Author: Richard K. Betts
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 312
Book Description
A reprint of the Harvard U. Press edition of 1977, this book analyzes one element in American cold war decision making--military advice and influence on the use of force--and considers how the proportion of military influence, relative to that of civilian advisers, has varied since WWII. Includes a new preface and epilogue to this edition. Paper edition (07469-7), $16.50. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises
Author: Richard K. Betts
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 312
Book Description
A reprint of the Harvard U. Press edition of 1977, this book analyzes one element in American cold war decision making--military advice and influence on the use of force--and considers how the proportion of military influence, relative to that of civilian advisers, has varied since WWII. Includes a new preface and epilogue to this edition. Paper edition (07469-7), $16.50. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 312
Book Description
A reprint of the Harvard U. Press edition of 1977, this book analyzes one element in American cold war decision making--military advice and influence on the use of force--and considers how the proportion of military influence, relative to that of civilian advisers, has varied since WWII. Includes a new preface and epilogue to this edition. Paper edition (07469-7), $16.50. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
American Force
Author: Richard K. Betts
Publisher: Columbia University Press
ISBN: 023152188X
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 385
Book Description
While American national security policy has grown more interventionist since the Cold War, Washington has also hoped to shape the world on the cheap. Misled by the stunning success against Iraq in 1991, administrations of both parties have pursued ambitious aims with limited force, committing the country's military frequently yet often hesitantly, with inconsistent justification. These ventures have produced strategic confusion, unplanned entanglements, and indecisive results. This collection of essays by Richard K. Betts, a leading international politics scholar, investigates the use of American force since the end of the Cold War, suggesting guidelines for making it more selective and successful. Betts brings his extensive knowledge of twentieth century American diplomatic and military history to bear on the full range of theory and practice in national security, surveying the Cold War roots of recent initiatives and arguing that U.S. policy has always been more unilateral than liberal theorists claim. He exposes mistakes made by humanitarian interventions and peace operations; reviews the issues raised by terrorism and the use of modern nuclear, biological, and cyber weapons; evaluates the case for preventive war, which almost always proves wrong; weighs the lessons learned from campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam; assesses the rise of China and the resurgence of Russia; quells concerns about civil-military relations; exposes anomalies within recent defense budgets; and confronts the practical barriers to effective strategy. Betts ultimately argues for greater caution and restraint, while encouraging more decisive action when force is required, and he recommends a more dispassionate assessment of national security interests, even in the face of global instability and unfamiliar threats.
Publisher: Columbia University Press
ISBN: 023152188X
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 385
Book Description
While American national security policy has grown more interventionist since the Cold War, Washington has also hoped to shape the world on the cheap. Misled by the stunning success against Iraq in 1991, administrations of both parties have pursued ambitious aims with limited force, committing the country's military frequently yet often hesitantly, with inconsistent justification. These ventures have produced strategic confusion, unplanned entanglements, and indecisive results. This collection of essays by Richard K. Betts, a leading international politics scholar, investigates the use of American force since the end of the Cold War, suggesting guidelines for making it more selective and successful. Betts brings his extensive knowledge of twentieth century American diplomatic and military history to bear on the full range of theory and practice in national security, surveying the Cold War roots of recent initiatives and arguing that U.S. policy has always been more unilateral than liberal theorists claim. He exposes mistakes made by humanitarian interventions and peace operations; reviews the issues raised by terrorism and the use of modern nuclear, biological, and cyber weapons; evaluates the case for preventive war, which almost always proves wrong; weighs the lessons learned from campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam; assesses the rise of China and the resurgence of Russia; quells concerns about civil-military relations; exposes anomalies within recent defense budgets; and confronts the practical barriers to effective strategy. Betts ultimately argues for greater caution and restraint, while encouraging more decisive action when force is required, and he recommends a more dispassionate assessment of national security interests, even in the face of global instability and unfamiliar threats.
War, Strategy and Intelligence
Author: Michael I. Handel
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1136286314
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 518
Book Description
Investigating the logic, conduct and nature of war on the highest political and strategic levels, these essays put less emphasis on operational and tactical aspects. They look at the impact of technology on warfare, the political nature of war and the limits of rational analysis in studying war.
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1136286314
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 518
Book Description
Investigating the logic, conduct and nature of war on the highest political and strategic levels, these essays put less emphasis on operational and tactical aspects. They look at the impact of technology on warfare, the political nature of war and the limits of rational analysis in studying war.
Civilian Control of the Military
Author: Michael C. Desch
Publisher: JHU Press
ISBN: 9780801866395
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 204
Book Description
"Power and Military Effectiveness is an instructive reassessment of the increasingly popular belief that military success is one of democracy's many virtues. International relations scholars, policy makers, and military minds will be well served by its lessons."--BOOK JACKET.
Publisher: JHU Press
ISBN: 9780801866395
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 204
Book Description
"Power and Military Effectiveness is an instructive reassessment of the increasingly popular belief that military success is one of democracy's many virtues. International relations scholars, policy makers, and military minds will be well served by its lessons."--BOOK JACKET.
US Special Forces and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam
Author: Christopher K. Ives
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1134145853
Category : Education
Languages : en
Pages : 199
Book Description
This volume examines US Army Special Forces efforts to mobilize and train indigenous minorities in Vietnam. Christopher K. Ives shows how before the Second Indochina War, the Republic of Vietnam had begun to falter under the burden of an increasingly successful insurgency. The dominant American military culture could not conform to President Kennedy’s guidance to wage 'small wars', while President Diem’s provincial and military structures provided neither assistance nor security. The Green Berets developed and executed effective counterinsurgency tactics and operations with strategic implications while living, training, and finally fighting with the Montagnard peoples in the Central Highlands. Special Forces soldiers developed and executed what needed to be done to mobilize indigenous minorities, having assessed what needed to be known. Combining Clausewitz, business theory and strategic insight, this book provides an important starting point for thinking about how the US military should be approaching the problems of today's ‘small wars’. US Special Forces and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam will be of much interest to students of the Vietnam War, Special Forces operations, military innovation and strategic theory in general.
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1134145853
Category : Education
Languages : en
Pages : 199
Book Description
This volume examines US Army Special Forces efforts to mobilize and train indigenous minorities in Vietnam. Christopher K. Ives shows how before the Second Indochina War, the Republic of Vietnam had begun to falter under the burden of an increasingly successful insurgency. The dominant American military culture could not conform to President Kennedy’s guidance to wage 'small wars', while President Diem’s provincial and military structures provided neither assistance nor security. The Green Berets developed and executed effective counterinsurgency tactics and operations with strategic implications while living, training, and finally fighting with the Montagnard peoples in the Central Highlands. Special Forces soldiers developed and executed what needed to be done to mobilize indigenous minorities, having assessed what needed to be known. Combining Clausewitz, business theory and strategic insight, this book provides an important starting point for thinking about how the US military should be approaching the problems of today's ‘small wars’. US Special Forces and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam will be of much interest to students of the Vietnam War, Special Forces operations, military innovation and strategic theory in general.
The Armed Forces Officer
Author: Richard Moody Swain
Publisher: Government Printing Office
ISBN: 9780160937583
Category : Study Aids
Languages : en
Pages : 216
Book Description
In 1950, when he commissioned the first edition of The Armed Forces Officer, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall told its author, S.L.A. Marshall, that "American military officers, of whatever service, should share common ground ethically and morally." In this new edition, the authors methodically explore that common ground, reflecting on the basics of the Profession of Arms, and the officer's special place and distinctive obligations within that profession and especially to the Constitution.
Publisher: Government Printing Office
ISBN: 9780160937583
Category : Study Aids
Languages : en
Pages : 216
Book Description
In 1950, when he commissioned the first edition of The Armed Forces Officer, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall told its author, S.L.A. Marshall, that "American military officers, of whatever service, should share common ground ethically and morally." In this new edition, the authors methodically explore that common ground, reflecting on the basics of the Profession of Arms, and the officer's special place and distinctive obligations within that profession and especially to the Constitution.
Nonstate Warfare
Author: Stephen Biddle
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691216657
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 464
Book Description
How nonstate military strategies overturn traditional perspectives on warfare Since September 11th, 2001, armed nonstate actors have received increased attention and discussion from scholars, policymakers, and the military. Underlying debates about nonstate warfare and how it should be countered is one crucial assumption: that state and nonstate actors fight very differently. In Nonstate Warfare, Stephen Biddle upturns this distinction, arguing that there is actually nothing intrinsic separating state or nonstate military behavior. Through an in-depth look at nonstate military conduct, Biddle shows that many nonstate armies now fight more "conventionally" than many state armies, and that the internal politics of nonstate actors—their institutional maturity and wartime stakes rather than their material weapons or equipment—determines tactics and strategies. Biddle frames nonstate and state methods along a continuum, spanning Fabian-style irregular warfare to Napoleonic-style warfare involving massed armies, and he presents a systematic theory to explain any given nonstate actor’s position on this spectrum. Showing that most warfare for at least a century has kept to the blended middle of the spectrum, Biddle argues that material and tribal culture explanations for nonstate warfare methods do not adequately explain observed patterns of warmaking. Investigating a range of historical examples from Lebanon and Iraq to Somalia, Croatia, and the Vietcong, Biddle demonstrates that viewing state and nonstate warfighting as mutually exclusive can lead to errors in policy and scholarship. A comprehensive account of combat methods and military rationale, Nonstate Warfare offers a new understanding for wartime military behavior.
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691216657
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 464
Book Description
How nonstate military strategies overturn traditional perspectives on warfare Since September 11th, 2001, armed nonstate actors have received increased attention and discussion from scholars, policymakers, and the military. Underlying debates about nonstate warfare and how it should be countered is one crucial assumption: that state and nonstate actors fight very differently. In Nonstate Warfare, Stephen Biddle upturns this distinction, arguing that there is actually nothing intrinsic separating state or nonstate military behavior. Through an in-depth look at nonstate military conduct, Biddle shows that many nonstate armies now fight more "conventionally" than many state armies, and that the internal politics of nonstate actors—their institutional maturity and wartime stakes rather than their material weapons or equipment—determines tactics and strategies. Biddle frames nonstate and state methods along a continuum, spanning Fabian-style irregular warfare to Napoleonic-style warfare involving massed armies, and he presents a systematic theory to explain any given nonstate actor’s position on this spectrum. Showing that most warfare for at least a century has kept to the blended middle of the spectrum, Biddle argues that material and tribal culture explanations for nonstate warfare methods do not adequately explain observed patterns of warmaking. Investigating a range of historical examples from Lebanon and Iraq to Somalia, Croatia, and the Vietcong, Biddle demonstrates that viewing state and nonstate warfighting as mutually exclusive can lead to errors in policy and scholarship. A comprehensive account of combat methods and military rationale, Nonstate Warfare offers a new understanding for wartime military behavior.
The Cold War and After
Author: Sean M. Lynn-Jones
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262620888
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 430
Book Description
The Cold War and After presents a collection of well-reasoned arguments selected fromthe journal International Security on the causes of the Cold War and the effect of its aftermath onthe peaceful coexistence of European states. This new edition includes all of the material from thefirst edition, plus four new articles: The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,Christopher Layne; International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle? Robert Jervis; WhyInternational Primacy Matters, Samuel P. Huntington; and International Relations Theory and the Endof the Cold War, John Lewis Gaddis.Sean M. Lynn-Jones is Managing Editor of International Security.Steven E. Miller is Director of Studies at the Center for Science and International Affairs, HarvardUniversity.
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262620888
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 430
Book Description
The Cold War and After presents a collection of well-reasoned arguments selected fromthe journal International Security on the causes of the Cold War and the effect of its aftermath onthe peaceful coexistence of European states. This new edition includes all of the material from thefirst edition, plus four new articles: The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,Christopher Layne; International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle? Robert Jervis; WhyInternational Primacy Matters, Samuel P. Huntington; and International Relations Theory and the Endof the Cold War, John Lewis Gaddis.Sean M. Lynn-Jones is Managing Editor of International Security.Steven E. Miller is Director of Studies at the Center for Science and International Affairs, HarvardUniversity.
Counterinsurgency and the United States Marine Corps
Author: Leo J. Daugherty III
Publisher: McFarland
ISBN: 1476629048
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 474
Book Description
Volume 2 continues the history of the U.S. Marine Corps' involvement in "small wars" after World War II, beginning with advisory efforts with the Netherlands Marine Korps (1943-1946). The authors describe counterinsurgency efforts during the Korean War (1950-1953), the development of vertical assault tactics in the late 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, counterinsurgency in Southeast Asia (1962-1975), involvement in Central America (1983-1989), and present-day conflicts, including the War on Terror and operations in Iraq and Libya.
Publisher: McFarland
ISBN: 1476629048
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 474
Book Description
Volume 2 continues the history of the U.S. Marine Corps' involvement in "small wars" after World War II, beginning with advisory efforts with the Netherlands Marine Korps (1943-1946). The authors describe counterinsurgency efforts during the Korean War (1950-1953), the development of vertical assault tactics in the late 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, counterinsurgency in Southeast Asia (1962-1975), involvement in Central America (1983-1989), and present-day conflicts, including the War on Terror and operations in Iraq and Libya.
Military Realism
Author: Peter Campbell
Publisher: University of Missouri Press
ISBN: 0826274269
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 391
Book Description
After the Vietnam War, the U.S. Army considered counterinsurgency (COIN) a mistake to be avoided. Many found it surprising, then, when setbacks in recent conflicts led the same army to adopt a COIN doctrine. Scholarly debates have primarily employed existing theories of military bureaucracy or culture to explain the army’s re-embrace of COIN, but Peter Campbell advances a unique argument centering on military realism to explain the complex evolution of army doctrinal thinking from 1960 to 2008. In five case studies of U.S. Army doctrine, Campbell pits military realism against bureaucratic and cultural perspectives in three key areas—nuclear versus conventional warfare, preferences for offense versus defense, and COIN missions—and finds that the army has been more doctrinally flexible than those perspectives would predict. He demonstrates that decision makers, while vowing in the wake of Vietnam to avoid (COIN) missions, nonetheless found themselves adapting to the geopolitical realities of fighting “low intensity” conflicts. In essence, he demonstrates that pragmatism has won out over dogmatism. At a time when American policymakers remain similarly conflicted about future defense strategies, Campbell’s work will undoubtedly shape and guide the debate.
Publisher: University of Missouri Press
ISBN: 0826274269
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 391
Book Description
After the Vietnam War, the U.S. Army considered counterinsurgency (COIN) a mistake to be avoided. Many found it surprising, then, when setbacks in recent conflicts led the same army to adopt a COIN doctrine. Scholarly debates have primarily employed existing theories of military bureaucracy or culture to explain the army’s re-embrace of COIN, but Peter Campbell advances a unique argument centering on military realism to explain the complex evolution of army doctrinal thinking from 1960 to 2008. In five case studies of U.S. Army doctrine, Campbell pits military realism against bureaucratic and cultural perspectives in three key areas—nuclear versus conventional warfare, preferences for offense versus defense, and COIN missions—and finds that the army has been more doctrinally flexible than those perspectives would predict. He demonstrates that decision makers, while vowing in the wake of Vietnam to avoid (COIN) missions, nonetheless found themselves adapting to the geopolitical realities of fighting “low intensity” conflicts. In essence, he demonstrates that pragmatism has won out over dogmatism. At a time when American policymakers remain similarly conflicted about future defense strategies, Campbell’s work will undoubtedly shape and guide the debate.