The Yom Kippur War PDF Download

Author:
Publisher: Doubleday Books
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 580

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Book Description
Reports findings of a December 1973 Jerusalem Symposium assessing the trauma among the world's Jews (and non-Jews) during and following the October war.

Author: Asaf Siniver
Publisher: Hurst Publishers
ISBN: 1849042969
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 343

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Book Description
The October War of 1973 (also known as the ‘Yom Kippur War’) was a watershed moment in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the modern Middle East more broadly. It marked the beginning of a US-led peace process between Israel and her Arab neighbours; it introduced oil diplomacy as a new means of leverage in international politics; and it affected irreversibly the development of the European Community and the Palestinian struggle for independence. Moreover, the regional order which emerged at the end of the war remained largely unchallenged for nearly four decades, until the recent wave of democratic revolutions in the Arab world. The fortieth anniversary of the October War provides a timely opportunity to reassess the major themes that emerged during the war and in its aftermath, and the contributors to this book provide the first comprehensive account of the domestic and international factors which informed the policies of Israel, Egypt, Syria and Jordan, as well as external actors before, during and after the war. In addition to chapters on the superpowers, the EU and the Palestinians, the book also deals with the strategic themes of intelligence and political economy, as well as the socio-political legacy of the war on Israeli and Arab societies.

Author: Abraham Rabinovich
Publisher: Schocken
ISBN: 0307429652
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 590

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Book Description
An updated edition that sheds new light on one of the most dramatic reversals of military fortune in modern history. The easing of Israeli military censorship after four decades has enabled Abraham Rabinovich to offer fresh insights into this fiercest of Israel-Arab conflicts. A surprise Arab attack on two fronts on the holiest day of the Jewish calendar, with Israel’s reserves un-mobilized, triggered apocalyptic visions in Israel, euphoria in the Arab world, and fraught debates on both sides. Rabinovich, who covered the war for The Jerusalem Post, draws on extensive interviews and primary source material to shape his enthralling narrative. We learn of two Egyptian nationals, working separately for the Mossad, who supplied Israel with key information that helped change the course of the war; of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan’s proposal for a nuclear “demonstration” to warn off the Arabs; and of Chief of Staff David Elazar’s conclusion on the fifth day of battle that Israel could not win. Newly available transcripts enable us to follow the decision-making process in real time from the prime minister’s office to commanders studying maps in the field. After almost overrunning the Golan Heights, the Syrian attack is broken in desperate battles. And as Israel regains its psychological balance, General Ariel Sharon leads a nighttime counterattack across the Suez Canal through a narrow hole in the Egyptian line -- the turning point of the war.

Author: Tom Cooper
Publisher: Middle East@War
ISBN: 9781911628712
Category : Arab-Israeli conflict
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
The majority of narratives about the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War stress that air power did not play a dominant role. The deployment of strong, well-integrated air defenses by Egypt and Syria, that caused heavy losses to the Israeli air force early during that conflict, not only spoiled Israel's prewar planning, but prevented it from providing support for Israeli ground forces too. A cross-examination of interviews with dozens of Egyptian participants in that conflict, contemporary reporting in the media, and also intelligence reports, offers an entirely different picture. Accordingly, for much of that war, the Israelis flew heavy air strikes on Port Said, on the northern entry to the Suez Canal. Furthermore, they repeatedly attacked two major Egyptian air bases in the Nile Delta - el-Mansourah and Tanta - in turn causing some of the biggest air battles of this war. Indeed, in Egypt, the response to these attacks reached the level of legend: the supposed repelling of an Israeli air strike on el-Mansourah, on 14 October 1973, prompted Cairo to declare not only a massive victory, but also that date for the day of its air force. However, the actual reasons for Israeli air strikes on Port Said, el-Mansourah and Tanta remain unclear to this day: there are no Israeli publications offering a sensible explanation, and there are no Egyptian publications explaining the reasoning. Only a cross-examination of additional reporting provides a possible solution: el-Mansourah was also the base of the only Egyptian unit equipped with R-17E ballistic missiles, known as the SS-1 Scud in the West. As of October 1973, these missiles were the only weapon in Egyptian hands capable of reaching central Israel - and that only if fired from the area around Port Said. While apparently unimportant in the overall context, this fact gains immensely in importance considering reports from the US intelligence services about the possible deployment of Soviet nuclear warheads to Egypt in October 1973. Discussing all the available information, strategy, tactics, equipment and related combat operations of both sides, '1973: the First Nuclear War' provides an in-depth insight into the Israeli efforts to prevent the deployment of Egyptian Scud missiles - whether armed with Soviet nuclear warheads or not - in the Port Said area: an effort that dictated a lengthy segment of the application of air power during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, and resulted in some of the most spectacular air-to-air and air-to-ground battles of that conflict. Illustrated by over 100 photographs, a dozen maps and 18 color profiles, this book thus offers an entirely new thesis about crucial, but previously unknown factors that determined the flow of the aerial warfare in October 1973.

Author: Richard Bordeaux Parker
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780813018539
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 396

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Book Description
"Constitutes a close examination of the events leading up to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and offers the first comparative analysis by Israeli, Egyptian, Jordanian, Syrian, American, and former Soviet military and diplomatic participants and scholars of that seminal event."-- Hermann F. Eilts, professor emeritus, Boston University, and former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Egypt Contents 1. Introduction 2. The Failure of Diplomacy 3. The Failures of Deterrence and Intelligence 4. The Airlift 5. Crisis Management 6. The Endgame 7. Lessons Learned and Puzzles to Be Solved 8. Summing Up The October War provides insiders' views of the politics and diplomacy of events leading up to and following the October, or Yom Kippur, War of 1973 between Egypt and Syria on one hand and Israel on the other, a turning point in the history of the modern Middle East. Offering fascinating insights into attitudes and processes, particularly in the United States but also in Israel and Egypt, the essays present firsthand accounts by senior officials--including U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and Israeli ambassador to the United States Simcha Dinitz--and scholars from the United States, Israel, Egypt, Russia, Syria, and Jordan. This book evolved from a 25th anniversary conference on the war in which representatives of the combatants and their superpower supporters discussed, for the first time, the perceptions, motives, and mistakes of the various parties. These frank, often surprising accounts, interspersed with analytical commentary by scholars in the field, are an important contribution to the historical record and to future policy analysis. Readers will emerge with a new appreciation of the complexity of such questions as whether the war could have been avoided, why it came as such a surprise, and whether the opportunity for peace that developed afterward was fully exploited. Richard B. Parker, scholar-in-residence at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C., was a Foreign Service officer specializing in the Middle East from 1949 to 1980. He served as ambassador to Algeria, Lebanon, and Morocco in the Ford and Carter administrations. He is the author or editor of five books, including The Six-Day War: A Retrospective (UPF, 1996) and The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East.

Author: Dr. George W. Gawrych
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786252791
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 242

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Includes 8 maps and more than 20 illustrations Armies appear to learn more from defeat than victory. In this regard, armed forces that win quickly, decisively, and with relative ease face a unique challenge in attempting to learn from victory. The Israel Defense Forces certainly fell into this category after their dramatic victory over the combined armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the Six Day War of June 1967. This study analyzes the problems that beset Israel in the aftermath of its decisive victory in the Six Day War over the Arabs. In the 1973 War, Anwar Sadat, Egypt’s president, was able to exploit Israeli vulnerabilities to achieve political success through a limited war. An important lesson emerges from this conflict. A weaker adversary can match his strengths against the weaknesses of a superior foe in a conventional conflict to attain strategic success. Such a strategic triumph for the weaker adversary can occur despite serious difficulties in operational and tactical performance. The author suggests a striking parallel between the military triumphs of Israel in 1967 and the United States in 1991. In both cases, success led to high expectations. The public and the armed forces came to expect a quick and decisive victory with few casualties. In this environment, a politically astute opponent can exploit military vulnerabilities to his strategic advantage. Sadat offers a compelling example of how this can be done.

Author: Simon Dunstan
Publisher: Osprey Publishing
ISBN: 9781846032882
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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On October 6, 1973, simultaneous attacks on two fronts caught Israel by surprise, on the holiest day of the Jewish year. With Israeli forcxes caught unprepared, the Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal, and the Syrian attack on the Golan Heights were both initially successful. The following month saw desperate fighting as the Israeli forces slowly drove the invading armies back. It took two UN ceasefires, and the threat of Soviet intervention before the Israeli forces came to a halt. Simon Dunstan offers a balanced analysis of the Yom Kippur War, describing the key battles and the forces involved and examining the outcome of the war - how at national and international levels the war was a disaster from which Israel has not recovered, as the nation became dependant on the USA for military, diplomatic and economic support. Illustrated with full-color artwork, photographs and detailed maps, this book provides an insight into the hostilities that enveloped the Middle East, the aftereffects of which are still seen today.

Author: Simon Dunstan
Publisher: Osprey Publishing
ISBN: 9781846033612
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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The Bar Lev Line along the Suez Canal was born out of the overwhelming victory of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the Six Day War of 1967. Devastated by their defeat, the Egyptian army began a prolonged campaign of artillery bombardments of Israeli positions causing many casualties. Accordingly, the IDF Chief of Staff, General Haim Bar-Lev, ordered the construction of a series of fortified positions and observation posts that were named the Bar Lev Line by the Israeli press, thanks to its inevitable association with the heavily fortified Maginot Line. This book examines the original 23 positions of the Bar Lev Line, known as Moazims (Moaz is 'castle keep' in Hebrew), each of which were between five and 15 kilometers apart and surrounded by barbed wire and minefields. With rare photographs and cutaway artwork, the design of these positions is described. Finally, the author analyzes the effectiveness of these positions when the Egyptians launched an offensive on Yom Kippur 1973. Manned by just 436 reservists the Moazims were quickly cut off and the Israeli defenders paid a high price with a casualty rate of almost 50 percent. Although widely criticized, the Bar Lev Line proved a success during the war of attrition, and in 1973 it was the political and military failures which allowed the Moazims to be surrounded, rather than the failure of the defensive line itself.

Author: Chaim Herzog
Publisher: Simon and Schuster
ISBN: 1510738800
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 328

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Book Description
This is the authoritative account of the Israeli army’s performance in the bitter Yom Kippur War of 1973. The origins of the war amid the turbulent history of competing powers in the Middle East are fully explored, as is the build-up of Arab forces that almost inexplicably caught Israel by surprise. The author then provides a gripping narrative of the conflict itself, punctuated by firsthand accounts and interviews with combatants. The War of Atonement is full of drama and tales of inspirational bravery, as Israel defied the odds to defeat the two-pronged invasion. An analysis of the political implications of the conflict bring this epic tale to a close. For this edition Chaim Herzog’s son, Brigadier General Michael Herzog, has written an introduction which places the book in the context of his father’s achievements and gives a revealing insight into the man himself. This is the most comprehensive work on a conflict that has had major implications for our own troubled times.

Author: Frank Aker
Publisher: Infinity Publishing
ISBN: 0741414961
Category : Israel-Arab War, 1973
Languages : en
Pages : 1

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