Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge PDF Download

Author: Torin Alter
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0195171659
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 360

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Author: Sam Coleman
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107141990
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 313

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A cutting-edge and groundbreaking set of new essays by top philosophers on key topics related to the ever-influential knowledge argument.

Author: Luca Malatesti
Publisher: Cambridge Scholars Publishing
ISBN: 1443844403
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 160

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There is widespread debate in contemporary philosophy of mind over the place of conscious experiences in the natural world – where the latter is taken to be broadly as described and explained by such sciences as physics, chemistry and biology; while conscious experiences encompass pains, bodily sensations, perceptions, feelings and moods. Many philosophers and scientists, who endorse physicalism or materialism, maintain that these mental states can be completely described and explained in natural terms. Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument is a very influential objection to physicalism and, thus, to such an optimistic view about the scientific treatability of conscious experiences. According to the knowledge argument, we can know facts about our colour experiences that are not physical facts. At the heart of this book lies a response to the knowledge argument that aims to defend a version of physicalism, that the author calls modest reductionism. This reply is based on the endorsement of the phenomenal concept strategy. According to this response, the knowledge argument cannot prove that there are non-physical facts. Instead, it can only show that there are ways of thinking about colour experiences that are based on phenomenal concepts that differ from scientific concepts. The author argues for the superiority of the phenomenal concept strategy over other influential physicalist replies to the knowledge argument. However, he criticises some recent physicalist accounts of phenomenal concepts and develops his own distinctive theory of these concepts.

Author: John Perry
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262661355
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 244

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Physicalism is the idea that if everything that goes on is physical, our consciousness and feelings must also be physical. This book defends a view called antecedent physicalism.

Author: Peter Ludlow
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262621892
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 488

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In Frank Jackson's famous thought experiment, Mary is confined to a black-and-white room and educated through black-and-white books and lectures on a black-and-white television. In this way, she learns everything there is to know about the physical world. If physicalism—the doctrine that everything is physical—is true, then Mary seems to know all there is to know. What happens, then, when she emerges from her black-and-white room and sees the color red for the first time? Jackson's knowledge argument says that Mary comes to know a new fact about color, and that, therefore, physicalism is false. The knowledge argument remains one of the most controversial and important arguments in contemporary philosophy.There's Something About Mary—the first book devoted solely to the argument—collects the main essays in which Jackson presents (and later rejects) his argument along with key responses by other philosophers. These responses are organized around a series of questions: Does Mary learn anything new? Does she gain only know-how (the ability hypothesis), or merely get acquainted with something she knew previously (the acquaintance hypothesis)? Does she learn a genuinely new fact or an old fact in disguise? And finally, does she really know all the physical facts before her release, or is this a "misdescription"? The arguments presented in this comprehensive collection have important implications for the philosophy of mind and the study of consciousness.

Author: Howard Robinson
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107087260
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 285

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This book offers a comprehensive defense of the knowledge argument, arguing that materialism cannot accommodate or explain consciousness and offering an original defense of conceptualism for the non-basic. It will be a valuable resource for scholars and advanced students of philosophy of mind, studying consciousness, dualism and the mind-body problem.

Author: Philip Goff
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190677015
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 305

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Book Description
The first half of this book argues that physicalism cannot account for consciousness, and hence cannot be true. The second half explores and defends Russellian monism, a radical alternative to both physicalism and dualism. The view that emerges combines panpsychism with the view that the universe as a whole is fundamental.

Author: Yujin Nagasawa
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9781107407862
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
In God and Phenomenal Consciousness, Yujin Nagasawa bridges debates in two distinct areas of philosophy: the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of religion. He proposes novel objections to Thomas Nagel's and Frank Jackson's well-known 'knowledge arguments' against the physicalist approach to phenomenal consciousness by utilizing his own objections to arguments against the existence of God. From the failure of these arguments, Nagasawa derives a unique metaphysical thesis, 'nontheoretical physicalism,' according to which although this world is entirely physical, there are physical facts that cannot be captured even by complete theories of the physical sciences.

Author: Robert J. Howell
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 0199654662
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 201

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Robert J. Howell offers a new account of the relationship between conscious experience and the physical world, based on a neo-Cartesian notion of the physical and careful consideration of three anti-materialist arguments. His theory of subjective physicalism reconciles the data of consciousness with the advantages of a monistic, physical ontology.

Author: David Papineau
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199243824
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 281

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Book Description
Thinking About Consciousness is a discussion of recent physicalist ideas about consciousness, written in an accessible style by David Papineau.