether RPM is deleterious enough to justify a stringent approach to RPM regulation. Part II closely examines the EU origins and current legal structure, where RPM has maintained its hardcore by-object designation pursuant to Art. 101(1) TFEU with the consequence of having no safe harbours, no applicability of the De Minimus Doctrine, an onerous negative rebuttable presumption, non-severability of the agreement and almost no chance of obtaining an exemption under Art. 101(3). This is exacerbated by the EC’s lack of guidance on how to prove all conditions necessary for an Art. 101(3) exemption and when a vertical arrangement actually escapes Art. 101(1) applicability. The aim of this book is to examine the economic models, historical origins and legal structures of the US/EU regimes to develop proposals on how to modify the EU’s current legal structure to ensure proper enforcement of RPM behaviour that actually enhances legal certainty through a more aligned approach at the national level. Part III proposes five solutions which scrutinise the concepts of appreciability, hardcore and by-object restraints, to implement modifications to EU’s current legal framework to ensure RPM receives reasonable and equitable treatment in line with economic theory.
Impact Evaluations of Federal Trade Commission Vertical Restraints Cases
Author: Ronald N. Lafferty
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 492
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 492
Book Description