Author: Kathryn P. GriffithPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Jurisprudence
Languages : en
Pages : 56
Book Description
The Philosophy of Judge Learned Hand
Author: Kathryn P. GriffithPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Jurisprudence
Languages : en
Pages : 56
Book Description
Judge Learned Hand, an Examination of His Philosophy and Its Implications for the American Judiciary
Author: Kathryn Pearcy GriffithPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Courts
Languages : en
Pages : 646
Book Description
Learned Hand
Author: Gerald GuntherPublisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199703434
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 724
Book Description
Billings Learned Hand was one of the most influential judges in America. In Learned Hand: The Man and the Judge, Gerald Gunther provides a complete and intimate account of the professional and personal life of Learned Hand. He conveys the substance and range of Hand's judicial and intellectual contributions with eloquence and grace. This second edition features photos of Learned Hand throughout his life and career, and includes a foreword by Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Gunther, a former law clerk for Hand, reviewed much of Hand's published work, opinions, and correspondence. He meticulously describes Hand's cases, and discusses the judge's professional and personal life as interconnected with the political and social circumstances of the times in which he lived. Born in 1872, Hand served on the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. He clearly crafted and delivered thousands of decisions in a wide range of cases through extensive, conscientious investigation and analysis, while at the same time exercising wisdom and personal detachment. His opinions are still widely quoted today, and will remain as an everlasting tribute to his life and legacy.
Opinions of Judge Learned Hand
Author: Robert AmoryThe Spirit of Liberty
Author: Learned HandPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Ciencias políticas
Languages : en
Pages : 260
Book Description
Learned Hand, by general consent, is one of the most distinguished living Americans. It seemed to Irving Dillard, editor of the editorial page of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch (1949-57), that Judge Hand's non-legal addresses and papers ought to be available in volume form -- and this book is the result. Here, in speeches and articles covering a time-span of sixty-five years, is one of the truly liberal, incisive, and human voices of American life. On such subjects as justice, tolerance, democracy, liberty; on such men as Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo, Stone, and Hughes; on the preservation of personality, the existence of a common will, the meaning of Americanism -- Judge Hand's living words are creative words with profound and enduring significance. Irving Dillard has supplied an Introduction that is a tribute to Learned Hand, and has prefaced each one of the forty-one addresses and papers with an informative note. The Spirit of Liberty is a heartening book for all Americans.
The Bill of Rights
Author: Learned HandPublisher:
ISBN: 9780674332287
Category : United States
Languages : en
Pages : 88
Book Description
Learned Hand's Trademark Jurisprudence
Author: Kenneth L. PortPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Learned Hand is considered by nearly all to be one of the most respected jurists in American legal history. The literature is replete with references to Hand, depicting him in superlative terms as one of the most accomplished and respected judges to sit on any United States court. Most recently, two of the people most qualified to make the determination have concluded that Hand was a great judge. Gerald Gunther in his biography on Hand (and in subsequent spin-off articles) relied on his personal affinity for Hand to conclude that Hand was a great judge. Also, Judge Richard Posner, based almost exclusively on a quantitative analysis of the number of times Hand's opinions have been cited in various courts, concluded that Hand was a great judge. Even though Hand never was promoted to the Supreme Court, in his fifty-plus years as a judge (sitting first in the district court and then in the circuit court), very few other judges have been canonized as much as Hand. In fact, in 1959 the Second Circuit held a special session to praise Hand's fifty years of judicial service. These comments were placed on the record and are reported in the Federal Reporter. No other judge in American history had received such an honor. A lawyer, judge or law student who formed his or her entire opinion of Learned Hand's opinions based on such canonization might expect each decision he wrote to be a masterpiece, each area of law he touched to be clarified, and each opinion to be consistent, true, and somehow objectively and normatively a correct statement of the law. Or, at least, these people might expect that his decisions were still good law today. As this article argues, however, as applied to Hand's substantive trademark jurisprudence, this is often not the case. Whether a judge is worthy of the type of praise Hand has received should be evaluated, as Richard Posner claims, by analyzing the contribution that a particular judge's decisions have had on the formulation and development of the law on any given subject. I accept this standard as axiomatic in this determination. Based on this standard, it is difficult to see how anyone could claim that Learned Hand was a great trademark judge. Learned Hand's trademark jurisprudence, taken as a distinct unit, exhibits a rather amazing conservativism. Hand's judicial philosophy in trademark cases was to give extreme deference to the common law as he learned it in the 1920s. He was extremely resistant to change. This is perhaps explained by what appears to be Hand's understanding of legal positivism - that law is a statement of the will of the sovereign and judges are not free to create law without a clear statement of authority from the State. This judicial philosophy by Hand actually had an extremely restrictive impact on the development of trademark law. Although Hand is given much credit for shaping the law in this area, substantially all of his discourse on the subject has a remarkably conservative tone. This conservativism seems to be informed by the legal positivists' notion of law and the role of lawyers. Because trademark law was in such a formative stage of development while Hand was judging these cases, and because trademark law has historically been a right derived at common law, he actually had a negative impact on the expansion of rights granted to holders of trademarks. In fact, Hand spent thirty years attempting to discredit the one case for which he is most often cited and on which much of his trademark jurisprudence fame is based. This article, then, is a systematic study of all twenty-five opinions (either majority or dissenting) regarding substantive trademark law that Learned Hand wrote while on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Part II introduces the law of trademarks. Part III introduces legal positivism, which I believe strongly influenced Hand's perspective on the role of a judge in our system of justice. Part IV describes Hand's peculiar interest and attraction to intellectual property opinions in general. Part V consists of a systematic analysis of Hand's trademark cases. The article concludes that Hand was a rather rigid legal positivist and that this philosophical perspective strongly influenced the manner in which Hand viewed his role as a judge in trademark cases, thereby dictating and explaining the outcomes of his trademark cases. Furthermore, Hand's legal positivist perspective explains the difference between his opinions and various otherwise irreconcilable cases by other courts - including the Supreme Court - and resulted in greatly restricting the development of trademark law. Finally, this article concludes that Hand's superlative reputation in the area of substantive trademark law is not only unearned, but is based on complete myth. Very few Learned Hand trademark decisions should be cited today as controlling law. This is not a great legacy for the greatest judge in the history of the federal courts of appeals. By analyzing Hand's trademark opinions and categorizing him as a legal positivist, it is hoped that more discussion and close scrutiny of Hand's opinions will be initiated. In this effort, it is important to note, the role of legal theory is to allow for such group structuring. Deliberate group structuring facilitates the understanding of specific bodies of information. Most importantly, my use of theory in this article is intended to be causal, not just descriptive. When theory is used causally as well as descriptively, one comes to understand and appreciate the constraints and the perspective under which specific jurists operated.
Henry Friendly, Greatest Judge of His Era
Author: David M. DorsenPublisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674064933
Category : Biography & Autobiography
Languages : en
Pages : 513
Book Description
Henry Friendly is frequently grouped with Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis Brandeis, Benjamin Cardozo, and Learned Hand as the best American jurists of the twentieth century. In this first, comprehensive biography of Friendly, Dorsen opens a unique window onto how a judge of this caliber thinks and decides cases, and how Friendly lived his life.
The Nature of the Judicial Process
Author: Benjamin Nathan CardozoPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Judges
Languages : en
Pages : 218
Book Description
In this famous treatise, a Supreme Court Justice describes the conscious and unconscious processes by which a judge decides a case. He discusses the sources of information to which he appeals for guidance and analyzes the contribution that considerations of precedent, logical consistency, custom, social welfare, and standards of justice and morals have in shaping his decisions.
Rethinking the Judicial Settlement of Reconstruction
Author: Pamela BrandweinPublisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139496964
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 283
Book Description
American constitutional lawyers and legal historians routinely assert that the Supreme Court's state action doctrine halted Reconstruction in its tracks. But it didn't. Rethinking the Judicial Settlement of Reconstruction demolishes the conventional wisdom - and puts a constructive alternative in its place. Pamela Brandwein unveils a lost jurisprudence of rights that provided expansive possibilities for protecting blacks' physical safety and electoral participation, even as it left public accommodation rights undefended. She shows that the Supreme Court supported a Republican coalition and left open ample room for executive and legislative action. Blacks were abandoned, but by the president and Congress, not the Court. Brandwein unites close legal reading of judicial opinions (some hitherto unknown), sustained historical work, the study of political institutions, and the sociology of knowledge. This book explodes tired old debates and will provoke new ones.