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Author: Gaoyang Cai Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
In this paper, we study the generalized Nash bargaining solution of bilateral bargaining in any given network, which is equivalent to the bilateral balanced outcome of a cooperative game with a network structure. We first establish that it is without loss of generality to focus on any maximum-weight matching when we discuss the existence of stable outcomes and the uniqueness of balanced outcomes. Then we characterize the exact network structure and characteristic function that ensure the existence of stable and balanced outcomes. Finally, we provide the necessary and sufficient condition for the uniqueness of balanced payoffs of a general network. We also show that any balanced outcome of a general weighted network consists of hierarchical balanced structures in which the outside options of agents in structures with lower slack values do not depend on the ones with higher slack values, but not vice versa. Our work combines and contributes to the literature on Nash bargaining, cooperative games, and network games.
Author: Gaoyang Cai Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
In this paper, we study the generalized Nash bargaining solution of bilateral bargaining in any given network, which is equivalent to the bilateral balanced outcome of a cooperative game with a network structure. We first establish that it is without loss of generality to focus on any maximum-weight matching when we discuss the existence of stable outcomes and the uniqueness of balanced outcomes. Then we characterize the exact network structure and characteristic function that ensure the existence of stable and balanced outcomes. Finally, we provide the necessary and sufficient condition for the uniqueness of balanced payoffs of a general network. We also show that any balanced outcome of a general weighted network consists of hierarchical balanced structures in which the outside options of agents in structures with lower slack values do not depend on the ones with higher slack values, but not vice versa. Our work combines and contributes to the literature on Nash bargaining, cooperative games, and network games.
Author: Rémy Delille Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
The thesis consists in four essays that deal with bargaining and networks in non cooperative game theory.The first chapter introduce river bargaining games in the context of externalities. The seawall bargaininggame deals with a non cooperative approach of an investment game in a context of positive externalities.The main result shows that the positioning of the agents impacts their incentives to sit at the bargainingtable, leading to a chicken game. An intermediary player should lead the negotiations to improve the societalwelfare. In the River bargaining problem, a non cooperative bargaining on a flowing resource in the presenceof negative externalities. Results show that depending on the instigator of the bargaining sequences but thereare analogies between solutions under the ATS and the UTI principles. The second chapter deals with theformation of networks of manufacturers and retailers in the presence of negative externalities when playersare level-K farsighted. The results show that, (i) a relatively low level of farsightedness is sufficient to reachthe infinite level of farsightedness; (ii) usual definitions of optimality or efficiency find limitations when itcomes to be confronted to a set-based definition of stability. (iii) If there is transitive correspondence betweenthe pairwise farsighted stable set and the level-1 farsighted stable set, then this set is likely to be stronglyefficient. In Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation, we proposes the concept of avon Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stable set with bargaining. Under this solution concept, the stablenetworks so as the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule emerge endogenously. This chapter providesnecessary conditions under which a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stable set with bargaining sustainsthe strongly efficient networks.
Author: Stefan Napel Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 3642561608 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 193
Book Description
This book investigates bargaining between two agents. Its objective is to present, to extend, and to apply the present state of theoretical knowledge. A wide range of questions will be considered: First of all, will two parties reach efficient agreements? Traditional economic theory gives a generally affirma tive answer for perfectly rational agents, who can carry out complex calcu lations instantaneously and without cost. The book uses innovative methods to analyse the implications of less demanding assumptions. A practical ques tion related to bargaining is: How much power does the design of institutions such as the U. N. Security Council give to each of its members? Formally, non permanent members' votes are necessary to pass resolutions, but theoretical investigation of pre-voting negotiation attributes all power to the five perma nent members. Or one may ask whether a society should rather finance the education in higher mathematics for a talented person than remedial training for a retarded person? Different concepts of justice yield different answers. Which particular concept is implemented in a given society is also a matter of bargaining, and it is of special philosophical interest to investigate which bargain will be struck in an ideal society in which individual talents and resources are not yet known. Very generally, a bilateral bargaining situation is characterized by two agents - individuals, firms, governments, etc.
Author: Christos Papadimitriou Publisher: Springer ISBN: 3540921850 Category : Computers Languages : en Pages : 748
Book Description
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2008, held in Shanghai, China, in December 2008. The 68 revised full papers presented together with 10 invited talks were carefully reviewed and selected from 126 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on market equilibrium, congestion games, information markets, nash equilibrium, network games, solution concepts, algorithms and optimization, mechanism design, equilibrium, online advertisement, sponsored search auctions, and voting problems.
Author: Kalyan Chatterjee Publisher: World Scientific ISBN: 9814447579 Category : Language Arts & Disciplines Languages : en Pages : 229
Book Description
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market OCo Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining consists of selected research in bargaining carried out by Kalyan Chatterjee by himself and with various co-authors. Chatterjee has been one of the earliest researchers to work on noncooperative bargaining theory and has contributed to bilateral bargaining with parties having private information as well as multilateral coalition formation models. Some of his work in each of these areas finds place here.The main theme of this collection of papers is the nature of negotiations when participants have alternatives to continue negotiating, either by beginning negotiations with a different partner or set of partners or by engaging in time-consuming search for such partners. Chapters in this book include: a noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining and features a laboratory experiment relevant to this theory as well as an extension to political negotiations, search for alternative partners, the effect of markets and bargaining on incentives of players to invest in the partnership and related papers on incentive compatibility, arbitration and a dynamic model of negotiation. The book also includes a new introduction that puts these papers in the context of the broader literature in the field.
Author: Emin Karagözoğlu Publisher: Springer Nature ISBN: 3030766667 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 486
Book Description
This Edited Collection provides a rigorous and rich overview of current bargaining research in economics and related disciplines, as well as a discussion of future directions. The Editors create cross-disciplinary and cross-methodological synergies by bringing together bargaining researchers from various fields, including game theory, experimental economics, political economy, autonomous negotiations, artificial intelligence, environmental economics and behavioral operations management; as well as using various methods, including the strategic approach, axiomatic approach, empirical research, lab and field experiments, machine learning and decision support systems. Offering insights into the theoretical foundations of bargaining research, traditional applications to bargaining research and topics of growing importance due to new advances in technology and the changing political and physical landscape of the world, this book is a key tool for anyone working on or interested in bargaining.
Author: Catherine de Fontenay Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper provides an analysis of a non-cooperative pairwise bargaining game between agents in a network. We establish that there exists an equilibrium that generates a coalitional bargaining division of the reduced surplus that arises as a result of externalities between agents. That is, we provide a non-cooperative justification for a cooperative division of a non-cooperative surplus. The resulting division is akin to the Myerson-Shapley value with properties that are particularly useful and tractable in applications. We demonstrate this by examining buyer-seller networks and vertical foreclosure.
Author: Bhaskar Dutta Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 3540247904 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 495
Book Description
When Murat Sertel asked us whether we would be interested in organizing a special issue of the Review of Economic Design on the formation of networks and groups, we were happy to accept because of the growing research on this important topic. We were also pleasantly surprised at the response to our request for submissions to the special issue, receiving a much larger number of sub missions than we had anticipated. In the end we were able to put together two special issues of insightful papers on this topic. Given the growing interest in this topic, we also decided (with encouragement from Murat) to combine the special issues in the form of a book for wider dissemination. However, once we had decided to edit the book, it was natural to move beyond the special issue to include at least some of the papers that have been influential in the literature on the formation of networks. These papers were published in other journals, and we are very grateful to the authors as well as the journals for permission to include these papers in the book.
Author: Sanjeev Goyal Publisher: MIT Press ISBN: 0262374072 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 823
Book Description
An accessible and comprehensive overview of the economic theory and the realities of networks written by a pioneering economics researcher. Networks are everywhere: the infrastructure that brings water into our homes, the social networks made up of our friends and families, the supply chains connecting cities, people, and goods. These interconnections contain economic trade-offs: for example, should an airline operate direct flights between cities or route all its flights through a hub? Viewing networks through an economics lens, this textbook considers the costs and benefits that govern their formation and functioning. Networks are central to an understanding of the production, consumption, and information that lie at the heart of economic activity. Sanjeev Goyal provides advanced undergraduate and graduate students with an accessible and comprehensive introduction to the economics research on networks of the past twenty-five years. Each chapter introduces a theoretical model illustrated with the help of case studies and formal proofs. After introducing the theoretical concepts, Goyal examines economic networks, including infrastructure, security, market power, and financial networks. He then covers social networks, with chapters on coordinating activity, communication and learning, information networks, epidemics, and impersonal markets. Finally, Goyal locates social and economic networks in a broader context covering networked markets, economic development, trust, and group networks in their relation to markets and the state. First textbook to provide a broad and comprehensive overview of twenty-first-century economic theory of networks Features engaging case studies and accessible exercises Written by a pioneering economics researcher
Author: Gaoyang Cai
Author: Gaoyang Cai
Author: Rémy Delille
Author: Stefan Napel
Author: Christos Papadimitriou
Author: Mikel Bedayo
Author: Kalyan Chatterjee
Author: Emin Karagözoğlu
Author: Catherine de Fontenay
Author: Bhaskar Dutta
Author: Sanjeev Goyal