Author: Delia IonaşcuPublisher:
ISBN: 9788086288475
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 39
Book Description
Strategic trade policy and mode of competition : symmetric versus asymmetric information
Author: Delia IonaşcuPublisher:
ISBN: 9788086288475
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 39
Book Description
Strategic Trade Policy and Mode of Competition
Author: Delia IonascuPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
In this paper, we analyze the following policy dilemma: strategic trade policy versus free trade when the domestic government is bound to intervene only after the domestic firm's strategic variable is chosen. This intervention allows the domestic firm to manipulate the domestic government and results in a socially inefficient choice of the strategic variable. However, commitment to free trade leads to forgoing the benefits from profit-shifting. Yet, from the social point of view, free trade may be optimal even under the assumption of symmetric information. Due to costly signaling, this result is reinforced in the case of asymmetric information.
Free Trade Versus Strategic Trade as a Choice Between Two 'second-best' Policies
Author: Delia IonascuPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Commercial policy
Languages : en
Pages : 52
Book Description
Strategic Trade Policies with Uncertainty about the Mode of Inter-firm Competition
Author: Giovanni MaggiFree Versus Strategic Trade as a Choice Between Two 'second-best' Policies
Author: Delia LonascuStrategic Trade Policy, Spillovers, and Uncertain Mode of Competition
Author: Krešimir ŽigićPublisher:
ISBN: 9788090232549
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 37
Book Description
Free Trade Vs. Strategic Trade
Author: Gene M. GrossmanPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Commercial policy
Languages : en
Pages : 46
Book Description
We investigate whether a welfare-maximizing government ought to pursue a program of" strategic trade intervention or instead commit itself to free trade when domestic firms will have an opportunity to manipulate the government's choice of the level of" intervention. Domestic firms may overinvest in physical and knowledge capital in a regime of" strategic intervention in order to influence the government's choice of subsidy. In the event commitment to free trade may be desirable even in settings where profit-shifting would be" possible. We analyze the desirability of such a commitment when the government is well" informed about firms' types and actions, and when it suffers from an informational disadvantage."
Strategic Trade Policy Under Asymmetric Information about Market Demand
Author: Frank SchuhmacherStrategic Trade Policy, Spillovers, and the Uncertain Mode of Competition
Author: Krešimir ŽigićPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
In this paper we discuss the incentives of a welfare maximizing government to implement strategic trade policy when there is, on the one hand, uncertainty about the relevant market information (like the type of competition, demand function, cost function, etc.), but, on the other hand, the environment of the contest between the firms is specific: there are two firms and the interaction among them is accompanied by technological spillovers from the domestic firm to the foreign firm. The two bench mark oligopoly models - Bertrand and Cournot - are assumed to be possible types of market competition. In order to analyse the problem of strategic policy under uncertainty, it is first necessary to work out in depth the optimal tariff policy in perfect information setup for both the Cournot and the Bertrand case. We argue, then, that the "informational" criticism of strategic trade policy is less relevant than was previously thought.
Strategic Trade Policies with Endogenous Mode of Competition
Author: Giovanni MaggiPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Commercial policy
Languages : en
Pages : 38
Book Description