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Author: Tracy Liu Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 45
Book Description
This paper empirically studies a decentralized dynamic peer-to-peer matching market. We use data from a leading ride-sharing platform in China to estimate a continuous-time dynamic model of search and match between drivers and passengers. We assess the efficiency of the decentralized market by how much centralized algorithms may improve welfare. We find that a centralized algorithm can increase the number of matches by making matches less frequently and matching agents more assortatively.
Author: Tracy Liu Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 45
Book Description
This paper empirically studies a decentralized dynamic peer-to-peer matching market. We use data from a leading ride-sharing platform in China to estimate a continuous-time dynamic model of search and match between drivers and passengers. We assess the efficiency of the decentralized market by how much centralized algorithms may improve welfare. We find that a centralized algorithm can increase the number of matches by making matches less frequently and matching agents more assortatively.
Author: Publisher: Elsevier ISBN: 0323988881 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 784
Book Description
Handbook of Industrial Organization Volume 4 highlights new advances in the field, with this new volume presenting interesting chapters. Each chapter is written by an international board of authors. Part of the renowned Handbooks in Economics series Chapters are contributed by some of the leading experts in their fields A source, reference and teaching supplement for industrial organizations or industrial economists
Author: Radoslav S Raykov Publisher: ISBN: Category : Capital market Languages : en Pages : 36
Book Description
"Many decentralized markets are able to attain a stable outcome despite the absence of acentral authority. A stable matching, however, need not be efficient if preferences are weak. This raises the question whether a decentralized market with weak preferences can attain Pareto efficiency in the absence of a central matchmaker. I show that when agent tastes are independent, the random stable match in a large-enough market is asymptotically Pareto efficient even with weak preferences. In fact, even moderate-sized markets can attain good efficiency levels. The average fraction of agents who can Pareto improve is below 10% in a market of size n = 79 when one side of the market has weak preferences; when both sides have weak preferences, the inefficiency falls below 10% for n> 158. This implies that approximate Pareto efficiency is attainable in a decentralized market even in the absence of a central matchmaker"--Abstract, p. ii.
Author: Marius Gramb Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
We study congestion problems in decentralized, two-sided matching markets. The main focus is on the impact of market thickness on these congestion problems. We find that it is often not optimal to make an offer to the best observed agent when the likelihood of acceptance is very low. We derive the optimal offering strategies for firms depending on market thickness and analyze who benefits when the market becomes thicker. We also investigate which market participants would benefit from a centralized market with assortative matching.
Author: Marina Agranov Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
We experimentally study decentralized one-to-one matching markets with transfers. We vary the information available to participants, complete or incomplete, and the surplus structure, supermodular or submodular. Several insights emerge. First, while markets often culminate in efficient matchings, stability is more elusive, reflecting the difficulty of arranging attendant transfers. Second, incomplete information and submodularity present hurdles to efficiency and especially stability; their combination drastically diminishes stability's likelihood. Third, matchings form "from the top down" in complete-information supermodular markets, but exhibit many more and less-obviously ordered offers otherwise. Last, participants' market positions matter far more than their dynamic bargaining styles for outcomes.
Author: Yasuhiro Shirata Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper examines stability and efficiency of the Walrasian equilibrium outcome in a decentralized two-sided networked market, where any pair of a buyer and a seller must be connected by a link to engage in trading. In this networked market, buyers and sellers first form a network and then they trade goods. We find that if side-payment contracts contingent on links are available and link cost is low, there exists a pairwise Nash stable network supporting the Walrasian equilibrium outcome. In the pairwise Nash stable network, sellers over-invest in links. Thanks to this inefficient over-investment, a level of price competition among buyers is sufficiently high so that the Walrasian price is stable.
Author: Tracy Liu
Author: Tracy Liu
Author: Maria Joana Dantas Vaz Pais
Author: 
Author: Radoslav S Raykov
Author: James W. Boudreau
Author: Marius Gramb
Author: Marina Agranov
Author: Yasuhiro Shirata
Author: Alfred Galichon
Author: Jinpeng Ma