Author: Yaser YoussifPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
The Effect of Corporate Governance on Management's Real Earnings Management Decisions
Author: Yaser YoussifExecutive Compensation and Earnings Management Under Moral Hazard
Author: Bo SunPublisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1437930980
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 33
Book Description
Analyzes executive compensation in a setting where managers may take a costly action to manipulate corporate performance, and whether managers do so is stochastic. Examines how the opportunity to manipulate affects the optimal pay contract, and establishes necessary and sufficient conditions under which earnings management occurs. The author¿s model provides a set of implications on the role earnings management plays in driving the time-series and cross-sectional variation of executive compensation. In addition, the model's predictions regarding the changes of earnings management and executive pay in response to corporate governance legislation are consistent with empirical observations. Charts and tables.
Real Earnings Management and Corporate Governance
Author: Cristhian MelladoPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 31
Book Description
This paper analyses the impact of both, the ownership structure features and the institutional settings, on real-based activities manipulation based on a sample of listed companies in the underexplored Latin American market for the period of 2004-2016. Using panel data based-GMM system estimator technique, the results confirm some previous literature that the monitoring role of the majority owner is crucial in mitigating the opportunistic behavior of managers in engaging in real activities manipulation that reduces the informative content of financial statements. However, the analysis of the insider ownership revealed the negative impact on transparency that entrenched managers cause. In this case, we observed that as insider ownership increases, managers engage more actively in real earnings management. Other corporate governance tools like the institutional ownership and the quality of the regulatory system demonstrated to be effective mechanisms in reducing the real activities manipulation. Taken together, our results mean that in institutional settings characterized by weak protection of the investors and possible conflicts of interests among shareholders, the oversight by majority shareholder in conjunction with the legal and regulatory framework becomes an important governance mechanism that reduces the managerial discretionary decision making concerning the quality of reported earnings.
The Impact of Corporate Governance and Real Earnings Management on Financial Statement Fraud in Malaysia
Author: Noorul AzwinPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 21
Book Description
This study examines the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and financial statement fraud in Malaysia. This study also investigates the likelihood of Malaysian financial statement fraud firms' involvement in real earnings management. Although a number of firms submitted fraudulent financial statement each year to deceive financial statement users in decision making, limited studies have been undertaken on financial statement fraud in emerging countries. This study will fill the research gap by examining the relationships between financial statement fraud, corporate governance and real earnings management. In the end, this study will make a significant contribution for regulators to make policies and analysts to identify early warning signals with regard to fraudulent financial reporting practices in Malaysia. Univariate and multiple regression models will be employed to test the hypothesized relation between firms convicted in financial statement fraud and corporate governance practices. This study will incorporate ethnic attribute on the board and audit committee. This study will also investigate changes towards corporate governance practice after fraud detection. To the best of the researcher's knowledge, no research has investigated pre and post corporate governance practices in related to financial statement fraud at the same time. Abnormal real earnings management will be used as the proxy for earnings management. Prior literatures have focused on accounting accruals to proxy earnings management. Nevertheless, past literatures documented that it is more favourable for managers to manipulate monetary values that involve with the timing of actual business transactions. It is also posited that real earnings management occurs before manipulation of accruals. As a result, the decision to use real earnings management in identifying early warning signal of financial statement fraud is appropriate. Potential findings of this study are the effective corporate governance mechanisms able to reduce fraudulent financial reporting. Furthermore, earnings quality is expected to decline towards the conviction of financial statement fraud.
Earnings Management and Corporate Governance in Family-Controlled Companies
Author: Sasson Bar-YosefPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Corporate governance literature advances the idea that certain aspects of board of directors' structure improve monitoring of managerial decisions. Among these is the managers' decision to manage earnings. Prior studies have shown that earnings management, in widely-held public companies, is less prevalent when there is a high level of board independence. However, there is less evidence on the effectiveness of board independence on earnings management in family-controlled companies. This issue is interesting in particular as such companies are susceptible to various types of agency concerns. It is the purpose of this study to shed light on the earnings management issue in family-controlled companies, characterized by a potentially low board independence environment. In this study, board independence is estimated by two parameters (i) proportion of independent directors on board, and (ii) lack of CEO/Board Chairman duality function, with special attention paid to the case where the CEO is a member of the controlling-family. Our empirical results provide evidence that, indeed, the impact of board independence on earnings management is weaker in family-controlled companies. The same effects are also found for the cases where the CEO is a member of the controlling-family, even though she is not also the Board Chairman.
Earnings Management. The Influence of Real and Accrual-Based Earnings Management on Earnings Quality
Author: Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3964875953
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 81
Book Description
Master's Thesis from the year 2019 in the subject Business economics - Accounting and Taxes, University of Duisburg-Essen, course: Master Thesis, language: English, abstract: This paper delves into various theories and approaches, aiming to define and differentiate earnings management from related concepts such as fraud, expectation management, and impression management. It explores the goals and incentives driving earnings management, including maximizing or minimizing earnings, beating targets, and smoothing. At the onset of the new millennium, corporate scandals rocked the business world, eroding trust in management, boards of directors, and the accounting profession. In response, regulations and policies aimed at enhancing corporate governance and financial reporting were swiftly implemented. The credibility, clarity, and consistency of financial reporting practices play a pivotal role in enabling investors to make informed decisions. Accurate and fair financial performance representations, as opposed to inflated and misleading figures, are essential for market players, including shareholders and creditors. Investors rely on audited financial reports to guide their investment decisions, underscoring the critical importance of accuracy and reliability in publicly available financial disclosures. Auditors, by reducing the risk of material misstatement, ensure the integrity of the information disclosed in a company's financial statements. Management, with the goal of achieving promised targets and ensuring the company's existence, may engage in earnings management as a strategic contribution to corporate policy. Financial reporting serves as a means to distinguish well-performing companies from their counterparts, facilitating efficient resource allocation and empowering stakeholders to make effective decisions. The disclosed earnings results significantly impact a firm's overall business activities and management decisions, particularly in satisfying analysts' expectations, which can influence equity value. While accounting standards play a role, the quality of financial statements is more influenced by company-specific and institutional factors shaping managers' incentives. These factors lead to financial reporting practices being viewed as the outcome of a cost-benefit assessment.
Introduction to Earnings Management
Author: Malek El DiriPublisher: Springer
ISBN: 3319626868
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 120
Book Description
This book provides researchers and scholars with a comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of earnings management theory and literature. While it raises new questions for future research, the book can be also helpful to other parties who rely on financial reporting in making decisions like regulators, policy makers, shareholders, investors, and gatekeepers e.g., auditors and analysts. The book summarizes the existing literature and provides insight into new areas of research such as the differences between earnings management, fraud, earnings quality, impression management, and expectation management; the trade-off between earnings management activities; the special measures of earnings management; and the classification of earnings management motives based on a comprehensive theoretical framework.
Earnings Management
Author: Joshua RonenPublisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 0387257713
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 587
Book Description
This book is a study of earnings management, aimed at scholars and professionals in accounting, finance, economics, and law. The authors address research questions including: Why are earnings so important that firms feel compelled to manipulate them? What set of circumstances will induce earnings management? How will the interaction among management, boards of directors, investors, employees, suppliers, customers and regulators affect earnings management? How to design empirical research addressing earnings management? What are the limitations and strengths of current empirical models?
Perspectives on Corporate Governance
Author: F. Scott KieffPublisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139490559
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
The events that began with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and Adelphia and continued into the financial crisis of 2008 teach us an important lesson: corporate governance matters. Although it is widely acknowledged that good corporate governance is a linchpin of good corporate performance, how can one improve corporate governance and its impact on corporate and overall economic performance. This book offers a diverse and forward-looking set of approaches from experts, covering the major areas of corporate governance reform and analyzing the full range of issues and concerns. Written to be both theoretically rigorous and grounded in the real world, the book is well suited for practicing lawyers, managers, lawmakers, and analysts, as well as academics conducting research or teaching a wide range of courses in law schools, business schools, and economics departments.
Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management
Author: Qiang ChengPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 72
Book Description
We examine whether internal governance affects the extent of real earnings management in U.S. corporations. Internal governance refers to the process through which key subordinate executives provide checks and balances in the organization and affect corporate decisions. Using the number of years to retirement to capture key subordinate executives' horizon incentives and using their compensation relative to CEO compensation to capture their influence within the firm, we find that the extent of real earnings management decreases with key subordinate executives' horizon and influence. The results are robust to alternative measures of internal governance and to various approaches used to address potential endogeneity including a difference-in-differences approach. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the effect of internal governance is stronger for firms with more complex operations where key subordinate executives' contribution is higher, is enhanced when CEOs are less powerful, is weaker when the capital markets benefit of meeting or beating earnings benchmarks is higher, and is stronger in the post-SOX period. This paper contributes to the literature by examining how internal governance affects the extent of real earnings management and by shedding light on how the members of the management team work together in shaping financial reporting quality.