Author: Mohammad Hossein Dehghani Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper studies technology adoption in a duopoly where the unbiased technological change improves production efficiency. Technological progress is exogenous and modeled as a jump process with a drift. There is always a Markov perfect equilibrium in which the firm with more efficient technology never preempts its rival. Also, a class of equilibria may exist that lead to a smaller industry surplus. In these equilibria either of the firms may preempt its rival in a set of technology efficiency values. The first investment does not necessarily happen at the boundary of this set due to the discrete nature of the technology progress. The set shrinks and eventually disappears when the difference between firms' efficiencies increases.
Author: Lars H. Sendstad Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 32
Book Description
Sequential investment opportunities or the presence of a rival typically hasten investment under risk neutrality. By contrast, greater price uncertainty or risk aversion increase the incentive to postpone investment in the absence of competition. We analyse how price and technological uncertainty, reflected in the random arrival of innovations, interact with attitudes towards risk to impact both the optimal technology adoption strategy and the optimal investment policy within each strategy, under a proprietary and a non-proprietary duopoly. Results indicate that technological uncertainty increases the follower's investment incentive and delays the entry of the non-proprietary leader, yet it does not affect the proprietary leader's optimal investment policy. Additionally, we show that technological uncertainty decreases the relative loss in the value of the leader due to the follower's entry, while the corresponding impact of risk aversion is ambiguous. Interestingly, we also find that a higher first-mover advantage with respect to a new technology does not affect the leader's entry, and that technological uncertainty may turn a pre-emption game into a war of attrition, where the second-mover gets the higher payoff.
Author: Mohammad Hossein Dehghani Firouzabadi Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 368
Book Description
Chapter 2 considers technology adoption under both technological and subsidy uncertainties. Uncertainty in subsidies for green technologies is considered as an example. Technological progress is exogenous and modeled as a jump process with a drift. The analytical solution is presented for cases when there is no subsidy uncertainty and when the subsidy changes once. The case when the subsidy follows a time invariant Markov process is analyzed numerically. The results show that improving the innovation process raises the investment thresholds. When technological jumps are small or rare, this improvement reduces the expected time before technology adoption. However, when technological jumps are large or abundant, this improvement may raise this expected time. Chapter 3 studies technology adoption in a duopoly where the unbiased technological change improves production efficiency. Technological progress is exogenous and modeled as a jump process with a drift. There is always a Markov perfect equilibrium in which the firm with more efficient technology never preempts its rival. Also, a class of equilibria may exist that lead to a smaller industry surplus. In these equilibria either of the firms may preempt its rival in a set of technology efficiency values. The first investment does not necessarily happen at the boundary of this set due to the discrete nature of the technology progress. The set shrinks and eventually disappears when the difference between firms' efficiencies increases. Chapter 4 studies the behavior of two firms after a new investment opportunity arises. Firms either invest immediately or wait until market uncertainty is resolved. Two types of separating equilibrium are possible when sunk costs are private information. In the first type the firm with lower cost invests first. In the second type the firm with higher cost invests first leading to a smaller industry surplus. The results indicate that the second type is possible only for strictly negatively correlated sunk costs. Numerical analysis illustrates that when first mover advantage is large, the firm that delays the investment should be almost certain about its rival's sunk cost. When market risk increases, the equilibria can exist when the firm is less certain.
Author: Antonio J. Conejo Publisher: Springer ISBN: 3319295012 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 389
Book Description
This book provides an in-depth analysis of investment problems pertaining to electric energy infrastructure, including both generation and transmission facilities. The analysis encompasses decision-making tools for expansion planning, reinforcement, and the selection and timing of investment options. In this regard, the book provides an up-to-date description of analytical tools to address challenging investment questions such as: How can we expand and/or reinforce our aging electricity transmission infrastructure? How can we expand the transmission network of a given region to integrate significant amounts of renewable generation? How can we expand generation facilities to achieve a low-carbon electricity production system? How can we expand the generation system while ensuring appropriate levels of flexibility to accommodate both demand-related and production-related uncertainties? How can we choose among alternative production facilities? What is the right time to invest in a given production or transmission facility? Written in a tutorial style and modular format, the book includes a wealth of illustrative examples to facilitate comprehension. It is intended for advanced undergraduate and graduate students in the fields of electric energy systems, operations research, management science, and economics. Practitioners in the electric energy sector will also benefit from the concepts and techniques presented here.
Author: Mohammad Hossein Dehghani Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper considers technology adoption under both technological and subsidy uncertainties. Uncertainty in subsidies for green technologies is considered as an example. Technological progress is exogenous and modeled as a jump process with a drift. The analytical solution is presented for cases when there is no subsidy uncertainty and when the subsidy changes once. The case when the subsidy follows a time-invariant Markov process is analyzed numerically. The results show that improving the innovation process raises the investment thresholds. When technological jumps are small or rare, this improvement reduces the expected time before technology adoption. However, when technological jumps are large or abundant, this improvement may raise this expected time.
Author: Mohammad Hossein Dehghani
Author: Lars H. Sendstad
Author: Heidrun C. Hoppe
Author: Heidrun Hoppe-Wewetzer
Author: Mohammad Hossein Dehghani Firouzabadi
Author: K. J. M. Huisman
Author: Tae-Kyun Kim
Author: Antonio J. Conejo
Author: Mohammad Hossein Dehghani
Author: Jill D. Teplensky