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Author: Neil Roughley Publisher: ISBN: 0190846461 Category : Language Arts & Disciplines Languages : en Pages : 393
Book Description
An interdisciplinary group of scholars investigates the claim that humans are essentially normative animals. They do so by looking at the nature and relations of three types of norms, or putative norms--social, moral, and linguistic--and asking whether they might be different expressions of one basic structure unique to humankind.
Author: Neil Roughley Publisher: ISBN: 0190846461 Category : Language Arts & Disciplines Languages : en Pages : 393
Book Description
An interdisciplinary group of scholars investigates the claim that humans are essentially normative animals. They do so by looking at the nature and relations of three types of norms, or putative norms--social, moral, and linguistic--and asking whether they might be different expressions of one basic structure unique to humankind.
Author: Neil Roughley Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 019084647X Category : Language Arts & Disciplines Languages : en Pages : 393
Book Description
It is often claimed that humans are rational, linguistic, cultural, or moral creatures. What these characterizations may all have in common is the more fundamental claim that humans are normative animals, in the sense that they are creatures whose lives are structured at a fundamental level by their relationships to norms. The various capacities singled out by discussion of rational, linguistic, cultural, or moral animals might then all essentially involve an orientation to obligations, permissions and prohibitions. And, if this is so, then perhaps it is a basic susceptibility, or proclivity to normative or deontic regulation of thought and behavior that enables humans to develop the various specific features of their life form. This volume of new essays investigates the claim that humans are essentially normative animals in this sense. The contributors do so by looking at the nature and relations of three types of norms, or putative norms-social, moral, and linguistic-and asking whether they might all be different expressions of one basic structure unique to humankind. These questions are posed by philosophers, primatologists, behavioral biologists, psychologists, linguists, and cultural anthropologists, who have collaborated on this topic for many years. The contributors are committed to the idea that understanding normativity is a two-way process, involving a close interaction between conceptual clarification and empirical research.
Author: Preston Stovall Publisher: Routledge ISBN: 1000434001 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 398
Book Description
This book provides an account of discursive or reason-governed cognition, by synthesizing research in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, and evolutionary anthropology. Using the grasp of a natural language as a model for the autonomous or self-governed rationality of discursive cognition, the author uses a semantics for individual intentions, shared intentions, and normative attitudes as a framework for understanding what it is to be a rational animal. This semantics interprets claims about shared intentions and claims about what people ought and may do as the expression of plans of action that involve taking the points of view of other people within a community. This has important consequences for our understanding of both the natural basis and the social relevance of intentional and normative mental states. In order to distinguish the strong and weak modal force, which characterizes normativity but not shared intentionality, the author argues that a notion of single-minded practical cognition is necessary. This account of single-mindedness is then used to shed light on the autonomy or self-government characteristic of discursive cognition, as manifest in a linguistic community whose members are able to adopt the standpoints of others. Drawing together research in philosophy and the related sciences, the formal account of the semantic content of the claims we use to give expression to shared intentional and normative mental states integrates well with research in cognitive science, evolutionary anthropology, and social psychology concerning the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of shared intentionality and norm psychology in human beings and other primates. The Single-Minded Animal will appeal to researchers and advanced students working on shared intentionality, normativity, rationality, cognitive science, social and developmental psychology, and evolutionary anthropology.
Author: Gary E. Varner Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA ISBN: 0199758786 Category : Nature Languages : en Pages : 334
Book Description
The book also draws heavily on empirical research on consciousness and cognition in non-human animals as a way of approaching the question of which animals, if any, are "persons," or at least "near-persons".
Author: Tom L. Beauchamp Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0195371968 Category : Medical Languages : en Pages : 997
Book Description
This text is designed to capture the nature of the questions as they stand today and to propose solutions to many of the major problems in the ethics of how we use animals.
Author: Shelly Kagan Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0192565176 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 320
Book Description
Most people agree that animals count morally, but how exactly should we take animals into account? A prominent stance in contemporary ethical discussions is that animals have the same moral status that people do, and so in moral deliberation the similar interests of animals and people should be given the very same consideration. In How to Count Animals, more or less, Shelly Kagan sets out and defends a hierarchical approach in which people count more than animals do and some animals count more than others. For the most part, moral theories have not been developed in such a way as to take account of differences in status. By arguing for a hierarchical account of morality - and exploring what status sensitive principles might look like - Kagan reveals just how much work needs to be done to arrive at an adequate view of our duties toward animals, and of morality more generally.
Author: T. J. Kasperbauer Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0190695811 Category : Nature Languages : en Pages : 249
Book Description
How do we think about animals? How do we decide what they deserve and how we ought to treat them? Subhuman takes an interdisciplinary approach to these questions, drawing from research in philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, law, history, sociology, economics, and anthropology. Subhuman argues that our attitudes to nonhuman animals, both positive and negative, largely arise from our need to compare ourselves to them.
Author: Tom Regan Publisher: University of Illinois Press ISBN: 9780252026119 Category : Animal rights Languages : en Pages : 206
Book Description
He puts the issue of animal rights in historical context, drawing parallels between animal rights activism and other social movements, including the anti-slavery movement in the nineteenth century and the gay-lesbian struggle today. He also outlines the challenges to animal rights posed by deep ecology and ecofeminism to using animals for human purposes and addresses the ethical dilemma of the animal rights advocate whose employer uses animals for research."--BOOK JACKET.
Author: Bart Streumer Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0191088951 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 262
Book Description
In Unbelievable Errors, Bart Streumer defends an error theory about all normative judgements: not just moral judgements, but also judgements about reasons for action, judgements about reasons for belief, and instrumental normative judgements. This theory says that these judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, but that these properties do not exist. It therefore entails that all normative judgements are false. Streumer also argues, however, that we cannot believe this error theory. This may seem to be a problem for the theory, but he argues that it is not. Instead, he argues, our inability to believe this error theory makes the theory more likely to be true, since it undermines objections to the theory, it makes it harder to reject the arguments for the theory, and it undermines revisionary alternatives to the theory. Streumer then sketches how certain other philosophical views can be defended in a similar way, and how philosophers should modify their method if there can be true theories that we cannot believe. He concludes that to make philosophical progress, we should sharply distinguish the truth of a theory from our ability to believe it
Author: Neil Roughley
Author: Neil Roughley
Author: Neil Roughley
Author: Preston Stovall
Author: Gary E. Varner
Author: Tom L. Beauchamp
Author: Shelly Kagan
Author: T. J. Kasperbauer
Author: Tom Regan
Author: Bart Streumer
Author: Conwy Lloyd Morgan