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Author: Yuanzhu Lu Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
We analyze the capacity choice of firms under demand uncertainty in a mixed duopoly market consisting of one private firm and one public firm. We define a two-stage game where firms choose capacity in the first stage without knowing which state of Nature is going to be realized, and output in the second stage knowing which state is realized. We address the question of maintaining over and under capacity in the equilibrium as a strategic device; and show that both symmetric and asymmetric outcomes can be realized.
Author: Yuanzhu Lu Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
We analyze the capacity choice of firms under demand uncertainty in a mixed duopoly market consisting of one private firm and one public firm. We define a two-stage game where firms choose capacity in the first stage without knowing which state of Nature is going to be realized, and output in the second stage knowing which state is realized. We address the question of maintaining over and under capacity in the equilibrium as a strategic device; and show that both symmetric and asymmetric outcomes can be realized.
Author: Yuanzhu Lu Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
We consider a game of endogenous timing of sequential choice of capacity and quantity with observable delay in a mixed duopoly and a private duopoly. In mixed duopoly, we find that a simultaneous play at the capacity stage or at the quantity stage can never be supported as subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE); whereas a simultaneous play at each stage turns out to be the unique SPNE in a private duopoly. In mixed duopoly there is multiplicity of equilibria and all SPNEs require sequentiality at the capacity as well as quantity stage.
Author: Juan Carlos Barcena Ruiz Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
An endogenous order of moves is analyzed in a mixed duopoly where firms first strategically choose their capacity levels and then compete at price level. In equilibrium, firms are shown to set prices simultaneously while capacities are chosen sequentially. This result is in contrast to the assumption of simultaneous order of moves for capacities choice made by Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (Economics Bulletin, Vol. 12 (2007), pp. 1-7) in a mixed duopoly. Besides, we find that there are two equilibria: in one of them the public firm is the leader in capacities and, in the other, the follower.
Author: Management Association, Information Resources Publisher: IGI Global ISBN: 1522525955 Category : Mathematics Languages : en Pages : 515
Book Description
Developments in the use of game theory have impacted multiple fields and created opportunities for new applications. With the ubiquity of these developments, there is an increase in the overall utilization of this approach. Game Theory: Breakthroughs in Research and Practice contains a compendium of the latest academic material on the usage, strategies, and applications for implementing game theory across a variety of industries and fields. Including innovative studies on economics, military strategy, and political science, this multi-volume book is an ideal source for professionals, practitioners, graduate students, academics, and researchers interested in the applications of game theory.
Author: Jan A. Mieghen Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 13
Book Description
This article shows that under uncertainty, a firm's capacity investment decision crucially depends on the mode of market approach (price-setting vs. quantity-setting) and competition that follows investment. We model an industry in which firms have to make capacity investment decisions when demand is uncertain. First each firm must decide on its capacity investment level. Then, industry capacity levels are observed and firms engage in quantity or pricecompetition. Finally, demand and revenues are realized. We begin by considering a monopoly and show that the monopoly price given an uncertain demand curve can be higher or lower than the reference price when the demand curve is known at the start. Moreover price and firm value may fall or rise with increasing uncertainty. We compare these results with a setting where a monopolist sets quantityinstead of price. The resulting investment fundamentally differs from the price-setting investment. Moreover, theinvestment strategy under quantity-setting is significantly less sensitive to variability and more profitable than under price-setting. Under quantity competition, these results extend to a duopoly, oligopoly and perfect competition. In addition, entry dettering investments are possible yet more difficult as variability increases and credible only at low investment costs. Under price competition, no pure equilibria exist if there is demand uncertain
Author: Yuanzhu Lu
Author: Yuanzhu Lu
Author: Morten Hviid
Author: 
Author: Bashyam T. C. A.
Author: Yuanzhu Lu
Author: Juan Carlos Barcena Ruiz
Author: Management Association, Information Resources
Author: Fernando Pacheco
Author: Jan A. Mieghen
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