Strategic Behavior and Cooperation in an Asymmetric Oligopoly PDF Download

Author: Marco Wulff
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783899638349
Category : Unternehmenskooperation - Forschung und Entwicklung - Marktzugang - Strategisches Management
Languages : en
Pages : 232

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Author: Malgorzata Knauff
Publisher: Presses univ. de Louvain
ISBN: 9782874630118
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 168

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Book Description
The thesis consists of five chapters. The first of them contains introduction. Chapter 2 considers a broad class of two player symmetric games, which display a fundamental non-concavity when actions of both players are about to be the same. This implies that no symmetric equilibrium is possible. We distinguish different properties of the payoff functions, like strategic substitutes, complements and quasi-concavity, which are not necessarily imposed globally on the joint action space. A number of applications from industrial organization and applied microeconomics literature are provided. In Chapter 3 we generalize to the extent possible the known results for the case of games with one-dimensional action sets to the general case of games with action spaces that are complete lattices. We find that in the general case the scope for asymmetric equilibrium behavior is definitely broader than in the one-dimensional case, though still quite limited. Moreover, we investigate under which sufficient conditions asymmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria are always Pareto dominated by symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria. In Chapter 4 we deal with the effects of market transparency on prices in the Bertrand duopoly model. We consider two types of strategic interaction between firms in an industry - strategic complementarities and substitutabilities. In the first case, the results are close to conventional wisdom, especially, when in the same time products are substitutes. Namely, equilibrium prices and profits are always decreasing in transparency level, while the consumer’s surplus is increasing. Considering price competition with strategic substitutes, an ambiguity in the direction of change of prices appears. This leads to ambiguity concerning equilibrium profits and surplus changes caused by increasing transparency. In Chapter 5 we provide general conditions for Cournot oligopoly with product differentiation to have monotonic reaction correspondences. We give a proof for the conditions stated by Vives (1999). Moreover we elaborate more general requirements. They allow for identifying increasing best responses even in case inverse demand is submodular, and similarly, decreasing best responses in case of supermodular inverse demand. Examples illustrating the scope of applicability of these results are provided.

Author: Steven Lawrence Puller
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 216

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Author: Xavier Vives
Publisher: MIT Press (MA)
ISBN: 9780262220606
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 446

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Book Description
Applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing. The text relates classic contributions to the field of modern game theory and discusses basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, paying particular attention to developments in the theory of supermodular games.

Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Factory management
Languages : en
Pages : 208

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Author: Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 9781782543220
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 236

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Book Description
'To non-economists, it is hard to understand why economists spend so much effort on the competitive model whereas the world seems to be replete with large and powerful economic actors. In this respect, Jean Gabszewicz is atypical: he has spent most of his research time working on imperfectly competitive markets. However, instead of restricting himself to partial equilibrium analyses, he has tackled from the outset the problem of imperfect competition in a system of interrelated markets with the aim of studying how market power is spread throughout the whole system. This is one of the most challenging and fascinating tasks that economists face. But this is also a very hard one, and may explain why so few have tried. This book builds on the seminal contributions of Cournot and Edgeworth and does not intend to provide a full-fledged answer to the many questions raised by the general theory of imperfect competition. However, by presenting in a transparent way most of the problems that lie at the roots of imperfect competition in general equilibrium and by proposing various elegant solutions, it paves the way to any future research in the field. No doubt it will become a basic reference in the long run. The economics profession should thank Jean Gabszewicz for a fresh and daring way of looking at market power.' - Jacques Thisse, Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium and École Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées, France Jean Gabszewicz's new book is devoted to the study of strategic multilateral exchange. Contrary to the classical competitive paradigm in which agents are assumed to behave as price takers, here traders are allowed to consciously behave as strategic agents who aim to influence trade to their own advantage. This is usually done in oligopoly theory using a partial equilibrium approach while in this case a system of interrelated markets is considered.

Author: Reinhard Selten (Economist, Germany)
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 9781781008294
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 924

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'These two volumes constitute an impressive collection of selected path-breaking works of Professor Selten. . . . Edward Elgar Publications deserve merit for bringing out most frequently-cited and prominent articles of Professor Selten in a conveniently available package.' - K. Ravikumar, Journal of Scientific and Industrial Research In 1994, the Nobel Prize was awarded to Reinhard Selten, John Nash and John Harsanyi, for pioneering analysis in game theory. Selten was the first to refine the Nash equilibrium concept of non-cooperative games for analysing dynamic strategic interaction and to apply these concepts to analyses of oligopoly.

Author: Patrick M. Emerson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages :

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Author: Robert J. Waldmann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Duopolies
Languages : en
Pages : 36

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Book Description

Author: Pablo Branas-Garza
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1137538163
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 239

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Book Description
How do applications affect behavior? Experimental Economics Volume II seeks to answer these questions by examining the auction mechanism, imperfect competition and incentives to understand financial crises, political preferences and elections, and more.