Task Force Stryker Network-Centric Operations in Afghanistan - Case Study of Real-World Application in War, Network Components, Echeloning Command Posts, and Tactical Decisionmaking PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Task Force Stryker Network-Centric Operations in Afghanistan - Case Study of Real-World Application in War, Network Components, Echeloning Command Posts, and Tactical Decisionmaking PDF full book. Access full book title Task Force Stryker Network-Centric Operations in Afghanistan - Case Study of Real-World Application in War, Network Components, Echeloning Command Posts, and Tactical Decisionmaking by U. S. Military. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: U. S. Military Publisher: ISBN: 9781549750038 Category : Languages : en Pages : 63
Book Description
This book presents a case study examining the real-world application of the network-centric warfare concept during combat operations in Afghanistan. Network-centric warfare "broadly describes the combination of strategies, emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures, and organizations that a fully or even partially networked force can employ to create a decisive Warfighting advantage." A great deal has been made of the asymmetric advantage of terrorists, insurgents, and guerrillas. In a networked environment with properly trained leaders, soldiers, and units, such advantages are fictional. Network-centric organizations are supposed to increase their combat power by doing a better job of synchronizing events and their consequences; achieving greater speed of command; and increasing lethality, survivability, and responsiveness of the formation. These capabilities can be a reality in today's operating environment. The main problem with network-centric operations is that there remains a great deal of skepticism among counterinsurgency pundits and others about the concept and the technology necessary to operate in such a fully networked environment. Task Force Stryker operations in Afghanistan (2009-2010) demonstrate a reality contrary to conventional wisdom. The reality is that network-centric operations are relevant and effective in the physical, information, cognitive, and social domains of warfare.3 Of course, these domains often merge, and it is important to order activities in a way that capitalizes on overlapping capability. For example, the attacks of enemy personnel and their subsequent detention by Afghan National Security Forces described in the vignettes in this paper are obviously in the physical domain. An intersection of domains, however, happens when the movement of forces and positioning of command posts in the physical domain enhances how the cognitive domain informs tactical decisionmaking. The combination of information technology (IT) and sensors creates an extraordinary level of situation awareness and understanding and is obviously in the information domain. However, technology alone is not enough; leaders must properly organize the technology in time and space, which occurs in the physical domain. Furthermore, people must be organized around the technology in ways to improve collaboration, which intersects with the social domain.
Author: U. S. Military Publisher: ISBN: 9781549750038 Category : Languages : en Pages : 63
Book Description
This book presents a case study examining the real-world application of the network-centric warfare concept during combat operations in Afghanistan. Network-centric warfare "broadly describes the combination of strategies, emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures, and organizations that a fully or even partially networked force can employ to create a decisive Warfighting advantage." A great deal has been made of the asymmetric advantage of terrorists, insurgents, and guerrillas. In a networked environment with properly trained leaders, soldiers, and units, such advantages are fictional. Network-centric organizations are supposed to increase their combat power by doing a better job of synchronizing events and their consequences; achieving greater speed of command; and increasing lethality, survivability, and responsiveness of the formation. These capabilities can be a reality in today's operating environment. The main problem with network-centric operations is that there remains a great deal of skepticism among counterinsurgency pundits and others about the concept and the technology necessary to operate in such a fully networked environment. Task Force Stryker operations in Afghanistan (2009-2010) demonstrate a reality contrary to conventional wisdom. The reality is that network-centric operations are relevant and effective in the physical, information, cognitive, and social domains of warfare.3 Of course, these domains often merge, and it is important to order activities in a way that capitalizes on overlapping capability. For example, the attacks of enemy personnel and their subsequent detention by Afghan National Security Forces described in the vignettes in this paper are obviously in the physical domain. An intersection of domains, however, happens when the movement of forces and positioning of command posts in the physical domain enhances how the cognitive domain informs tactical decisionmaking. The combination of information technology (IT) and sensors creates an extraordinary level of situation awareness and understanding and is obviously in the information domain. However, technology alone is not enough; leaders must properly organize the technology in time and space, which occurs in the physical domain. Furthermore, people must be organized around the technology in ways to improve collaboration, which intersects with the social domain.
Author: Harry Daniel Tunnell Publisher: ISBN: Category : Network-centric operations (Military science) Languages : en Pages : 17
Book Description
This case study examines the real-world application of the network-centric warfare concept during combat operations in Afghanistan. Network-centric warfare broadly describes the combination of strategies, emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures, and organizations that a fully or even partially networked force can employ to create a decisive Warfighting advantage. A great deal has been made of the asymmetric advantage of terrorists, insurgents, and guerrillas. In a networked environment with properly trained leaders, soldiers, and units, such advantages are fictional. Network-centric organizations are supposed to increase their combat power by doing a better job of synchronizing events and their consequences; achieving greater speed of command; and increasing lethality, survivability, and responsiveness of the formation. These capabilities can be a reality in today's operating environment. The main problem with network-centric operations is that there remains a great deal of skepticism among counterinsurgency pundits and others about the concept and the technology necessary to operate in such a fully networked environment.
Author: Publisher: Government Printing Office ISBN: 9780160873386 Category : Languages : en Pages : 82
Book Description
As the world enters a new millennium, the U.S. military simultaneously enters a new era in warfare -- an era in which warfare is affected by a changing strategic environment and rapid technological change. The United States and its multinational partners are experiencing a transition from the Industrial Age to the Information Age. Simultaneously, it is fully engaged in a global war on terrorism set in a new period of globalization. These changes, as well as the experiences gained during recent and ongoing military operations, have resulted in the current drive to transform the force with network-centric warfare (NCW) as the centerpiece of this effort. This document describes how the tenets and principles of NCW are providing the foundation for developing new warfighting concepts, organizations, and processes that will allow U.S. forces to maintain a competitive advantage over potential adversaries, now and in the future. In sum, the report provides an overview of the ongoing implementation of NCW in the Department of Defense (DoD). A brief description of NCW, including its origins, its central role in force transformation, its tenets and principles, and an implementation strategy, are provided in Chapter 1. An examination of NCW as an emerging theory of war, its relationship to the four domains of Information Age warfare, the growing evidence of its benefits, and the warfighting advantages it can provide are examined in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 focuses on network-centric operations (NCO), including the relationship of NCO to the overarching Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC), the NCO experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, the development of the NCO Conceptual Framework, and the conduct of NCO case studies. An overview of Joint and Service plans and initiatives to develop and implement network-centric capabilities and the growing investment in these capabilities by our allies and multinational partners are provided in Chapter 4.
Author: Gregory A. Goodwin Publisher: ISBN: Category : Computer simulation Languages : en Pages : 106
Book Description
Access to current, accurate battlefield information via the Army Battle Command System (ABCS), is supposed to improve decision making by leaders and commanders, but some research suggests that information systems may, paradoxically, have the opposite effect by overwhelming leaders with information or by emphasizing irrelevant information. There are currently no published reports examining the impact of ABCS systems on decision-making. This report is an effort to address this important research gap through an investigation of the ways the ABCS impacts decision-making by Army leaders at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). Observer/controllers (O/Cs) at JRTC reported that few units are fully trained to use their ABCS systems. Nevertheless, most units were able to leverage some system capabilities to accomplish mission objectives. The most common decision errors were the result of the availability heuristic (e.g., making a decision with incomplete information). Of the six decision errors examined, only two were reported to involve ABCS systems. O/Cs also indicated that when digital systems increased errors, it was due to improper use rather than the design of the system. Thus, the data suggest that these systems do not increase decision errors; however, their potential to reduce errors has not yet been fully realized by units training at JRTC.
Author: Donald P., Donald Wright, Ph. D. Publisher: CreateSpace ISBN: 9781494407155 Category : Languages : en Pages : 218
Book Description
For the US Army to succeed in the 21st Century, Soldiers of all ranks must understand and use Mission Command. Mission Command empowers leaders at all levels, allowing them to synchronize all warfighting functions and information systems to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative against a range of adversaries. This collection of historical vignettes seeks to sharpen our understanding of Mission Command philosophy and practice by providing examples from the past in which Mission Command principles played a decisive role. Some vignettes show junior officers following their commander's intent and exercising disciplined initiative in very chaotic combat operations. Others recount how field grade officers built cohesive teams that relied on mutual trust to achieve key operational objectives. Each historical account is complemented by an annotated explanation of how the six Mission Command principles shaped the action. For this reason, the collection is ideal for leader development in the Army school system as well as for unit and individual professional development. Mission Command places great responsibility on our Soldiers.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Command and control systems Languages : en Pages : 40
Book Description
Joint Vision 2020 is the conceptual template for how we will channel the vitality of our people and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting.
Author: U. S. Military
Author: U. S. Military
Author: Harry Daniel Tunnell
Author: 
Author: 
Author: 
Author: 
Author: Gregory A. Goodwin
Author: Dag Henriksen
Author: Donald P., Donald Wright, Ph. D.
Author: