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Author: Bibo Liu Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
The principal-agent problem is an important model in the field of Economics of Information. In this thesis we study only a particular type of principal-agent problem which is called moral hazard model and by the principal-agent problem we mean it is moral hazard model. The moral hazard model actually belongs to the class of bilevel programming problems in Mathematics. In Economics. the first order approach is used to reduce the principal-agent problem to a single level optimization problem. However, this approach is only valid under some strong conditions. Moreover the approach can only be used under the assumption that the optimal action of the principal-agent problem and its relaxed problem appears only at an interior point. In this thesis, we consider a new relaxed problem. Under more general assumptions. we can solve the principal-agent problem without restricting the optimal action of the agent to be in the interior.
Author: Bibo Liu Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
The principal-agent problem is an important model in the field of Economics of Information. In this thesis we study only a particular type of principal-agent problem which is called moral hazard model and by the principal-agent problem we mean it is moral hazard model. The moral hazard model actually belongs to the class of bilevel programming problems in Mathematics. In Economics. the first order approach is used to reduce the principal-agent problem to a single level optimization problem. However, this approach is only valid under some strong conditions. Moreover the approach can only be used under the assumption that the optimal action of the principal-agent problem and its relaxed problem appears only at an interior point. In this thesis, we consider a new relaxed problem. Under more general assumptions. we can solve the principal-agent problem without restricting the optimal action of the agent to be in the interior.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
The principal-agent problem is an important model in the field of Economics of Information. In this thesis we study only a particular type of principal-agent problem which is called moral hazard model and by the principal-agent problem we mean it is moral hazard model. The moral hazard model actually belongs to the class of bilevel programming problems in Mathematics. In Economics. the first order approach is used to reduce the principal-agent problem to a single level optimization problem. However, this approach is only valid under some strong conditions. Moreover the approach can only be used under the assumption that the optimal action of the principal-agent problem and its relaxed problem appears only at an interior point. In this thesis, we consider a new relaxed problem. Under more general assumptions. we can solve the principal-agent problem without restricting the optimal action of the agent to be in the interior.
Author: Mojdeh Shadnam Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
This thesis studies existence and characterization of optimal solutions to the principal-agent problem with adverse selection for both discrete and continuous problems. The existence results are derived by the abstract concepts of differentiability and convexity. Under the Spence Mirrlees condition, we show that the discrete problem reduces to a problem that always satisfies the linear independence constraint qualification, while the continuum of type problem becomes an optimal control problem. We then use the Ellipsoid algorithm to solve the problem in the discrete and convex case. For the problem without the Spence Mirrlees condition, we consider different classes of constraint qualifications. Then we introduce some easy-to-check conditions to verify these constraint qualifications. Finally we give economic interpretations for several numerical examples.
Author: Jakša Cvitanic Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 3642141994 Category : Mathematics Languages : en Pages : 258
Book Description
In recent years there has been a significant increase of interest in continuous-time Principal-Agent models, or contract theory, and their applications. Continuous-time models provide a powerful and elegant framework for solving stochastic optimization problems of finding the optimal contracts between two parties, under various assumptions on the information they have access to, and the effect they have on the underlying "profit/loss" values. This monograph surveys recent results of the theory in a systematic way, using the approach of the so-called Stochastic Maximum Principle, in models driven by Brownian Motion. Optimal contracts are characterized via a system of Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential Equations. In a number of interesting special cases these can be solved explicitly, enabling derivation of many qualitative economic conclusions.
Author: Bernard Salanié Publisher: MIT Press ISBN: 0262195259 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 257
Book Description
A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition.
Author: M. A. P. Bovens Publisher: Oxford Handbooks ISBN: 0199641250 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 737
Book Description
Drawing on the best scholars in the field from around the world, this handbook showcases conceptual and normative as well as the empirical approaches in public accountability studies.
Author: Lexa N. Palmer Publisher: Book Lovers HQ ISBN: Category : Mathematics Languages : en Pages : 195
Book Description
Embark on a journey to unlock the secrets behind successful decision-making with "Strategic Decisions: The Mathematics of Game Theory." This comprehensive exploration leaves no stone unturned in the intricate world of game theory, offering insights into how individuals, businesses, and nations make strategic choices in various contexts. Whether you're navigating the complexities of competitive markets, political landscapes, or everyday interactions, this book equips you with the tools to understand and influence outcomes, ensuring a confident and reassured learning journey. In "Strategic Decisions," you'll not only grasp the foundational game theory concepts, including Nash equilibrium, dominant strategies, and mixed strategies, but also witness their real-world applications. The book transcends theory to explore practical applications in economics, politics, business, and beyond, empowering you with the knowledge of how game theory can be applied to real-world situations. From optimizing market strategies to understanding the dynamics of international relations, this book provides a rich understanding of the strategic behavior that shapes our world. What You Will Find in This Book: The history and evolution of game theory Key concepts like Nash equilibrium and dominant strategies Applications of game theory in economics and market strategies Insights into political strategy and international relations The role of information and signaling in decision-making Behavioral game theory and human psychology Ethical and philosophical considerations in strategic choices Case studies and practical applications across various fields Whether you're a student, professional, or curious reader, "Strategic Decisions: The Mathematics of Game Theory" offers not just insights, but a potential transformation in your approach to decision-making. Dive into the world of game theory and let it inspire and motivate you to make strategic choices that can shape your future.
Author: Bibo Liu
Author: Bibo Liu
Author: 
Author: Mojdeh Shadnam
Author: Mojdeh Shadnam
Author: Jakša Cvitanic
Author: Bernard Salanié
Author: Ian Jewitt
Author: M. A. P. Bovens
Author: Lexa N. Palmer
Author: Marcel Boyer