The 2007 Iran Nuclear Estimate Revisited PDF Download

Author: Robert Jervis
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1000588203
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 186

View

Book Description
The 2007 Iran Nuclear Estimate Revisited: Anatomy of a Controversy explores both the contents and reaction to the U.S. intelligence community’s (IC) National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that Iran had suspended its clandestine program to develop nuclear weapons. The volume offers insights into the art of intelligence analysis and the issues encountered when estimates run counter to policy or partisan preferences. In November 2007, the U.S. National Intelligence Council issued an NIE entitled Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities that contained a surprising finding. Analysts concluded that Iran had probably suspended its clandestine effort to develop a nuclear weapon. This assessment created a political firestorm, despite the fact that analysts went to great lengths to assess the accuracy of their sources and to offer nuanced judgments about the complex issues surrounding Iran’s civilian and military nuclear programs. In this edited volume, former intelligence professionals and leading intelligence scholars describe and assess the factors that shaped this NIE and the course of events that sparked an international controversy. These chapters make a valuable contribution to the understanding of the state of the art when it comes to intelligence analysis and the challenges that emerge when intelligence estimates address significant foreign and defence policy issues and on-going political debates. One of the chapters in this volume was originally published in the book titled, Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies, edited by Robert Dover, Michael Goodman, Claudia Hillebrand. Other chapters were originally published in the journals Intelligence and National Security and Comparative Strategy.

Author: Robert Jervis
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1000588181
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 171

View

Book Description
The 2007 Iran Nuclear Estimate Revisited: Anatomy of a Controversy explores both the contents and reaction to the U.S. intelligence community’s (IC) National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that Iran had suspended its clandestine program to develop nuclear weapons. The volume offers insights into the art of intelligence analysis and the issues encountered when estimates run counter to policy or partisan preferences. In November 2007, the U.S. National Intelligence Council issued an NIE entitled Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities that contained a surprising finding. Analysts concluded that Iran had probably suspended its clandestine effort to develop a nuclear weapon. This assessment created a political firestorm, despite the fact that analysts went to great lengths to assess the accuracy of their sources and to offer nuanced judgments about the complex issues surrounding Iran’s civilian and military nuclear programs. In this edited volume, former intelligence professionals and leading intelligence scholars describe and assess the factors that shaped this NIE and the course of events that sparked an international controversy. These chapters make a valuable contribution to the understanding of the state of the art when it comes to intelligence analysis and the challenges that emerge when intelligence estimates address significant foreign and defence policy issues and on-going political debates. One of the chapters in this volume was originally published in the book titled, Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies, edited by Robert Dover, Michael Goodman, Claudia Hillebrand. Other chapters were originally published in the journals Intelligence and National Security and Comparative Strategy.

Author: James J. Wirtz
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
ISBN: 1003837204
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 166

View

Book Description
This volume describes how technological and geo-political trends are rapidly transforming maritime affairs. A mix of original and previously published material, this volume describes how the 21st-century great power competition is changing the face of naval operations in general, and U.S. Navy operations in the Western Pacific in particular. The rise of an assertive China and its new anti-access and area-denial capabilities threaten the aircraft carrier-based maritime dominance of the U.S. Navy. Military and political trends in the Western Pacific and beyond suggest that the world is encountering a pivotal moment when existing weapons, tactics, and operations might be rendered obsolete by techno-strategic change. This volume considers these developments from three perspectives by describing: (1) the techno-strategic setting; (2) the institutional constraints that impede the ability of the U.S. Navy to respond to these changes; and (3) a new approach to naval force planning and strategy to cope with these developments. The volume culminates in a discussion of sophisticated strategies and operational concepts that position the U.S. Navy and its maritime allies and partners to prevail in today’s techno-strategic churn. This book will be of much interest to students of naval policy, strategic studies, Asia-Pacific politics, and International Relations.

Author: Ofira Seliktar
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 1498569765
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 285

View

Book Description
This book analyzes the process of evaluating Iran’s nuclear project and the efforts to roll it back, resulting in the 2015 nuclear agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA). Despite its aura of scientific exactitude, nuclear intelligence is complex and susceptible to methodological disagreements and political bias at the international oversight level—the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—and within the countries involved in the rollback project – Israel and the United States. To highlight both the technological problems of assessing compliance and the politicization, each chapter in the book uses a real-time comparison of the nuclear developments in Iran, and the perception of Israel and the United States. This methodology yielded some significant results. Essentially, two camps had formed in each country; those who were pushing for an agreement with Iran and those who opposed it. The Israeli intelligence agencies – the Mossad and the Military Intelligence – as well as the highly secretive Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) which advised them considered the program to be weak and slow moving. The right-wing government of Benjamin Netanyahu suggested that Iran was steps away from the “point of no return,” making it an existential threat to Israel. A virtually identical split emerged in Washington. While the intelligence community and the advising scientists from the National Nuclear Laboratories, considered Iran progress to be relatively modest, the Republicans and the Israel lobby - the Jewish organizations and the Christian Zionists— warned of the imminent danger of a nuclear Iran. With the Obama administration pushing for the JCPOA, a fierce debate took place in Congress. The Israeli intelligence and military chiefs led by the Mossad chief Meir Dagan, which had previously blocked Netanyahu from a preemptive action, quietly supported the agreement. In Washington, the Israel lobby, and the Republicans, helped by Netanyahu, mounted an all-out effort to defeat the deal in Congress. The pro-deal coalition fought back by mobilizing the scientific community, military and intelligence officials, the business lobby, and grassroots Democrats. The JCPOA represents the first successful effort of peaceful counterproliferation. At the same, excessive politicization has clouded its legitimacy and cast doubt about its future.

Author: Richard K. Betts
Publisher: Columbia University Press
ISBN: 023113889X
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 266

View

Book Description
Combining study with experience, Richard K. Betts draws on three decades of work within the U.S. intelligence community to illuminate the paradoxes and problems that frustrate the intelligence process. Unlike America's efforts to improve its defenses against natural disasters, strengthening its strategic assessment capabilities means outwitting crafty enemies who operate beyond U.S. borders. It also requires looking within to the organizational and political dynamics of collecting information and determining its implications for policy. Betts outlines key strategies for better intelligence gathering and assessment. He describes how fixing one malfunction can create another; in what ways expertise can be both a vital tool and a source of error and misjudgment; the pitfalls of always striving for accuracy in intelligence, which in some cases can render it worthless; the danger, though unavoidable, of "politicizing" intelligence; and the issue of secrecy--when it is excessive, when it is insufficient, and how limiting privacy can in fact protect civil liberties. Grounding his arguments in extensive theory and policy analysis, Betts takes a comprehensive and realistic look at the convergence of knowledge and power in facing the intelligence challenges of the twenty-first century.

Author: Daniel Joyner
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190635711
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 281

View

Book Description
This book provides an international legal analysis of the most important questions regarding Iran's nuclear program since 2002. Setting these legal questions in their historical and diplomatic context, this book aims to clarify how the relevant sources of international law - including primarily the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and IAEA treaty law - should be properly applied in the context of the Iran case. It provides an instructional case study of the application of these sources of international law, the lessons which can be applied to inform both the on-going legal and diplomatic dynamics surrounding the Iran nuclear dispute itself, as well as similar future cases. Some questions raised regard the watershed diplomatic accord reached between Iran and Western states in July, 2015, known as the Joint Comprehensive Program of Action. The answers will be of interests to diplomats and academics, as well as to anyone who is interested in understanding international law's application to this sensitive dispute in international relations.

Author: Benoît Pelopidas
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
ISBN: 1003836178
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 203

View

Book Description
This book offers the first non-official history of French nuclear policies which goes beyond the divide between nuclear weapons and nuclear energy policies. It addresses the sizing of France’s nuclear forces, technological assistance to countries with nuclear weapons programs, uranium prospection, nuclear testing, its health effects and protests against it, as well as plans to prevent and manage accidents in nuclear power plants. It is based on new questions and new sources from France and abroad. The chapters in this volume show how independent and interdisciplinary scholarship free from conflicts of interests can uniquely advance our understanding of nuclear history and politics. This is the case because it does not treat the categories and judgments of official discourse as neutral starting points of the analysis. This volume is based on untapped primary sources from France, the UK, the US, India, South Africa and Iran, on a new assessment of the health consequences of French nuclear testing in Polynesia thanks to a modern atmospheric particle transport code coupled with historical weather data, open-source information about radioactive debris (“mushroom”) clouds, as well as data on the composition and particle sizes of the fallout; and on new survey data about French knowledge of and attitudes towards nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. They show notably that the first generation of French nuclear forces lacked technical credibility despite reliance on outside help. Several French officials knew this, as did France's allies and adversaries. Moreover, French strategic collaborations associated to nuclear programs extended to India and South Africa; nuclear safety regulations changed fundamentally after the Cold War, and approximately 110,000 people, i.e. 90% of the French Polynesian population in the 1970s, could have received doses that would qualify them for compensation according to French law. The volume will be of interest to scholars and students of history, politics, international relations, military history, war studies, conflict and global governance. Most of the chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue in Cold War History. A few chapters were first published in the Nonproliferation Review, Diplomacy & Statecraft and Science & Global Security.

Author: Wyn Bowen
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1137273097
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 209

View

Book Description
In this book, the authors explore the controversial Iranian nuclear programme through the conceptual lens of nuclear hedging. In 2002, revelations regarding undeclared nuclear facilities thrust Iran’s nuclear activities under the spotlight and prompted concerns that Tehran was pursuing nuclear weapons. Iran has always denied nuclear weapons aspirations, yet it cannot be disputed that the Islamic Republic has gone well beyond what is required for a civil nuclear programme based on energy production and scientific research. What, then, is the nature and significance of Iran's nuclear behaviour? Does it form part of a coherent strategy? What can Iran's actions in the nuclear field tell us about Tehran's intentions? And what does the Iranian case teach us about proliferation behaviour more generally? This book addresses these questions by exploring the nature of nuclear hedging and how this approach might be identified, before applying this logic to the Iranian case. It provides fresh insights into the inherently opaque area of nuclear proliferation and a more nuanced interpretation of the Iranian nuclear challenge.

Author: Joachim Krause
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 113658546X
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 242

View

Book Description
This book examines the strategic implications of Iran’s nuclear programme, providing an inventory of the negotiations and a discussion of possible solutions to this pressing international security issue. The Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear programme has been the cause of one of the most extended international crises of the past decade. Multilateral institutions have been unable to resolve the issue, which has the potential to derail the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Recent failures of diplomatic offers for an extended Iran-EU cooperation and projected US arms sales to Iran’s neighbours suggest an imminent escalation of the issue, which has been simmering since first reports about Iranian nuclear fuel-enrichment activities emerged in 2002. Since then, the topic has been the subject of intense media coverage as well as academic and diplomatic debate. This volume brings together analysts and authors with diverse backgrounds, including international diplomats formerly involved in negotiations with Iranian officials. The various chapters bring together different perspectives and empirical analyses, and include detailed assessments of both US and European efforts in diplomatic relations with Iran, as well as of the domestic politics in Iran itself. This book will be of interest to students of Iranian politics, Middle Eastern politics, strategic studies, nuclear proliferation, international security, foreign policy and IR in general.

Author: David Albright
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781536845655
Category : National security
Languages : en
Pages : 312

View

Book Description
In 1989, South Africa made the momentous decision to abandon its nuclear weapons, making it the first and still the only country that has produced nuclear weapons and given them up. Over thirty years, the apartheid regime had created a remarkably sophisticated capability to build nuclear weapons-both the nuclear warhead and advanced military systems to deliver them. The program was born in secret and remained so until its end. The government initially sought to dismantle it in secret. It hoped to avoid any negative international consequences of possessing nuclear weapons. The apartheid government's strategy did not work, because too many intelligence agencies knew about South Africa's nuclear weapons. Faced with intense pressure, South Africa's President F.W. de Klerk reversed course and adopted a policy of transparency in 1993. However, he decided to hide many of its aspects. Nonetheless, most of the remaining secrets emerged over the ensuing 25 years. Revisiting South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program draws on previously secret information to provide the first comprehensive, technically-oriented look at South Africa's nuclear weapons program; how it grew, evolved, and ended. It also finds lessons for today's nuclear proliferation cases.