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Author: U S Army Command and General Staff Coll Publisher: CreateSpace ISBN: 9781508902768 Category : Languages : en Pages : 64
Book Description
When the 24th Infantry Division deployed to Korea in July 1950 it experienced a series of defeats from 5-20 July in an attempt to delay the invading North Korean People's Army (NKPA). The division suffered devastating losses of men and equipment and was withdrawn from combat because it was no longer capable of effective combat operations. Historians blamed the appalling losses and demoralizing defeats of 5-20 July on poor training, poor equipment, and lazy, ill-disciplined soldiers of an occupation army. The operational approach and the operational art of the commanders and staffs of the Eight Army and the 24th Infantry Division was the real cause of this reckless waste of American lives. They failed to employ their forces in accordance with their training, experience, and readiness and that of the enemy. Additionally, the gains the 24th Infantry Division achieved in delaying the NKPA were not decisive. The subsequent successful defense of the Pusan Perimeter occurred despite, not because of the 24th ID's delaying operation. This monograph explores the reasons for the 24th Infantry Division's defeats between 5 and 20 July. Although Eighth Army was not at an optimal state of readiness, it was sufficiently equipped and ready to conduct fundamental operational and tactical tasks. In modern warfare, technology and numerical preponderance are not the primary determinant of results; force employment is the primary cause of victory or defeat. Lastly, this monograph examines the operational art of the 24th Infantry Division and shows the small delays achieved were not decisive. The primary and immediate cause of failure was poor force employment and operational art. The 24th Infantry Division should have been able to delay two reinforced NKPA Infantry Divisions without suffering the devastating losses that it did.
Author: U S Army Command and General Staff Coll Publisher: CreateSpace ISBN: 9781508902768 Category : Languages : en Pages : 64
Book Description
When the 24th Infantry Division deployed to Korea in July 1950 it experienced a series of defeats from 5-20 July in an attempt to delay the invading North Korean People's Army (NKPA). The division suffered devastating losses of men and equipment and was withdrawn from combat because it was no longer capable of effective combat operations. Historians blamed the appalling losses and demoralizing defeats of 5-20 July on poor training, poor equipment, and lazy, ill-disciplined soldiers of an occupation army. The operational approach and the operational art of the commanders and staffs of the Eight Army and the 24th Infantry Division was the real cause of this reckless waste of American lives. They failed to employ their forces in accordance with their training, experience, and readiness and that of the enemy. Additionally, the gains the 24th Infantry Division achieved in delaying the NKPA were not decisive. The subsequent successful defense of the Pusan Perimeter occurred despite, not because of the 24th ID's delaying operation. This monograph explores the reasons for the 24th Infantry Division's defeats between 5 and 20 July. Although Eighth Army was not at an optimal state of readiness, it was sufficiently equipped and ready to conduct fundamental operational and tactical tasks. In modern warfare, technology and numerical preponderance are not the primary determinant of results; force employment is the primary cause of victory or defeat. Lastly, this monograph examines the operational art of the 24th Infantry Division and shows the small delays achieved were not decisive. The primary and immediate cause of failure was poor force employment and operational art. The 24th Infantry Division should have been able to delay two reinforced NKPA Infantry Divisions without suffering the devastating losses that it did.
Author: Kyeore Lee Publisher: ISBN: Category : Korean War, 1950-1953 Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This thesis evaluates the 24th Infantry Division’s combat effectiveness during its first two months of combat during the Korean War, July-August 1950. The existing literature on the Division’s combat record in Korea point to poor individual training, low morale, and a lack of discipline as the causes for the Division’s disastrous defeats in key battles against the Korean People’s Army (KPA). This thesis critically examines these claims in light of documentary evidence and oral veteran accounts to argue that the existing literature’s diagnosis of poor training and morale are rooted in opinion instead of fact. The thesis re-evaluates the Division’s combat record in Korea using regimental and divisional war diaries to objectively measure its performance in its execution of contemporary doctrine, adaptation to the tactical situation, and displayed proficiency of arms. The thesis ultimately argues that the 24th Infantry Division performed adequately in combat, and that its defeat is attributable to failures in strategic and operational leadership.
Author: J. Garrett Publisher: ISBN: 9781521875957 Category : Languages : en Pages : 91
Book Description
"No more Task Force Smiths" - This catchphrase is used to express a desire to avoid the perceived mistakes that lead to the defeat of Task Force Smith during the opening days of the Korean War. It deployed and was decimated by the North Korean advance. The defeat has generally been blamed on poor training, poor leadership and poor equipment. The real cause for the failure, however, has been ignored.Task Force Smith was deployed to the Korean Theater without any concept of how and why it was to be employed. During the initial phase of the Korean War, the United States forces were repeatedly thrown into battle against the North Koreans without any real reflection, but under the illusion that it was better to do something than nothing. This book explores what happened to Task Force Smith and why. The lesson never learned is that the understanding of military science and the operational art, not technology, plays the greatest role in victory or defeat.
Author: Edwin Palmer Hoyt Publisher: ISBN: Category : Korean War, 1950-1953 Languages : en Pages : 328
Book Description
When the North Korean People's Army swept across the 38th parallel, they cut through South Korean and U.S. forces like a hot knife through butter--until they reached the port city of Pusan. There, U.S. forces dug in for a courageous last stand against the enemy--and triumphed in the face of overwhelming odds. Photographs.
Author: Richard Wiersema Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 61
Book Description
The purpose of this monograph is to inquire whether or not the traditional explanation of poor peacetime training and unit readiness is adequate to account for U.S. Army defeats during the first month of the Korean War. General histories of the war, such as those written by Roy Appleman, Clay Blair, and T.R. Fehrenbach, identify poor physical conditioning, lack of combat training, low strength and weak small unit leadership as prevalent in all U.S. Army units. The post-1945 drawdown is identified as the root cause of these shortcomings. The Army's equipment was "old and worn" and its soldiers were "undertrained, understrength, ill- equipped." This paper will focus on what happened to the regiments in two of the Eighth Army's three divisions. It will consider the performance of all three of the 24th Infantry Division's regiments between 5-20 July, or from Task Force Smith's first encounter north of Osan to the brutal stand at Taejon. It is this period in particular that historians have identified the materiel, personnel and training weaknesses as being critical, and have, by extrapolation, extended their importance to other units.
Author: Thomas E. Hanson Publisher: Texas A&M University Press ISBN: 1603443355 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 201
Book Description
"Historians and sliders have not been kind to either [General Douglas] MacArthur or the soldiers whom he placed in harm's way in the summer of 1950 ... This study seeks to redress the imbalance that exists between fact and interpretation. For too long historians and soldiers have roundly criticized Task Force Smith's performance, extrapolated from its fate a set of assumptions about what constitutes readiness, and then used those assumptions to condemn the entire Eighth Army. The reality is much more complex. A proper examination of the historical record reveals wide disparities in the readiness and combat effectiveness of the subordinate units of America's first forward-deployed Cold War field force ... This work will demonstrate how units achieved that readiness by means of case studies of four infantry regiments, one from each of the four infantry divisions that constituted the Eighth Army in 1950. It synthesizes contemporary training doctrine, training records generated by maneuver units, unit histories, reports of inspections by outside agencies, contemporary self-assessments, and the observations of veterans who served in Japan in the fifteen months before the outbreak of the Korean War. It challenges the long-standing reputation of the Eighth Army as flabby, dispirited, and weak"--Introduction.
Author: U S Army Command and General Staff Coll
Author: U S Army Command and General Staff Coll
Author: Kyeore Lee
Author: United States Forces, Korea
Author: J. Garrett
Author: Edwin Palmer Hoyt
Author: Steven J. Rauch
Author: William Glenn Robertson
Author: Richard Wiersema
Author: Thomas E. Hanson
Author: William J. Webb