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Author: Panagiotis Fotis Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing ISBN: 1509900896 Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 509
Book Description
The objective of this book is twofold. First, it presents the economics of minority shareholdings, under both merger and antitrust law. In particular, economic analysis provides both an overall assessment of minority shareholdings in the context of concentrations, and Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the examination of the link between non-controlling minority shareholdings, merger control and antitrust law. Second, the book also provides a legal assessment and an analysis of selected case law. According to settled European case law, minority shareholdings are analysed not only under Regulation 139/2004, but also under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Nevertheless, according to current enforcement practice at European and international levels, several national competition authorities have adopted different approaches. The million dollar question is whether the existing regulatory framework is sufficient to cover all possible cases. In summary, the book will be a useful tool for students, practitioners, researchers, economic and legal experts and competition authorities. It provides a comprehensive survey of the subject, which has been missing until now and answers many questions that have been raised in the literature in the last decades.
Author: Panagiotis Fotis Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing ISBN: 1509900896 Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 509
Book Description
The objective of this book is twofold. First, it presents the economics of minority shareholdings, under both merger and antitrust law. In particular, economic analysis provides both an overall assessment of minority shareholdings in the context of concentrations, and Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the examination of the link between non-controlling minority shareholdings, merger control and antitrust law. Second, the book also provides a legal assessment and an analysis of selected case law. According to settled European case law, minority shareholdings are analysed not only under Regulation 139/2004, but also under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Nevertheless, according to current enforcement practice at European and international levels, several national competition authorities have adopted different approaches. The million dollar question is whether the existing regulatory framework is sufficient to cover all possible cases. In summary, the book will be a useful tool for students, practitioners, researchers, economic and legal experts and competition authorities. It provides a comprehensive survey of the subject, which has been missing until now and answers many questions that have been raised in the literature in the last decades.
Author: Frank P. Maier-Rigaud Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 14
Book Description
Following the standard (acquisition of control) merger logic, merger control regimes have typically treated horizontal minority shareholdings as a matter of coordinated effects. As in a standard horizontal merger case, the transaction implies full control of the target firm and joint profit maximization post-merger, it is easy to see the acquisition of minority shares being analysed as a matter of information flows and influencing conduct. In that sense, competitive effects of shareholdings are not systematically different from a standard merger, although the effects of the shareholding are attenuated by the more limited degree of influence exerted by the minority shareholder. This has led to a focus on the acquired rights of minority shareholders in an effort to gauge the actual influence that such a shareholder may exert on the company. In other words, the focus has been on coordinated effects resulting from the influence of the minority shareholder to the detriment of a non-coordinated effects analysis. This article focusses on the non-coordinated effects of minority shareholdings in oligopolistic markets. It is demonstrated that minority shareholdings even when they fall below the usual thresholds can lead to a significant impediment of effective competition (SIEC) on a purely non-coordinated basis. This is particularly likely in a market with differentiated products, when a firm partially acquires shareholdings in its closest competitor and when the next best alternative products are only weak substitutes. While share thresholds may be a decent rough proxy for coordinated effects to the extent that they convey different degrees of direct influence, it is shown that such thresholds are much less meaningful in the context of non-coordinated effects as general market conditions and in particular closeness of competition, which is independent of the magnitude of the shares, becomes much more important.
Author: Daniel P. O'Brien Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 45
Book Description
Recent empirical research purports to show that common ownership by institutional investors harms competition even when all financial holdings are minority interests. This research has received a great deal of attention, leading to both calls for and actual changes in antitrust policy. This paper examines the research on this subject to date and finds that its conclusions regarding the effects of minority shareholdings on competition are not well established. Without prejudging what more rigorous empirical work might show, we conclude that researchers and policy authorities are getting well ahead of themselves in drawing policy conclusions from the research to date. The theory of partial ownership does not yield a specific relationship between price and the MHHI. In addition, the key explanatory variable in the emerging research - the MHHI - is an endogenous measure of concentration that depends on both common ownership and market shares. Factors other than common ownership affect both price and the MHHI, so the relationship between price and the MHHI need not reflect the relationship between price and common ownership. Thus, regressions of price on the MHHI are likely to show a relationship even if common ownership has no actual causal effect on price. The instrumental variable approaches employed in this literature are not sufficient to remedy this issue. We explain these points with reference to the economic theory of partial ownership and suggest avenues for further research.
Author: Panagiotis Fotis Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing ISBN: 1509900888 Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 336
Book Description
The objective of this book is twofold. First, it presents the economics of minority shareholdings, under both merger and antitrust law. In particular, economic analysis provides both an overall assessment of minority shareholdings in the context of concentrations, and Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the examination of the link between non-controlling minority shareholdings, merger control and antitrust law. Second, the book also provides a legal assessment and an analysis of selected case law. According to settled European case law, minority shareholdings are analysed not only under Regulation 139/2004, but also under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Nevertheless, according to current enforcement practice at European and international levels, several national competition authorities have adopted different approaches. The million dollar question is whether the existing regulatory framework is sufficient to cover all possible cases. In summary, the book will be a useful tool for students, practitioners, researchers, economic and legal experts and competition authorities. It provides a comprehensive survey of the subject, which has been missing until now and answers many questions that have been raised in the literature in the last decades.
Author: Mario Cistaro Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 32
Book Description
Recent studies have linked the concentration of common shareholding in competing corporations among the same group of minority shareholders with competition concerns. This paper will examine whether the correlation between the structure of corporate ownership captured by common shareholding and the structure of the market(s) in which the companies operate might determine anticompetitive effects and be considered illegal under antitrust laws. To this regard, after describing the main theoretical and empirical foundations for the competition concerns associated to common shareholding, I will analyze the arguments raised both in favor and against the enforcement of the antitrust laws and, in particular as regards the latter, the lack of evidence on the causal mechanism through which common shareholdings determine anticompetitive effects. While in the US, the Clayton Act seem to ban merger and stock acquisition that are likely to have anticompetitive effects regardless of whether the mechanism for those effects is known, a different conclusion should be reached with regard to the European Union antitrust laws. Under the EU merger regulation competitive effects of common shareholdings are captured if, and only, they confer control, being control the causal mechanism preidentified by the EU law to link competitive effects to a transaction that modifies the structure of the market.
Author: António Gomes Publisher: Leya ISBN: 9724041689 Category : Law Languages : pt-BR Pages : 22
Book Description
António Gomes ? Minority Shareholders and Merger Control in Portugal Este artigo faz parte da Revista de Concorrência e Regulação - Ano 1 - N.o 1 - Janeiro-Março 2010 Consulte a página da revista em http://cr.almedina.net Esta revista está também disponível como parte de uma Assinatura.
Author: Gian Diego Pini Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 151
Book Description
Minority share acquisitions between competitors have been mistakenly considered of concern only in case they result in a change of control.First the economic theory, closely followed by courts and doctrine, explained and demonstrated that even the acquisition of non-controlling shareholdings may distort competition and requires a close scrutiny by competition authorities.This article analyzes the impact of minority shareholdings on the incentives of rival firms and ascertains whether the authorities are provided with adequate tools to investigate and address the potential anticompetitive effects.The results of the economic theory are the starting point to assess whether the legal treatment of minority shareholdings under the EU and US antitrust systems is appropriate and adequate.
Author: Samuel de Haas Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
Non-controlling minority shareholdings in rivals (NCMS) lower the sus- tainability of collusion under a wide variety of circumstances. Nevertheless, NCMS are sometimes deemed to facilitate collusion, in particular if the level of NCMS is exogenous. The present paper endogenizes firms' choice of NCMS and answers the question: Would colluding firms find it rational to acquire NCMS in rivals? The study of the acquisition reveals that firms have an in- centive to acquire NCMS which are accompanied by a shift from collusive to competitive behaviour.
Author: Rebecca Ellen De Simone Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
I find no robust relationship between the cross-holdings of minority shareholders and the competition incentives embedded in the compensation of top firm executives. Rather, I find that firms with shareholders that hold relatively more cross-holdings in direct competitor firms are more likely to adopt performance pay that expressly rewards out-performing peers. This chapter contributes to the current policy debate on how to regulate diversified investors by casting doubt on the anti-competitive effects of these holdings, at least through the mechanism of executive compensation, the main way that firms align shareholder and executive incentives.
Author: Panagiotis Fotis
Author: Panagiotis Fotis
Author: Frank P. Maier-Rigaud
Author: Daniel P. O'Brien
Author: Panagiotis Fotis
Author: Mario Cistaro
Author: António Gomes
Author: Shirley Meadowcroft
Author: Gian Diego Pini
Author: Samuel de Haas
Author: Rebecca Ellen De Simone