Author: Leora Friedberg Publisher: ISBN: Category : Old age pensions Languages : en Pages : 40
Book Description
The Social Security earnings test reduces benefits at a 33-50% rate once earnings pass a threshold amount - among the highest marginal tax rates in the economy. Previous research dismissed the importance of the earnings test but failed to take advantage of three changes in the earnings test rules in order to identify its impact. Each change applied to some age groups and not others - which make them useful for identifying the effect of tax rules on the labor supply of working beneficiaries. Beneficiaries in the Current Population Survey satisfy the strongest prediction: many keep their earnings just below the exempt amount, and this bunching shifts with the earnings test rule changes. The rule changes are then incorporated into an econometric model of labor supply to identify income and substitution elasticities. The resulting elasticity estimates suggest considerable deadweight loss suffered by working beneficiaries. Simulations predict a substantial boost to labor supply from eliminating the earnings test, and at a minimal fiscal cost. However, a slight decrease in labor supply is predicted from the recently legislated increase in the exempt amount
Author: Jonathan Gruber Publisher: ISBN: Category : Labor supply Languages : en Pages : 56
Book Description
The Social Security earnings test, a version of which still applies to those ages 62-64, reduces immediate payments to beneficiaries whose labor income exceeds a given threshold. Although benefits are subsequently increased to compensate for any such reduction, the earnings test is typically perceived as a tax on working. As a result, it is considered by many to be an important disincentive to paid work for older Americans. Yet there is little evidence to suggest an economically significant effect of the earnings test on hours of work, and almost no research on the effect of the test on the decision to work at all. We investigate these issues using the significant changes in the structure of the earnings test over the past 25 years, using data over the past 25 years, using data over the 1973-1998 period from the March Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS), which provide large samples of observations on the elderly. Our analysis suggests two major conclusions. First, the earnings test exerts no robust influence on the labor supply decisions of men. Neither graphical analyses of breaks in labor supply trends, nor regression estimates that control for underlying trends in labor supply by age group, reveal any significant impact of changes in earnings test parameters on aggregate employment, hours of work, or earnings for men. For women, there is more suggestive evidence that the earnings test is affecting labor supply decisions. Second, loosening the earnings test appears to accelerate benefits receipt among the eligible population, lowering benefits levels, and heightening concerns about the standard of living of these elderly at very advanced ages. Our findings suggest some cause for caution before rushing to remove the earnings test at younger ages.
Author: Hugo Benitez-Silva Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
The labor supply and benefit claiming incentives provided by the early retirement rules of the Social Security Old Age benefits program are of growing importance as the Normal Retirement Age (NRA) increases to 67, the labor force participation of Older Americans rises, and a variety of reforms to the Social Security system are considered. Any reform needs to take into account the effects and rationale of the Social Security Earnings Test and the Actuarial Adjustment Factor. We describe these incentives, and analyze benefit withholding patterns using data from the Master Beneficiary Files of the Social Security Administration, and present descriptive and exploratory evidence on the determinants of benefit withholding using data from the Health and Retirement Survey. We then investigate the importance of the Earnings Test limits for work and claiming behavior using a dynamic life-cycle model of labor supply, benefit claiming, and withholding. We use the latter framework to compare the consequences of a number of changes to the Earnings Test provision for the labor supply behavior and earnings of older Americans.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Older men Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
In this study the social security earnings test is shown to have a significant effect empirically on the labor supply of retirement aged men. A rich data file from the Social Security Administration containing accurate benefit information provides a cross- section sample of 65-70 year old married men who worked some amount for empirical investigation. The data pertain to 1972. The results indicate that eliminating the earnings test would increase labor supply by 151 annual hours and payroll tax revenue by $31 per individual in the sample. The way in which the earnings test is relaxed is important also. Raising the exempt amount increased labor supply while lowering the tax rate did not. This follows from analyzing labor supply decisions over a nonlinear earnings-tested budget constraint. An econometric technique was developed for consistently estimating labor supply over nonlinear budget constraints. This technique conveniently summarized the budget constraint in an expected value calculation.
Author: Selahattin Imrohoroglu Publisher: DIANE Publishing ISBN: 1437930913 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 37
Book Description
This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. A general equilibrium model of overlapping generations that incorporates endogenous saving, labor force participation, work hours, and Social Security (SS) benefit claims. Three SS reforms are studied: 1) a reduction in benefits and payroll taxes; 2) an increase in the earliest retirement age, to 64 from 62; and 3) an increase in the normal retirement age, to 68 from 66. A 50% cut in the scope of the current system significantly raises asset holdings and the labor input, through higher participation of older workers, and reduces the shortfall of the SS budget. Increasing the normal retirement age also raises saving and the labor supply, but the effects are smaller. Postponing the earliest retirement age has only a negligible effect. Charts and tables.
Author: United States. Congress. House. Select Committee on Aging. Subcommittee on Retirement Income and Employment Publisher: ISBN: Category : Old age pensions Languages : en Pages : 200
Author: Leora Friedberg
Author: Jonathan Gruber
Author: 
Author: Hugo Benitez-Silva
Author: Anthony J. Pellechio
Author: 
Author: Selahattin Imrohoroglu
Author: Stephen D. Rubb
Author: United States. Congress. House. Select Committee on Aging. Subcommittee on Retirement Income and Employment
Author: David Pattison (Writer on old age pensions)