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Author: Darrell Duffie Publisher: ISBN: Category : Bank failures Languages : en Pages : 46
Book Description
I explain the key failure mechanics of large dealer banks, and some policy implications. This is not a review of the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Systemic risk is considered only in passing. Both the financial crisis and the systemic importance of large dealer banks are nevertheless obvious and important motivations.
Author: Darrell Duffie Publisher: ISBN: Category : Bank failures Languages : en Pages : 46
Book Description
I explain the key failure mechanics of large dealer banks, and some policy implications. This is not a review of the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Systemic risk is considered only in passing. Both the financial crisis and the systemic importance of large dealer banks are nevertheless obvious and important motivations.
Author: Darrell Duffie Publisher: Princeton University Press ISBN: 1400836999 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 108
Book Description
A leading finance expert explains how and why big banks fail—and what can be done to prevent it Dealer banks—that is, large banks that deal in securities and derivatives, such as J. P. Morgan and Goldman Sachs—are of a size and complexity that sharply distinguish them from typical commercial banks. When they fail, as we saw in the global financial crisis, they pose significant risks to our financial system and the world economy. How Big Banks Fail and What to Do about It examines how these banks collapse and how we can prevent the need to bail them out. In sharp, clinical detail, Darrell Duffie walks readers step-by-step through the mechanics of large-bank failures. He identifies where the cracks first appear when a dealer bank is weakened by severe trading losses, and demonstrates how the bank's relationships with its customers and business partners abruptly change when its solvency is threatened. As others seek to reduce their exposure to the dealer bank, the bank is forced to signal its strength by using up its slim stock of remaining liquid capital. Duffie shows how the key mechanisms in a dealer bank's collapse—such as Lehman Brothers' failure in 2008—derive from special institutional frameworks and regulations that influence the flight of short-term secured creditors, hedge-fund clients, derivatives counterparties, and most devastatingly, the loss of clearing and settlement services. How Big Banks Fail and What to Do about It reveals why today's regulatory and institutional frameworks for mitigating large-bank failures don't address the special risks to our financial system that are posed by dealer banks, and outlines the improvements in regulations and market institutions that are needed to address these systemic risks.
Author: Jefferson Duarte Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 44
Book Description
We empirically test for the presence of two types of financial contagion across large broker-dealers and dealer banks during the crisis of 2007-2009: the type based on the idea that market illiquidity mediates the spread of distress from one dealer to others, or, “liquidity contagion”, and the type based on the idea that one dealer's distress directly undermines the franchise value of others, or, “franchise value contagion”. We test for the two types of contagion against the null hypothesis that correlation in dealer-distress during the crisis was only due to an observable common shock to the real estate assets that triggered the crisis. We find evidence that prior to the Federal Reserve and Treasury market interventions in the Fall of 2008, both types of contagion were present. Franchise-value contagion, however, dominates, accounting for 95% of all contagion. Furthermore, unlike liquidity contagion which disappears after the interventions are in place, franchise-value contagion remains.
Author: Adam Kirk Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 27
Book Description
The failure and near-collapse of some of the largest dealer banks on Wall Street in 2008 highlighted the profound complexity of the industry. Dealer banks are financial intermediaries that make markets for many securities and derivatives. Like standard banks, funding for a loan made by a dealer bank may come from the bank's own equity or from external sources, such as depositors or creditors. Unlike standard banks, however, dealer banks rely heavily upon collateralized borrowing and lending, which give rise to “internal” sources of financing. This article provides a descriptive and analytical perspective of dealer banks and their sources of financing, both internal and external. The authors conclude that “internal” sources of financing, relative to external sources of financing, yield high levels of efficiency in normal times, but can experience significant and abrupt reductions in stressful times. Their results suggest that accounting netting for collateralized transactions may not reflect a true netting of economic exposures, and that a prudent risk management framework should acknowledge the risks inherent in collateralized finance.
Author: Mr.Stijn Claessens Publisher: International Monetary Fund ISBN: 1475583583 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 37
Book Description
This note outlines the basic economics of the shadow banking system, highlights (systemic) risks related to it, and suggests implications for measurement and regulatory approaches.
Author: Gary B. Gorton Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0199742111 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 232
Book Description
Originally written for a conference of the Federal Reserve, Gary Gorton's "The Panic of 2007" garnered enormous attention and is considered by many to be the most convincing take on the recent economic meltdown. Now, in Slapped by the Invisible Hand, Gorton builds upon this seminal work, explaining how the securitized-banking system, the nexus of financial markets and instruments unknown to most people, stands at the heart of the financial crisis. Gorton shows that the Panic of 2007 was not so different from the Panics of 1907 or of 1893, except that, in 2007, most people had never heard of the markets that were involved, didn't know how they worked, or what their purposes were. Terms like subprime mortgage, asset-backed commercial paper conduit, structured investment vehicle, credit derivative, securitization, or repo market were meaningless. In this superb volume, Gorton makes all of this crystal clear. He shows that the securitized banking system is, in fact, a real banking system, allowing institutional investors and firms to make enormous, short-term deposits. But as any banking system, it was vulnerable to a panic. Indeed the events starting in August 2007 can best be understood not as a retail panic involving individuals, but as a wholesale panic involving institutions, where large financial firms "ran" on other financial firms, making the system insolvent. An authority on banking panics, Gorton is the ideal person to explain the financial calamity of 2007. Indeed, as the crisis unfolded, he was working inside an institution that played a central role in the collapse. Thus, this book presents the unparalleled and invaluable perspective of a top scholar who was also a key insider.
Author: Perry Mehrling Publisher: Princeton University Press ISBN: 1400836263 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 189
Book Description
How the U.S. Federal Reserve began actively intervening in markets Walter Bagehot's Lombard Street, published in 1873 in the wake of a devastating London bank collapse, explained in clear and straightforward terms why central banks must serve as the lender of last resort to ensure liquidity in a faltering credit system. Bagehot's book set down the principles that helped define the role of modern central banks, particularly in times of crisis—but the recent global financial meltdown has posed unforeseen challenges. The New Lombard Street lays out the innovative principles needed to address the instability of today's markets and to rebuild our financial system. Revealing how we arrived at the current crisis, Perry Mehrling traces the evolution of ideas and institutions in the American banking system since the establishment of the Federal Reserve in 1913. He explains how the Fed took classic central banking wisdom from Britain and Europe and adapted it to America's unique and considerably more volatile financial conditions. Mehrling demonstrates how the Fed increasingly found itself serving as the dealer of last resort to ensure the liquidity of securities markets—most dramatically amid the recent financial crisis. Now, as fallout from the crisis forces the Fed to adapt in unprecedented ways, new principles are needed to guide it. In The New Lombard Street, Mehrling persuasively argues for a return to the classic central bankers' "money view," which looks to the money market to assess risk and restore faith in our financial system.
Author: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Publisher: ISBN: 9780966180817 Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
Crisis and Response: An FDIC History, 2008¿2013 reviews the experience of the FDIC during a period in which the agency was confronted with two interconnected and overlapping crises¿first, the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, and second, a banking crisis that began in 2008 and continued until 2013. The history examines the FDIC¿s response, contributes to an understanding of what occurred, and shares lessons from the agency¿s experience.
Author: Robert Pasley Publisher: Routledge ISBN: 1351531786 Category : Social Science Languages : en Pages : 318
Book Description
In the early 1990s, the First National Bank of Keystone in West Virginia began buying and securitizing subprime mortgages from all over the country, and quickly grew from a tiny bank with just $100 million in assets to over $1.1 billion. For three years, it was listed as the most profitable large community bank in the country. It was all a fraud. All of the securitization deals the bank entered into lost money. To hide that fact, bank insiders started cooking the books, and concealing that they were also embezzling millions of dollars from the bank. This was all hidden from the bank's attorneys and auditors, federal bank examiners, and even the board of directors of the bank. To keep the examiners at bay, the bank insiders did everything possible to avoid giving them access to documents they were entitled to see, documents they knew would sink their scheme. The head of the bank even went so far as to bury four large truckloads of documents in a ditch on her ranch. Robert S. Pasley explores the failure of the First National Bank of Keystone, the intrigue involved, and the lessons that could have been learned?and still can be learned?about how banks operate, how federal banking regulators supervise financial institutions, how agencies interact with one another, and how such failures can be avoided in the future.
Author: George G. Kaufman Publisher: Elsevier ISBN: 9780762310807 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 464
Book Description
Contains papers which consider the basic role of market discipline, how it may be applied to banking and more broadly to large financial institutions of various types.
Author: Darrell Duffie
Author: Darrell Duffie
Author: Darrell Duffie
Author: Jefferson Duarte
Author: Adam Kirk
Author: Mr.Stijn Claessens
Author: Gary B. Gorton
Author: Perry Mehrling
Author: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Author: Robert Pasley
Author: George G. Kaufman