Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 35
Book Description
In order to manage its Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program effectively, the U.S. Army needs reliable information about the effects of SRBs on reenlistment rates at the Military Occupational Speciality (MOS) level. Until recently, research has not addressed the reenlistment decision, bias due to population heterogeneity, and interaction between compensation policy and retention. This research examines these fundamental issues and suggests techniques for their application at the MOS level. It highlights the importance of (1) understanding institutional details of compensation policy, including the role of SRBs; (2) defining random error terms in the empirical analyses; and (3) using longitudinal research data.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 78
Book Description
A logit model was applied to estimate the effect of selective reenlistment bonuses (SRBs) on the retention rates of Army Soldiers. The model was estimated separately by occupational group and by first (zone A), second (zone B) and third term (zone C) reenlistment decisions. An "annualized cost of leaving" (ACOL) variable was constructed to estimate the net financial returns to reenlisting in the Army compared to leaving for the civilian sector. The model was estimated using data on actual reenlistments from the period FYl99O tlirough FY2OOO. The effects of SRBs on reenlistments at Zones A, B, and C were estimated at three levels of occupational aggregation-all Army, CMF, and MOS. After out-of-sample testing, we re-specified and re-estimated the model. In general, the results for Zone A at all levels of occupational aggregation indicate that reenlistment bonuses have a positive and statistically significant effect on Zone A reenlistments. The magnitude of the effect varied by occupation, but a one-level increase in SRB at Zone A typically increases the reenlistment rate by three to seven percentage points, depending upon the occupation. The results for Zone B are also solid at both the CMF and MOS levels. Results for Zone C, where reenlistment rates are typically very high, were reasonably solid but not as good as the Zone A and B results. We were unable to obtain positive, statistically significant ACOL parameter estimates for a small number of occupation groups. Statistically significant effects for demographic control variables and labor market conditions were also obtained.
Author: Jeremy Arkes Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 47
Book Description
Researchers have, for decades, been attempting to estimate the effects of Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRBs) on the probability of reenlistment for the military services. SRBs are targeted to specific military occupations for which reenlistment rates are lower (or expected to be lower) than what is needed. This article first identifies four primary sources of biases affecting these models: reverse causality from supply shifts (a negative bias), the endogeneity of the decision point causing coded SRBs to be higher for reenlisters than leavers (a positive bias), measurement error (a likely negative bias), and excess supply preventing the full effect of an SRB change to materialize (a positive or negative bias). The report proceeds to develop a model that attempts to address the first two biases. With U.S. Navy data from FY2001-FY2008, I examine the extent to which the biases are affecting the estimated SRB effects. I demonstrate that fixing the problem of the endogeneity of the decision point results in large reductions in the estimated SRB effects, as expected. There is also evidence consistent with measurement error causing a negative bias, also as expected. And, the evidence is mixed as to how the fix for reverse causality affects the estimates.
Author: John H. Enns Publisher: ISBN: Category : Bounties, Military Languages : en Pages : 84
Book Description
An extension of the methodology and data used in an earlier Rand study (reported in R-1502-ARPA) which developed and estimated a statistical model of reenlistment supply for the Army, Navy, and Air Force for a single year, FY 1971. The present study analyzes four years of reenlistment data (FY 1971-FY 1974) using two regression models to generate an estimate of a four-year average bonus response. It is concluded that (1) selective reenlistment bonuses have the desired positive effect on first-term reenlistment rates; (2) the bonus elasticity under current bonus policy is likely to about 2.0; (3) differences in bonus response between service branches are not large enough to require separate bonus management policies for each service; (4) the different bonus multiples each produce about the same per dollar effect; and (5) there is no evidence of differences between broadly defined occupational groups in bonus response. (Author).
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Military discharge Languages : en Pages : 44
Book Description
"In this study the effects of Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRBs) on Army reenlistments over the 1990-2000 period at Zones A, B, and C at three levels of occupational aggregation - all Army, career management field (CMF), and military occupational specialty (MOS) - were re-estimated to explicitly control for the drawdown in the mid-1990s as well as labor market conditions. In general, the results for Zone A at all levels of occupational aggregation indicate that reenlistment bonuses have a positive and statistically significant effect on Zone A reenlistments. A one-level increase in SRB at Zone A typically increases the reenlistment rate by 3 to 7 percentage points, depending upon the occupation. The results for Zone B are also solid at both the CMF and MOS levels. Results for Zone C, where reenlistment rates are typically very high, were reasonably solid but not quite as good as the Zone A and B results. The results provide the Army with estimates of reenlistment responsiveness to bonus changes for all three zones for all MOS. We also estimated the effect of SRBs on the reenlisting Soldier's choice of length of reenlistment. Increases in the SRB level not only increase reenlistments, but also increase the length of reenlistment. The length of reenlistment effects were incorporated into the SRB Management System to better predict program costs and the additional staff years of contracted service provided by the bonus program."--Stinet.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Decision making Languages : en Pages : 53
Book Description
The Selective Reenlistment Bonus program is a powerful force management tool designed to increase retention in undermanned skills. This thesis analyzes many of the theoretical applications of alternative compensation methods, specifically auctions, signaling theory, and experimental economics; and explains how an economic experiment might be applied within the Department of Defense. This experimental approach presents service members a certain scenario which mirrors a choice they might face when posed with a retention decision. Economic experiments are an inexpensive way to make more informed personnel policy decisions. This thesis postulates that economic experiments are an excellent means to capture the human element in the decision-making process. Additionally, economic experiments provide another form of simulation to "wind-tunnel" test policy changes before implementing them across the services. The sample experiment discussed in this thesis combines the theoretical principles of both auction and signaling theory and provides a means to analyze concrete data for which the Department of Defense could use before actually conducting an auction of selective reenlistment bonuses.
Author: Beth J. Asch Publisher: RAND Corporation ISBN: 9780833049667 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
"This monograph provides an empirical analysis of the enlistment, attrition, and reenlistment effects of bonuses, applying statistical models that control for such other factors as recruiting resources, in the case of enlistment and deployments in the case of reenlistment, and demographics. Enlistment and attrition models are estimated for the Army and our reenlistment model approach is twofold. The Army has greatly increased its use of reenlistment bonuses since FY 2004, and we begin by providing an in-depth history of the many changes in its reenlistment bonus program during this decade. We follow this with two independent analyses of the effect of bonuses on Army reenlistment. As we show, the results from the models are consistent, lending credence to the robustness of the estimates. One approach is extended to the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, to obtain estimates of the effect of bonuses on reenlistment for all services. We also estimate an enlistment model for the Navy. The estimated models are used to address questions about the cost-effectiveness of bonuses and their effects in offsetting other factors that might adversely affect recruiting and retention, such as changes in the civilian economy and frequent deployments"--P. iii.
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Author: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences
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Author: Jeremy Arkes
Author: John H. Enns
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Author: Beth J. Asch