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Author: Dante Aldrighi Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 18
Book Description
This paper aims at evaluating the influence of ownership and control concentration as well as of characteristics of the controlling shareholders on the performance of limited liability companies. To tackle this objective, a panel analysis is carried out relying on data over the period 1997-2002, compiled from financial and ownership structure reports firms in Brazil are required to file to the stock market regulator. The main findings are the following: (1) high voting rights by the largest ultimate shareholder are negatively associated with firms' returns on assets, vindicating the thesis of minority shareholders' expropriation by controlling shareholders; (2) the presence of either pyramids or non-voting right shares has a significant negative impact on the largest firms' performance; and (3) among the largest corporations, those whose largest ultimate shareholder is a foreign investor tend to yield higher returns on assets than those controlled by families while pyramid ownership structures render them systematically under-performing. These results are in accordance with the literature that associates large voting power, pyramidal schemes, non-voting right shares, and weak disclosure with expropriation of outsider investors.
Author: Dante Aldrighi Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 18
Book Description
This paper aims at evaluating the influence of ownership and control concentration as well as of characteristics of the controlling shareholders on the performance of limited liability companies. To tackle this objective, a panel analysis is carried out relying on data over the period 1997-2002, compiled from financial and ownership structure reports firms in Brazil are required to file to the stock market regulator. The main findings are the following: (1) high voting rights by the largest ultimate shareholder are negatively associated with firms' returns on assets, vindicating the thesis of minority shareholders' expropriation by controlling shareholders; (2) the presence of either pyramids or non-voting right shares has a significant negative impact on the largest firms' performance; and (3) among the largest corporations, those whose largest ultimate shareholder is a foreign investor tend to yield higher returns on assets than those controlled by families while pyramid ownership structures render them systematically under-performing. These results are in accordance with the literature that associates large voting power, pyramidal schemes, non-voting right shares, and weak disclosure with expropriation of outsider investors.
Author: Alqatan, Ahmad Publisher: IGI Global ISBN: 1799848531 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 425
Book Description
After the global financial crisis, the topic of corporate governance has been gaining momentum in accounting and finance literature since it may influence firm and bank management in many countries. Corporate Governance and Its Implications on Accounting and Finance provides emerging research exploring the implications of a good corporate governance system after global financial crises. Corporate governance mechanisms may include board and audit committee characteristics, ownership structure, and internal and external auditing. This book is devoted to all topics dealing with corporate governance including corporate governance characteristics, board diversity, CSR, big data governance, bitcoin governance, IT governance, and governance disclosure, and is ideally designed for executives, BODs, financial analysts, government officials, researchers, policymakers, academicians, and students.
Author: Hoang N. Pham Publisher: Routledge ISBN: 1000540332 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 132
Book Description
The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance has been studied extensively in corporate finance and corporate governance literature. Nevertheless, the mediation (path) analysis to examine the issue can be adopted as a new approach to explain why and how ownership structure is related to firm performance and vice versa. This approach calls for full recognition of the roles of agency costs and corporate risk-taking as essential mediating variables in the bi-directional and mediated relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Based on the agency theory, corporate risk management theory and accounting for the dynamic endogeneity in the ownership–performance relationship, this book develops two-mediator mediation models, including recursive and non-recursive mediation models, to investigate the ownership structure–firm performance relationship. It is demonstrated that agency costs and corporate risk-taking are the ‘missing links’ in the ownership structure–firm performance relationship. Hence, this book brings into attention the mediation and dynamic approach to this issue and enhances the knowledge of the mechanisms for improving firm’s financial performance. This book will be of interest to corporate finance, management and economics researchers and policy makers. Post-graduate research students in corporate governance and corporate finance will also find this book beneficial to the application of econometrics into multi-dimensional and complex issues of the firm, including ownership structure, agency problems, corporate risk management and financial performance.
Author: Malla Praveen Bhasa Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
This paper attempts to review literature on corporate governance on the ownership structure from a firm performance perspective. The dominant paradigm of corporate governance is based on the argument of Berle and Means (1932) that separation of ownership and control affects the reported level of income of firms, either positively or negatively. Subsequent studies have taken off from this concept of separation of ownership and control or in what is otherwise more famously known as 'conflict of interests' theory. Seven major arguments that have emerged within the context of 'conflict of interests' theory are explained in this paper. These arguments are basically considered to have emerged as an explanation to discuss the motivations that govern the managers and owners running the corporations. The uniqueness of the paper is in the way the literature is organized. As alluded earlier, corporate governance within the conflict of interests framework is subject to behavioral motivations of those who run the corporations. The profoundness of conflict of interests lies in where the locus of control is - with the managers, the owners, the institutional investors or with the markets. Hence, the literature has been classified under a few major headings to explain the importance of 'locus of control' and its impacts on firm's performance. Finally, some concluding remarks are offered in the summary.
Author: Katinka Wölfer Publisher: Europäische Hochschulschriften / European University Studies / Publications Universitaires Européennes ISBN: 9783631667156 Category : Corporations Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
The book illustrates that the impact of ownership on firm value depends not only on the concentration of ownership but also on the identity of blockholders. Large shareholders can use their power to influence corporate performance. However, owners are no homogenous group and have different motivations and abilities.
Author: Abdella Kormie Dinga Publisher: ISBN: Category : Corporate governance Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
The research study comprises of two preceding Chapters, three main empirical Parts, and CONCLUSION. The first Chapter, Introduction, presents the overall research objectives and questions of the study based on the existing agency perspectives regarding the issues of control and governance conflicts in modern corporations. The second Chapter, Review of Theoretical Frameworks, presents a brief account of similarities and differences between the existing theoretical frameworks relevant to the control of corporations. The review identified that the agency theory provides powerful testable models and tools that can be used in the investigation of the agency conflicts and the possible solutions that mitigate the governance problems. The three empirical Chapters follow mainly the deductive research approach of making statistical inferences using a sample of major UK listed firms in the FTSE All Share Index for the period 2003-2007. Chapter Three deals with the analysis of the state and trends or evolution of corporate ownership and control structure and some board structures of the UK listed firms. The Chapter has been instrumental in preparing the raw materials of ownership and control structure variables that are used in the succeeding two chapters. Chapter Four deals with the analysis of the relationship between ownership structure and performance using aggregate stake of all identifiable blockholders? categories and all external blockholders in the agency perspective. Chapter Five presents analysis of the relationship among ownership, control structures and firm performance using the structural equations framework in the control dominance-contestability perspective. Finally, the Thesis closes with a Conclusion. In summary, the Theses of this empirical research study suggest the followings. Firstly, there is the prevalence of multiple significant blockholders in the modern listed firms even when share ownership is dispersed. Secondly, in the presence of multiple significant blockholders in the firm, there is a likelihood that the second-type agency conflicts between large shareholders and minority shareholders exists, and that might be the dominant force that determines the possible control configuration even in listed firms with dispersed ownership. Thirdly and finally, the traditional one-equation modelling and their estimations in the methodology of looking into the relationship of separate share ownership categories or accounting for few of the categories might not precisely identify (1) the blockholders? (control forces?) incentives and ability of exerting control over the modern corporations, (2) the problem of endogeneity that might arise in the relationships, and (3) the way significant multiple blockholders interact and share control of the firms. Hence, the use of structural equations modelling and control dominance-contestability perspectives, in which the roles of blockholders structure control forces, internal and external governance mechanisms, and the problems of endogeneity are accounted for might be appropriate to reveal the control configuration of modern listed firms with multiple large blockholders.
Author: Dante Aldrighi
Author: Dante Aldrighi
Author: Alqatan, Ahmad
Author: Hoang N. Pham
Author: D. Pyper
Author: Malla Praveen Bhasa
Author: Eva M. Meyerson
Author: derek c. jones, panu kalmi and niels mygind
Author: Katinka Wölfer
Author: Khaldoun Abd Allh Mahmoud Alwshah
Author: Abdella Kormie Dinga