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Author: Andrew Mumford Publisher: Routledge ISBN: 0415667453 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 218
Book Description
This book examines the complex practice of counter-insurgency warfare through the prism of the British experiences of irregular war in the post-war era, from Malaya up to the current Iraq war.
Author: Allan Orr Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 231
Book Description
Counter-Insurgency is the most political form of warfare. Unlike other forms of war the political or ideological proclivities of entire populations are at stake. Counter-Insurgency has, due this, confounded and bewildered practitioners, academics and policy makers alike for the longest time. Only in the latter quarter of the 20th century, after the visceral war fought for South-Vietnam's soul, did military officers, academics and government officials feel they had broken the code of counter-insurgency. The problem was, it was determined, that counter-insurgency's code was primarily political and not military or a combination of both, as previously thought. The key to waging counter-insurgency then lay on the political plane, through a plan revolving around compelling one's adversary to negotiate and reach a political accord as an end to the conflict. As such the popular understanding of counter-insurgency has become that to be successful a plan of action to quell insurrection must be more politically than militarily based. But is this correct, has the code truly been cracked? The following thesis aims to examine this claim, proffer a counter-point, analyse supporting evidence to the riposte and draw conclusions based on this evidence. The following thesis then is less thesis and more anti-thesis, aiming to undercut the popular thesis of the field by positing a radical assertion for the field of counter-insurgency analysis, particularly in today's political climate. That assertion can be summed thusly - counter-insurgency wars can indeed be resolved favourably for counter-insurgent practitioners by nought but military means alone, without support from or regard for political considerations vis a vis insurgent elements. To accomplish this the thesis will examine the current literature and schools of thought in the field within the introduction, conduct two case studies on the American Civil War and Chechen Wars to illuminate insurrectionary conflicts resolved by military might, and finally posit conclusions based on the analysis this approach permits. The drive train for the following theoretical enquiry thus is the review of the field's very core, an analysis of its most basest nature and the questioning of the current understanding of the phenomena to better understand this most complex form of warfare and political/ideologically driven violence.
Author: Hannah Gurman Publisher: New Press, The ISBN: 1595588256 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 306
Book Description
The first book of its kind, Hearts and Minds is a scathing response to the grand narrative of U.S. counterinsurgency, in which warfare is defined not by military might alone but by winning the "hearts and minds" of civilians. Dormant as a tactic since the days of the Vietnam War, in 2006 the U.S. Army drafted a new field manual heralding the resurrection of counterinsurgency as a primary military engagement strategy; counterinsurgency campaigns followed in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite the fact that counterinsurgency had utterly failed to account for the actual lived experiences of the people whose hearts and minds America had sought to win. Drawing on leading thinkers in the field and using key examples from Malaya, the Philippines, Vietnam, El Salvador, Iraq, and Afghanistan, Hearts and Minds brings a long-overdue focus on the many civilians caught up in these conflicts. Both urgent and timely, this important book challenges the idea of a neat divide between insurgents and the populations from which they emerge—and should be required reading for anyone engaged in the most important contemporary debates over U.S. military policy.
Author: Larry E. Cable Publisher: NYU Press ISBN: 9780814714096 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 322
Book Description
"Conflict of Myths is an in-depth devastating critique of how the U.S. government and its military services approached and misconceived the problems of guerilla warfare and counterinsurgency conflict in general, and in Vietnam in particular. It is also a first-rate overview built on original sources of how military institutions make and revise strategic doctrine. Finally, it is a concise treatment of the nature of pre-Vietnam, twentieth-century low-intensity military conflict which will be a useful starting point for both scholars and practitioners interested in the subject." —David A. Rosenberg,Department of Strategy,Naval War College "This brilliant new book offers a plausible explanation for American military strategy in Vietnam, particularly the bombing efforts along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the Rolling Thunder Campaign in North Vietnam and explains why we trained, structured, and equipped the South Vietnamese Army in the American image. Cable offers not only solid research, but also considerable insight and a marvelous writing style. It is most encouraging to find a scholar concerned with national security affairs who is willing to do solid research on a difficult subject. Cable has tackled a difficult, emotion-laden subject crucial to the most likely future conflicts that may draw American involvement. Must reading!" —Colonel Dennis Drew,Director, Airpower Research Institute,Air University
Author: Gian Gentile Publisher: New Press, The ISBN: 1595588965 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 142
Book Description
A searing indictment of US strategy in Afghanistan from a distinguished military leader and West Point military historian—“A remarkable book” (National Review). In 2008, Col. Gian Gentile exposed a growing rift among military intellectuals with an article titled “Misreading the Surge Threatens U.S. Army’s Conventional Capabilities,” that appeared in World Politics Review. While the years of US strategy in Afghanistan had been dominated by the doctrine of counterinsurgency (COIN), Gentile and a small group of dissident officers and defense analysts began to question the necessity and efficacy of COIN—essentially armed nation-building—in achieving the United States’ limited core policy objective in Afghanistan: the destruction of Al Qaeda. Drawing both on the author’s experiences as a combat battalion commander in the Iraq War and his research into the application of counterinsurgency in a variety of historical contexts, Wrong Turn is a brilliant summation of Gentile’s views of the failures of COIN, as well as a trenchant reevaluation of US operations in Afghanistan. “Gentile is convinced that Obama’s ‘surge’ in Afghanistan can’t work. . . . And, if Afghanistan doesn’t turn around soon, the Democrats . . . who have come to embrace the Petraeus-Nagl view of modern warfare . . . may find themselves wondering whether it’s time to go back to the drawing board.” —The New Republic
Author: Robert Egnell Publisher: Columbia University Press ISBN: 0231535414 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 249
Book Description
Long considered the masters of counterinsurgency, the British military encountered significant problems in Iraq and Afghanistan when confronted with insurgent violence. In their effort to apply the principles and doctrines of past campaigns, they failed to prevent Basra and Helmand from descending into lawlessness, criminality, and violence. By juxtaposing the deterioration of these situations against Britain's celebrated legacy of counterinsurgency, this investigation identifies both the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, exposing a disconcerting gap between ambitions and resources, intent and commitment. Building upon this detailed account of the Basra and Helmand campaigns, this volume conducts an unprecedented assessment of British military institutional adaptation in response to operations gone awry. In calling attention to the enduring effectiveness of insurgent methods and the threat posed by undergoverned spaces, David H. Ucko and Robert Egnell underscore the need for military organizations to meet the irregular challenges of future wars in new ways.
Author: Andrew Mumford Publisher: Strategic Studies Institute U. S. Army War College ISBN: Category : History Languages : en Pages : 40
Book Description
This monograph holds that an aura of mythology has surrounded conventional academic and military perceptions of British performance in the realm of irregular warfare. It identifies 10 myths regarding British counterinsurgency performance and seeks to puncture them by critically assessing the efficacy of the British way of counterinsurgency from the much-vaunted, yet over-hyped, Malayan Emergency to the withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq in 2009. It challenges perceptions of the British military as an effective learning institution when it comes to irregular warfare and critically assesses traditional British counterinsurgency strategic maxims regarding hearts and minds and minimum force.
Author: M.L.R. Smith Publisher: Columbia University Press ISBN: 0231539126 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 289
Book Description
The counterinsurgency (COIN) paradigm dominates military and political conduct in contemporary Western strategic thought. It assumes future wars will unfold as "low intensity" conflicts within rather than between states, requiring specialized military training and techniques. COIN is understood as a logical, effective, and democratically palatable method for confronting insurgency—a discrete set of practices that, through the actions of knowledgeable soldiers and under the guidance of an expert elite, creates lasting results. Through an extensive investigation into COIN's theories, methods, and outcomes, this book undermines enduring claims about COIN's success while revealing its hidden meanings and effects. Interrogating the relationship between counterinsurgency and war, the authors question the supposed uniqueness of COIN's attributes and try to resolve the puzzle of its intellectual identity. Is COIN a strategy, a doctrine, a theory, a military practice, or something else? Their analysis ultimately exposes a critical paradox within COIN: while it ignores the vital political dimensions of war, it is nevertheless the product of a misplaced ideological faith in modernization.
Author: John Nagl Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing USA ISBN: 0313077037 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 273
Book Description
Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. He compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 with that developed in the Vietnam Conflict from 1950-1975, through use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both conflicts. In examining these two events, he argues that organizational culture is the key variable in determining the success or failure of attempts to adapt to changing circumstances. Differences in organizational culture is the primary reason why the British Army learned to conduct counterinsurgency in Malaya while the American Army failed to learn in Vietnam. The American Army resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency during the course of the Vietnam Conflict, preferring to treat the war as a conventional conflict in the tradition of the Korean War or World War II. The British Army, because of its traditional role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics that its history and the national culture created, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. This is the first study to apply organizational learning theory to cases in which armies were engaged in actual combat.
Author: Douglas Porch
Author: Douglas Porch
Author: Andrew Mumford
Author: Allan Orr
Author: Hannah Gurman
Author: Larry E. Cable
Author: Gian Gentile
Author: Robert Egnell
Author: Andrew Mumford
Author: M.L.R. Smith
Author: John Nagl