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Author: Afshad J. Irani Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 28
Book Description
This study examines the effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) on the relevance of company-sponsored conference calls. Measuring relevance by a conference call's ability to improve analyst forecast accuracy and consensus, I find larger improvements in both variables during the period surrounding conference calls in the post-FD era versus the pre-FD era. These findings imply that in the post-FD era relatively more about a firm's upcoming earnings becomes known during conference calls, consistent with FD's success in eliminating selective disclosure.
Author: Afshad J. Irani Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 28
Book Description
This study examines the effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) on the relevance of company-sponsored conference calls. Measuring relevance by a conference call's ability to improve analyst forecast accuracy and consensus, I find larger improvements in both variables during the period surrounding conference calls in the post-FD era versus the pre-FD era. These findings imply that in the post-FD era relatively more about a firm's upcoming earnings becomes known during conference calls, consistent with FD's success in eliminating selective disclosure.
Author: Shyam V. Sunder Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 53
Book Description
This study provides evidence on the impact of the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg. FD) on information asymmetry. Reg. FD prohibits firms from disclosing quot;materialquot; information selectively to analysts and institutional investors. The regulation has triggered a debate on mainly three issues: (a) whether use of nonpublic channels for selective disclosure (such as, analyst conference calls) results in information asymmetry among investors, (b) whether prohibiting nonpublic communications is contributing to leveling of information asymmetry among investors, and (c) whether Reg. FD has caused firms to reduce the quality of their public voluntary disclosures. The present study addresses all of these issues. I use a sample of earnings conference calls and classify firms as either, (1) quot;openquot; firms, which always held conference calls accessible to all investors; or (2) quot;restrictedquot; firms, which held conference calls for only analysts and institutional investors in the pre- Reg. FD period. I find that restricted firms faced higher information asymmetry compared to open firms in the pre- Reg. FD period. However, in the post- Reg. FD period the differences in information asymmetry between open and restricted firms do not persist. Taken together it suggests that selective disclosure was causing greater information asymmetry among investors and Reg. FD has contributed to the leveling of such information asymmetry. In additional tests, I do not find evidence that Reg. FD has caused firms to reduce quality of information conveyed in conference calls. The study adds to our understanding of how voluntary and mandated disclosure impact information asymmetry among investors.
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services. Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises Publisher: ISBN: Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 182
Author: Brian J. Bushee Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 43
Book Description
This paper investigates the effect of regulation that mandates open access to information on managers' disclosure choices and investors' reactions to disclosures. The recently passed Regulation FD (Reg FD) requires firms to make material disclosures broadly available. Using a sample of firms that previously restricted access to conference calls and a sample of firms that voluntarily allowed unlimited access to their calls in the pre-Reg FD period, we examine the effect of the new rule on managers' decisions regarding the timing, use, and information content of calls, as well as the effect on investors' trading behavior during the call. Our results indicate that Reg FD had a significant negative impact on managers' decisions to continue hosting conference calls and on their decisions regarding the optimal time to hold the call. However, contrary to the concerns of many critics, the magnitudes of these changes are not large. We do not find evidence that Reg FD decreased the amount of information disclosed during the call period, contrary to the concerns of Reg FD opponents. Finally, we find evidence that the new rule increased price volatility for firms that previously restricted access to their calls (relative to firms that previously held open calls) and that the amount of individual investor trading increased following the rule change. Overall, our results suggest that Reg FD impacted trading during the conference call window for firms most affected by the new regulation.
Author: William J. Mayew Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
This paper considers the potential for public information disclosures to complement the existing private information of financial analysts. In such a setting, analysts allowed to participate during earnings conference calls by asking questions receive public signals that can facilitate the generation of new and valuable private information for the asking analyst. Realizing these public signals are valuable for the asking analyst, managers can use their discretion to discriminate among analysts by granting more participation to more favorable analysts. I use post Regulation FD conference call transcripts to document that the probability of an analyst asking a question during an earnings conference call is increasing in the favorableness of the analyst's outstanding stock recommendation. I also find that downgrades are associated with decreases in access to management during the conference call relative to other recommendation change activity. Analyst prestige moderates these effects. Favorable and prestigious analysts have higher participation probabilities than favorable and unprestigous analysts. Further, downgrades result in participation decreases only for unprestigous analysts. These findings are consistent with practitioner and regulatory concerns that managers discriminate among analysts by allowing more management access to more favorable analysts.
Author: Cheng F. Lee Publisher: Center for PBBEFR & Airiti Press ISBN: 9866286622 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
Advances in Quantitative Analysis of Finance and Accounting (New Series) is an annual publication designed to disseminate developments in the quantitative analysis of finance and accounting. The publication is a forum for statistical and quantitative analyses of issues in finance and accounting as well as applications of quantitative methods to problems in financial management, financial accounting, and business management. The objective is to promote interaction between academic research in finance and accounting and applied research in the financial community and the accounting profession.
Author: Armando R. Gomes Publisher: ISBN: Category : Capital costs Languages : en Pages : 76
Book Description
We empirically investigate the effects of the adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure ( Reg FD') by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in October 2000. This rule was intended to stop the practice of selective disclosure,' in which companies give material information only to a few analysts and institutional investors prior to disclosing it publicly. We find that the adoption of Reg FD caused a significant reallocation of information-producing resources, resulting in a welfare loss for small firms, which now face a higher cost of capital. The loss of the selective disclosure' channel for information flows could not be compensated for via other information transmission channels. This effect was more pronounced for firms communicating complex information and, consistent with the investor recognition hypothesis, for those losing analyst coverage. Moreover, we find no significant relationship of the different responses with litigation risks and agency costs. Our results suggest that Reg FD had unintended consequences and that information' in financial markets may be more complicated than current finance theory admits.
Author: Afshad J. Irani
Author: Afshad J. Irani
Author: Shyam V. Sunder
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services. Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises
Author: Brian J. Bushee
Author: William J. Mayew
Author: Cheng F. Lee
Author: Lei Shi
Author: Armando R. Gomes
Author: Guler Aras
Author: Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts