The Entrapment Defense PDF Download

Author: Paul Marcus
Publisher: MICHIE
ISBN:
Category : Defense (Criminal procedure)
Languages : en
Pages : 824

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Book Description

Author: Michael T. Callahan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Defense (Criminal procedure)
Languages : en
Pages : 16

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Book Description

Author: John Rubin
Publisher: Unc School of Government
ISBN: 9781560113881
Category : Defense (Criminal procedure)
Languages : en
Pages : 103

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Book Description
This book addresses the main issues in cases involving entrapment claims in North Carolina. It focuses on North Carolina law but examines federal decisions and decisions of other states for additional guidance. It discusses the substantive rules of entrapment and related offenses, procedural and evidentiary issues that may arise at trial, and burdens of proof for the prosecution and defendant. Included is a list of related books and articles from other sources.

Author: Michael T. Callahan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Defense (Criminal procedure)
Languages : en
Pages : 13

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Book Description

Author: John Michael Callahan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Due process of law
Languages : en
Pages : 8

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Book Description

Author: Elmer A. Gates
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Entrapment (Criminal law)
Languages : en
Pages : 52

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Book Description

Author: Richard H. McAdams
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
The entrapment defense is the primary legal regulation of undercover operations. Though courts and commentators say that the state should not punish an undercover defendant who does not offend outside such operations, no existing theory fully justifies this principle or the defense (without calling into question basic commitments of American criminal law): (1) Under retributive theory, the entrapped are blameworthy, given that a defendant who succumbs to the same temptation from a private party is blameworthy. (2) Fairness theories fail to justify the defense, given that existing law refuses to recognize unfairness in particular distributions of criminal temptations or in selective law enforcement. (3) Existing institutional theories fail to explain the precise political danger of entrusting officials with the power of undercover operations, given that targets can refuse criminal opportunities. (4) Among other problems, existing economic theories rest on a untenable dichotomy between "true" offenders who commit crimes outside of undercover operations and "false" offenders who don't. The paper reconstructs the latter two theories, overcoming existing weaknesses to fully justify the defense. The institutional theory rests on the high degree of fortuity to an individual's legal compliance, the state manipulation of which creates a serious risk of political abuse. The economic theory arises from the need to correct a principal-agent problem that motivates police to favor unproductive tactics yielding high numbers of low value arrests (even if the resulting offenders are not false). These theories reveal that the normative consensus is misguided; the defense should not be conceived as a way of protecting individual defendants who do not offend outside undercover operations. The two rationales point to the desirability of tailoring a specific entrapment defense to each crime, but the paper also describes the best unitary defense.

Author: Paul Marcus
Publisher: MICHIE
ISBN: 9780874738339
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 62

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Author: Paul Marcus
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Due process of law
Languages : en
Pages : 16

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Book Description

Author: Michael DeFeo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Defense (Criminal procedure)
Languages : en
Pages : 168

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Book Description