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Stock Price Crashes: Role of Slow-moving Capital

Stock Price Crashes: Role of Slow-moving Capital PDF Author: Mila Getmansky
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

Book Description
We study the role of various trader types in providing liquidity in spot and futures markets based on complete order-book and transactions data as well as cross-market trader identifiers from the National Stock Exchange of India for a single large stock. During normal times, short-term traders who carry little inventory overnight are the primary intermediaries in both spot and futures markets, and changes in futures prices Granger-cause changes in spot prices. However, during two days of fast crashes, Granger-causality ran both ways. Both crashes were due to large-scale selling by foreign institutional investors in the spot market. Buying by short-term traders and cross-market traders was insufficient to stop the crashes. Mutual funds, patient traders with better trade-execution quality who were initially slow to move in, eventually bought sufficient quantities leading to price recovery in both markets. Our findings suggest that market stability requires the presence of well-capitalized standby liquidity providers.

Stock Price Crashes: Role of Slow-moving Capital

Stock Price Crashes: Role of Slow-moving Capital PDF Author: Mila Getmansky
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

Book Description
We study the role of various trader types in providing liquidity in spot and futures markets based on complete order-book and transactions data as well as cross-market trader identifiers from the National Stock Exchange of India for a single large stock. During normal times, short-term traders who carry little inventory overnight are the primary intermediaries in both spot and futures markets, and changes in futures prices Granger-cause changes in spot prices. However, during two days of fast crashes, Granger-causality ran both ways. Both crashes were due to large-scale selling by foreign institutional investors in the spot market. Buying by short-term traders and cross-market traders was insufficient to stop the crashes. Mutual funds, patient traders with better trade-execution quality who were initially slow to move in, eventually bought sufficient quantities leading to price recovery in both markets. Our findings suggest that market stability requires the presence of well-capitalized standby liquidity providers.

Stock Price Crashes

Stock Price Crashes PDF Author: Mila Getmansky
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Portfolio management
Languages : en
Pages : 53

Book Description
We study two fast crashes using orders/cancellations/trades data with trader identities for a stock trading in the spot and single stock futures markets on the National Stock Exchange of India during April-June/2006 when there was no algorithmic trading. Spot (futures) prices fell by 6.1% (4.6%) and 11.1% (12.3%) within 15 minutes during crashes. Buying by capital constrained short-term-traders who were the primary intraday liquidity providers was not sufficient to halt price decline. Domestic mutual funds, slow to move in, bought sufficient quantities leading to price recovery. Crashes and recoveries began in the spot market though volume was higher in futures.

Slow Moving Capital

Slow Moving Capital PDF Author: Mark Mitchell
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Arbitrage
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Book Description
We study three cases in which specialized arbitrageurs lost significant amounts of capital and, as a result, became liquidity demanders rather than providers. The effects on security markets were large and persistent: Prices dropped relative to fundamentals and the rebound took months. While multi-strategy hedge funds who were not capital constrained increased their positions, a large fraction of these funds actually acted as net sellers consistent with the view that information barriers within a firm (not just relative to outside investors) can lead to capital constraints for trading desks with mark-to-market losses. Our findings suggest that real world frictions impede arbitrage capital.

Slow-Moving Capital and Stock Returns

Slow-Moving Capital and Stock Returns PDF Author: Sergey Isaenko
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 48

Book Description
This paper studies the effects that delays in capital allocations in the stock market and high short-term trading incentives have on returns of this market. We report that capital inertia makes the Sharpe ratio and the volatility of the stock returns many times higher than in an economy with no capital delays. Furthermore, in agreement with empirical literature, the stock price displays short-term overreaction and high volatility of the conditional Sharpe ratio.

Stock Market Crashes: Predictable And Unpredictable And What To Do About Them

Stock Market Crashes: Predictable And Unpredictable And What To Do About Them PDF Author: William T Ziemba
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9813223863
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 309

Book Description
'Overall, the book provides an interesting and useful synthesis of the authors’ research on the predictions of stock market crashes. The book can be recommended to anyone interested in the Bond Stock Earnings Yield Differential model, and similar methods to predict crashes.'Quantitative FinanceThis book presents studies of stock market crashes big and small that occur from bubbles bursting or other reasons. By a bubble we mean that prices are rising just because they are rising and that prices exceed fundamental values. A bubble can be a large rise in prices followed by a steep fall. The focus is on determining if a bubble actually exists, on models to predict stock market declines in bubble-like markets and exit strategies from these bubble-like markets. We list historical great bubbles of various markets over hundreds of years.We present four models that have been successful in predicting large stock market declines of ten percent plus that average about minus twenty-five percent. The bond stock earnings yield difference model was based on the 1987 US crash where the S&P 500 futures fell 29% in one day. The model is based on earnings yields relative to interest rates. When interest rates become too high relative to earnings, there almost always is a decline in four to twelve months. The initial out of sample test was on the Japanese stock market from 1948-88. There all twelve danger signals produced correct decline signals. But there were eight other ten percent plus declines that occurred for other reasons. Then the model called the 1990 Japan huge -56% decline. We show various later applications of the model to US stock declines such as in 2000 and 2007 and to the Chinese stock market. We also compare the model with high price earnings decline predictions over a sixty year period in the US. We show that over twenty year periods that have high returns they all start with low price earnings ratios and end with high ratios. High price earnings models have predictive value and the BSEYD models predict even better. Other large decline prediction models are call option prices exceeding put prices, Warren Buffett's value of the stock market to the value of the economy adjusted using BSEYD ideas and the value of Sotheby's stock. Investors expect more declines than actually occur. We present research on the positive effects of FOMC meetings and small cap dominance with Democratic Presidents. Marty Zweig was a wall street legend while he was alive. We discuss his methods for stock market predictability using momentum and FED actions. These helped him become the leading analyst and we show that his ideas still give useful predictions in 2016-2017. We study small declines in the five to fifteen percent range that are either not expected or are expected but when is not clear. For these we present methods to deal with these situations.The last four January-February 2016, Brexit, Trump and French elections are analzyed using simple volatility-S&P 500 graphs. Another very important issue is can you exit bubble-like markets at favorable prices. We use a stopping rule model that gives very good exit results. This is applied successfully to Apple computer stock in 2012, the Nasdaq 100 in 2000, the Japanese stock and golf course membership prices, the US stock market in 1929 and 1987 and other markets. We also show how to incorporate predictive models into stochastic investment models.

Slow Capital, Fast Prices

Slow Capital, Fast Prices PDF Author: Stefan Gissler
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

Book Description


Crash

Crash PDF Author: Ivaylo Ivanov
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781517358594
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 86

Book Description
The odds of an investor experiencing a big market crash during his/her life are 100%.A well-diversified portfolio will save you from losing money in any 10-year period, but it also "save" you from achieving high returns over time. Diversification won't save you from experiencing big drawdowns during market panics when correlations go to 1.00 and all assets move together up and down disregarding of underlying fundamentals.Paul Tudor Jones says that "once in a hundred years events" have started to occur every five years. Obviously, his comment is more of an anecdote than a statistical fact, but it is also a reflection of a timeless market truth - the obvious rarely happens, the unexpected constantly occurs.The stock market is not a place, where for one party to win, another has to lose. It is a place, driven by cycles - periods when almost everyone is a winner followed by periods when almost everyone is a loser.Everyone could make a lot of money during market rallies when liquidity and performance chasing lift all boats and trump all bad news. Not everyone keeps that money when the inevitable correction comes.They say that the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. Well, if you do the same things over and over in financial markets, you are guaranteed to get different results. Markets change; luckily in a relatively cyclical manner; unluckily the duration of each cycle is unpredictable.Patterns repeat all the time because human mindset hasn't changed for thousands of years. Since 1980, the S & P 500 has had an average intra-year decline of 14.2%. In 27 of last 35 years, stocks have still been positive for the year.Corrections come a lot slower than anyone expects, but once they happen they escalate faster than most could imagine.The typical correction has distinct stages that vary in duration and require different tactical approach:1) Quick and wide-spread leg lower that ends with a momentum low.2) Oversold bounce.3) Choppy period, that whipsaws both bulls and bears.4) A Retest of the momentum lows with breadth divergence.5) A RecoveryThe history of U.S. stock markets has been a perpetual long-term uptrend interrupted occasionally, but very consistently by shocks. Most of those shocks take the form of short-term drawdowns that come and go. Some corrections turn into bear markets that last more than a year. They say that almost everyone loses money in bear markets - both bulls and bears. Bulls because they stubbornly hold on to positions in favorite companies and some stocks never recover from deep drawdowns. Bears because they get squeezed during the violent rallies that happen under declining 200-day moving averages. Bear markets should be respected, but they should not be feared. They require a different approach than what most are get used to in bull markets.I wrote this book mainly to serve as my own guidance, to organize my thoughts and learn more in the process.Keep in mind that everyone has his own agenda and bias, including me. The following pages present the perspective of a trader, who believes in active portfolio management and stock picking. The thought process and observations that I share here might not be suitable for everyone.By reading this guideline, you will become better educated in the following subjects:How to protect capital during market correctionsWhen to raise cash, take profits and sell long holdingsWhen and how to hedgeHow to remain calm and protect your confidence during correctionsHow to make money on the short side during market correctionsHow to survive extremely choppy periods during market correctionsHow to be flexible and prosper during long bear marketsHow to recognize market bottomsHow to make money during market recoveriesHow to use social media during corrections

The history of stock market crashes

The history of stock market crashes PDF Author: Peter Rössel
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3668728003
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 16

Book Description
Academic Paper from the year 2018 in the subject Business economics - Investment and Finance, grade: A, Post University (Malcolm Baldrige School of Business), language: English, abstract: This paper was written in the course "Investment Management". It outlines the history of stock market crashes that occurred throughout time. Starting with the first big crash, the tulip mania, in the years of 1636 and 1637. Following, further big crashes up to recent days are presented and the reasons and outcomes of these are explained. A stock market crash can be defined as an extreme price collapse on the stock market. Usually this process takes a few days to a few weeks. During this period mostly panic sales, which generate a large excess supply and thus lead to drastically falling prices dominate the scene.

Behavioral Finance: The Second Generation

Behavioral Finance: The Second Generation PDF Author: Meir Statman
Publisher: CFA Institute Research Foundation
ISBN: 1944960864
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 255

Book Description
Behavioral finance presented in this book is the second-generation of behavioral finance. The first generation, starting in the early 1980s, largely accepted standard finance’s notion of people’s wants as “rational” wants—restricted to the utilitarian benefits of high returns and low risk. That first generation commonly described people as “irrational”—succumbing to cognitive and emotional errors and misled on their way to their rational wants. The second generation describes people as normal. It begins by acknowledging the full range of people’s normal wants and their benefits—utilitarian, expressive, and emotional—distinguishes normal wants from errors, and offers guidance on using shortcuts and avoiding errors on the way to satisfying normal wants. People’s normal wants include financial security, nurturing children and families, gaining high social status, and staying true to values. People’s normal wants, even more than their cognitive and emotional shortcuts and errors, underlie answers to important questions of finance, including saving and spending, portfolio construction, asset pricing, and market efficiency.

International Capital Flows

International Capital Flows PDF Author: Martin Feldstein
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 0226241807
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 500

Book Description
Recent changes in technology, along with the opening up of many regions previously closed to investment, have led to explosive growth in the international movement of capital. Flows from foreign direct investment and debt and equity financing can bring countries substantial gains by augmenting local savings and by improving technology and incentives. Investing companies acquire market access, lower cost inputs, and opportunities for profitable introductions of production methods in the countries where they invest. But, as was underscored recently by the economic and financial crises in several Asian countries, capital flows can also bring risks. Although there is no simple explanation of the currency crisis in Asia, it is clear that fixed exchange rates and chronic deficits increased the likelihood of a breakdown. Similarly, during the 1970s, the United States and other industrial countries loaned OPEC surpluses to borrowers in Latin America. But when the U.S. Federal Reserve raised interest rates to control soaring inflation, the result was a widespread debt moratorium in Latin America as many countries throughout the region struggled to pay the high interest on their foreign loans. International Capital Flows contains recent work by eminent scholars and practitioners on the experience of capital flows to Latin America, Asia, and eastern Europe. These papers discuss the role of banks, equity markets, and foreign direct investment in international capital flows, and the risks that investors and others face with these transactions. By focusing on capital flows' productivity and determinants, and the policy issues they raise, this collection is a valuable resource for economists, policymakers, and financial market participants.