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Author: Laura Alfaro Publisher: ISBN: Category : Debts, External Languages : en Pages : 42
Book Description
Apresenta um modelo de equilíbrio dinâmico para estudar quantitativamente os serviços de contingência da dívida soberana e os riscos de spread dos países.
Author: Laura Alfaro Publisher: ISBN: Category : Debts, External Languages : en Pages : 42
Book Description
Apresenta um modelo de equilíbrio dinâmico para estudar quantitativamente os serviços de contingência da dívida soberana e os riscos de spread dos países.
Author: Laura Alfaro Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
We construct a dynamic equilibrium model with contingent service and adverse selection to quantitatively study sovereign debt. In the model, benefits of defaulting are tempered by higher future interest rates. For a wide set of parameters, the only equilibrium is one in which the sovereign defaults in all states; additional output losses, however, sustain equilibria that resemble the data. We show that due to the adverse selection problem, some countries choose to delay default to reduce loss of reputation. Moreover, although equilibria with no default imply greater welfare levels, they are not sustainable in highly indebted and volatile countries.
Author: Mr.Giovanni Dell'Ariccia Publisher: International Monetary Fund ISBN: 1484359623 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 54
Book Description
This paper reviews empirical and theoretical work on the links between banks and their governments (the bank-sovereign nexus). How significant is this nexus? What do we know about it? To what extent is it a source of concern? What is the role of policy intervention? The paper concludes with a review of recent policy proposals.
Author: Nathan Foley-Fisher Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
Privately-produced safe debt is designed so that there is no adverse selection in trade. This is because no agent finds it profitable to produce private information about the debt's backing and all agents know this (i.e., it is information-insensitive). But in some macro states, it becomes profitable for some agents to produce private information, and then the debt faces adverse selection when traded (i.e., it becomes information-sensitive). We empirically study these adverse selection dynamics in a very important asset class, collateralized loan obligations, a large symbiotic appendage of the regulated banking system, which finances loans to below investment-grade firms.
Author: Mark Aguiar Publisher: Princeton University Press ISBN: 0691176817 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 200
Book Description
An integrated approach to the economics of sovereign default Fiscal crises and sovereign default repeatedly threaten the stability and growth of economies around the world. Mark Aguiar and Manuel Amador provide a unified and tractable theoretical framework that elucidates the key economics behind sovereign debt markets, shedding light on the frictions and inefficiencies that prevent the smooth functioning of these markets, and proposing sensible approaches to sovereign debt management. The Economics of Sovereign Debt and Default looks at the core friction unique to sovereign debt—the lack of strong legal enforcement—and goes on to examine additional frictions such as deadweight costs of default, vulnerability to runs, the incentive to “dilute” existing creditors, and sovereign debt’s distortion of investment and growth. The book uses the tractable framework to isolate how each additional friction affects the equilibrium outcome, and illustrates its counterpart using state-of-the-art computational modeling. The novel approach presented here contrasts the outcome of a constrained efficient allocation—one chosen to maximize the joint surplus of creditors and government—with the competitive equilibrium outcome. This allows for a clear analysis of the extent to which equilibrium prices efficiently guide the government’s debt and default decisions, and of what drives divergences with the efficient outcome. Providing an integrated approach to sovereign debt and default, this incisive and authoritative book is an ideal resource for researchers and graduate students interested in this important topic.
Author: Thorsten Foltz Publisher: GRIN Verlag ISBN: 3668410240 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 101
Book Description
Master's Thesis from the year 2016 in the subject Economics - Other, grade: 1,3, University of Siegen, language: English, abstract: Market liquidity is most important for financial markets and thus for the real economy. Market-makers seem to provide less liquidity recently. The reasons of such a behaviour are shown within this work. It exhibits the regulations which have changed, the behaviour of market-makers and how financial markets are able to become illiquid. After this more theoretical framework, which refers to financial stability, several measures of liquidity are introduced and empirically tested on a dataset of about 60,000 corporate and sovereign bonds in 34 countries over a period of eleven years. The result, is that bond markets became less liquid within the last three years than during the financial and the following European debt crisis.
Author: International Monetary Fund. Asia and Pacific Dept Publisher: International Monetary Fund ISBN: 1498346812 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 50
Book Description
Background. The case for sovereign state-contingent debt instruments (SCDIs) as a countercyclical and risk-sharing tool has been around for some time and remains appealing; but take-up has been limited. Earlier staff work had advocated the use of growth-indexed bonds in emerging markets and contingent financial instruments in low-income countries. In light of recent renewed interest among academics, policymakers, and market participants—staff has analyzed the conceptual and practical issues SCDIs raise with a view to accelerate the development of self-sustaining markets in these instruments. The analysis has benefited from broad consultations with both private market participants and policymakers. The economic case for SCDIs. By linking debt service to a measure of the sovereign’s capacity to pay, SCDIs can increase fiscal space, and thus allow greater policy flexibility in bad times. They can also broaden the sovereign’s investor base, open opportunities for risk diversification for investors, and enhance the resilience of the international financial system. Should SCDI issuance rise to account for a large share of public debt, it could also significantly reduce the incidence and cost of sovereign debt crises. Some potential complications require mitigation: a high novelty and liquidity premium demanded by investors in the early stage of market development; adverse selection and moral hazard risks; undesirable pricing effects on conventional debt; pro-cyclical investor demand; migration of excessive risk to the private sector; and adverse political economy incentives.
Author: Laura Alfaro
Author: Laura Alfaro
Author: Laura Alfaro
Author: Mr.Giovanni Dell'Ariccia
Author: Nathan Foley-Fisher
Author: Gilles Chemla
Author: Mark Aguiar
Author: Thorsten Foltz
Author: Nathan Foley-Fisher
Author: Ernst Mohr
Author: International Monetary Fund. Asia and Pacific Dept