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Author: Jakša Cvitanic Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 3642141994 Category : Mathematics Languages : en Pages : 258
Book Description
In recent years there has been a significant increase of interest in continuous-time Principal-Agent models, or contract theory, and their applications. Continuous-time models provide a powerful and elegant framework for solving stochastic optimization problems of finding the optimal contracts between two parties, under various assumptions on the information they have access to, and the effect they have on the underlying "profit/loss" values. This monograph surveys recent results of the theory in a systematic way, using the approach of the so-called Stochastic Maximum Principle, in models driven by Brownian Motion. Optimal contracts are characterized via a system of Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential Equations. In a number of interesting special cases these can be solved explicitly, enabling derivation of many qualitative economic conclusions.
Author: Jakša Cvitanic Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 3642141994 Category : Mathematics Languages : en Pages : 258
Book Description
In recent years there has been a significant increase of interest in continuous-time Principal-Agent models, or contract theory, and their applications. Continuous-time models provide a powerful and elegant framework for solving stochastic optimization problems of finding the optimal contracts between two parties, under various assumptions on the information they have access to, and the effect they have on the underlying "profit/loss" values. This monograph surveys recent results of the theory in a systematic way, using the approach of the so-called Stochastic Maximum Principle, in models driven by Brownian Motion. Optimal contracts are characterized via a system of Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential Equations. In a number of interesting special cases these can be solved explicitly, enabling derivation of many qualitative economic conclusions.
Author: Alfred Galichon Publisher: Princeton University Press ISBN: 0691183465 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 184
Book Description
Optimal Transport Methods in Economics is the first textbook on the subject written especially for students and researchers in economics. Optimal transport theory is used widely to solve problems in mathematics and some areas of the sciences, but it can also be used to understand a range of problems in applied economics, such as the matching between job seekers and jobs, the determinants of real estate prices, and the formation of matrimonial unions. This is the first text to develop clear applications of optimal transport to economic modeling, statistics, and econometrics. It covers the basic results of the theory as well as their relations to linear programming, network flow problems, convex analysis, and computational geometry. Emphasizing computational methods, it also includes programming examples that provide details on implementation. Applications include discrete choice models, models of differential demand, and quantile-based statistical estimation methods, as well as asset pricing models. Authoritative and accessible, Optimal Transport Methods in Economics also features numerous exercises throughout that help you develop your mathematical agility, deepen your computational skills, and strengthen your economic intuition. The first introduction to the subject written especially for economists Includes programming examples Features numerous exercises throughout Ideal for students and researchers alike
Author: Nicholas J. Higham Publisher: Princeton University Press ISBN: 0691150397 Category : Mathematics Languages : en Pages : 1014
Book Description
The must-have compendium on applied mathematics This is the most authoritative and accessible single-volume reference book on applied mathematics. Featuring numerous entries by leading experts and organized thematically, it introduces readers to applied mathematics and its uses; explains key concepts; describes important equations, laws, and functions; looks at exciting areas of research; covers modeling and simulation; explores areas of application; and more. Modeled on the popular Princeton Companion to Mathematics, this volume is an indispensable resource for undergraduate and graduate students, researchers, and practitioners in other disciplines seeking a user-friendly reference book on applied mathematics. Features nearly 200 entries organized thematically and written by an international team of distinguished contributors Presents the major ideas and branches of applied mathematics in a clear and accessible way Explains important mathematical concepts, methods, equations, and applications Introduces the language of applied mathematics and the goals of applied mathematical research Gives a wide range of examples of mathematical modeling Covers continuum mechanics, dynamical systems, numerical analysis, discrete and combinatorial mathematics, mathematical physics, and much more Explores the connections between applied mathematics and other disciplines Includes suggestions for further reading, cross-references, and a comprehensive index
Author: Bernard Salanié Publisher: MIT Press ISBN: 0262195259 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 257
Book Description
A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition.
Author: K. G. Binmore Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0195300572 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 652
Book Description
Ken Binmore's previous game theory textbook, Fun and Games (D.C. Heath, 1991), carved out a significant niche in the advanced undergraduate market; it was intellectually serious and more up-to-date than its competitors, but also accessibly written. Its central thesis was that game theory allows us to understand many kinds of interactions between people, a point that Binmore amply demonstrated through a rich range of examples and applications. This replacement for the now out-of-date 1991 textbook retains the entertaining examples, but changes the organization to match how game theory courses are actually taught, making Playing for Real a more versatile text that almost all possible course designs will find easier to use, with less jumping about than before. In addition, the problem sections, already used as a reference by many teachers, have become even more clever and varied, without becoming too technical. Playing for Real will sell into advanced undergraduate courses in game theory, primarily those in economics, but also courses in the social sciences, and serve as a reference for economists.
Author: M. A. P. Bovens Publisher: Oxford Handbooks ISBN: 0199641250 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 737
Book Description
Drawing on the best scholars in the field from around the world, this handbook showcases conceptual and normative as well as the empirical approaches in public accountability studies.
Author: Jean-Jacques Laffont Publisher: Princeton University Press ISBN: 1400829453 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 436
Book Description
Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.
Author: Nicola Acocella Publisher: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 9780521586382 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 546
Book Description
Recent developments in public economics have largely been in the direction of reaffirming the limits of the market and of establishing new ones. The possible existence of fundamental non-convexities, imperfect and asymmetric information, incentive compatibility, imperfect competition, strategic complementarity, and scale economies led to the conclusion that a large set of market failures exist; such situations also imply government failure. Acocella, considers this complicated picture and provides a discussion of the different approaches to establishing social 'rankings' of the possible situations and the underlying principles. The arguments for and against different institutions are then analysed at a micro and macroeconomic level. The market and the government are recognised as imperfect, and thus complementary, institutions. Specific policy targets and instruments are considered in the areas of micro and macro-economic policy. Special attention is devoted to questions of policy management in an open economy. Finally, problems of domestic and international policy co-ordination are considered.
Author: Jakša Cvitanic
Author: Jakša Cvitanic
Author: Shigeo Kusuoka
Author: Alfred Galichon
Author: I. V. Evstigneev
Author: Nicholas J. Higham
Author: Bernard Salanié
Author: K. G. Binmore
Author: M. A. P. Bovens
Author: Jean-Jacques Laffont
Author: Nicola Acocella