Author: Mark Bagnoli
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 18
Book Description
Durable Goods Monopoly with Entry of New Consumers
Durable Goods Monopoly with Uninformed Consumers
Author: Joseph Emmett Harrington
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 34
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 34
Book Description
Pacman Refutes the Coase Conjecture
Author: Mark Bagnoli
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 18
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 18
Book Description
Durable Goods Monopoly with Uninformed Consumers
Author: Joseph Emmett Harrington
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Durable goods, Consumer
Languages : en
Pages : 34
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Durable goods, Consumer
Languages : en
Pages : 34
Book Description
Durable Goods Monopoly with a Finite But Uncertain Number of Consumers
Author: David W. Majerus
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Durable goods, Consumer
Languages : en
Pages : 15
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Durable goods, Consumer
Languages : en
Pages : 15
Book Description
Strategic buyers in a durable goods monopoly
Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly
Author: Stanford University. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 61
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 61
Book Description
Durable Goods Monopoly and Futures Markets
Author: Ronald W. Anderson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Durable goods, Consumer
Languages : en
Pages : 44
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Durable goods, Consumer
Languages : en
Pages : 44
Book Description
Differentiated Durable Goods Monopoly
Author: Francesco Nava
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Durable goods, Consumer
Languages : en
Pages : 46
Book Description
The paper analyzes a durable good monopoly problem in which multiple varieties can be produced and sold. A robust Coase conjecture establishes that the market eventually clears, that profits exceed static optimal market-clearing profits, and that profits converge to this lower bound in all stationary equilibria when prices can be revised instantaneously. In contrast to the one-variety case though, equilibrium pricing is neither efficient nor minimal (that is, equal to the maximum between marginal cost an the minimal value). Conclusions apply even when products can be scrapped albeit at possibly smaller mark-ups. If so, a novel motive for selling high cost products naturally emerges. Moreover, with positive marginal costs, cross-subsidization arises as a result of equilibrium pricing. The online appendix delivers insights on product design.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Durable goods, Consumer
Languages : en
Pages : 46
Book Description
The paper analyzes a durable good monopoly problem in which multiple varieties can be produced and sold. A robust Coase conjecture establishes that the market eventually clears, that profits exceed static optimal market-clearing profits, and that profits converge to this lower bound in all stationary equilibria when prices can be revised instantaneously. In contrast to the one-variety case though, equilibrium pricing is neither efficient nor minimal (that is, equal to the maximum between marginal cost an the minimal value). Conclusions apply even when products can be scrapped albeit at possibly smaller mark-ups. If so, a novel motive for selling high cost products naturally emerges. Moreover, with positive marginal costs, cross-subsidization arises as a result of equilibrium pricing. The online appendix delivers insights on product design.