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Author: A. Mitchell Polinsky Publisher: ISBN: Category : Liability (Law) Languages : en Pages : 40
Book Description
Should the level of liability imposed on an injurer be based on the harm he caused or instead on the gain he obtained from engaging in the harmful act? The main point of this article is that there is a strong reason to favor liability based on harm rather than gain when account is taken of the possibility of legal error. Notably, even a small underestimate of gain can lead an injurer to commit a harmful act when the harm greatly exceeds his gain, causing a large social loss. In contrast, a comparable error in the estimate of harm will not lead an injurer to engage in the harmful act when the harm significantly exceeds his gain. The general superiority of harm-based liability is shown to hold under the rules of negligence and strict liability and regardless of whether potential injurers know the error that will be made.
Author: A. Mitchell Polinsky Publisher: ISBN: Category : Liability (Law) Languages : en Pages : 40
Book Description
Should the level of liability imposed on an injurer be based on the harm he caused or instead on the gain he obtained from engaging in the harmful act? The main point of this article is that there is a strong reason to favor liability based on harm rather than gain when account is taken of the possibility of legal error. Notably, even a small underestimate of gain can lead an injurer to commit a harmful act when the harm greatly exceeds his gain, causing a large social loss. In contrast, a comparable error in the estimate of harm will not lead an injurer to engage in the harmful act when the harm significantly exceeds his gain. The general superiority of harm-based liability is shown to hold under the rules of negligence and strict liability and regardless of whether potential injurers know the error that will be made.
Author: A. Mitchell Polinsky Publisher: ISBN: Category : Liability (Law) Languages : en Pages : 22
Book Description
A central result in the economic theory of liability is that, if an injurer's liability equals the victim's loss, then either the rule of strict liability or the rule of negligence can induce the injurer to behave properly. However, for this result to hold, the injurer must know the victim's loss before the injurer decides whether to engage in the harmful activity and, g fortiori, before any harm has occurred. This paper reevaluates the rules of strict liability and negligence when the injurer's information is imperfect. Two questions are addressed: Under each rule, should the level of liability imposed on the injurer still equal the victim's loss? Are the rules of strict liability and negligence still equally desirable? With respect to the first question, it is demonstrated that the optimal level of liability generally is not equal to the victim's loss. With respect to the second question, it is shown that if the injurer's liability equals the victim's loss, then the two rules are equivalent, but if liability is set optimally under each rule, then strict liability generally induces the injurer to behave in a more appropriate way.
Author: Kirst, Philipp Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing ISBN: 1800887523 Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 416
Book Description
This cutting-edge book provides a thorough analysis of the transposition of the rules of the EU Damages Directive, examining their impact on the enforcement of competition law and the victim’s right to full compensation. It also studies the possible consequences of an anticipated rise in civil damages actions in Europe and how this, in turn, may alter the effectiveness of the enforcement system.
Author: J. Shahar Dillbary Publisher: Aspen Publishing ISBN: 1543823181 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 679
Book Description
The purchase of this ebook edition does not entitle you to receive access to the Connected eBook on CasebookConnect. You will need to purchase a new print book to get access to the full experience including: lifetime access to the online ebook with highlight, annotation, and search capabilities, plus an outline tool and other helpful resources. Law and Economics: Theory, Cases, and Other Materials is a comprehensive introduction to the subject area of law and economics, with stimulating in depth discussion of actual case law by two leading scholars in the field. It provides a clear description of the key points of law and economics across various substantive areas of law, combining the traditional approach to the study of law and economics with new important insights from behavioral economics and competing theories. Importantly, Law and Economics artfully introduces and connects theory to practice to provide a coherent picture rather than a patch-like studying experience. Using detailed case-notes, comments and examples, Law and Economics explains why future lawyers should care about economic analysis of the law and how economics can and should play a role in litigation and conflict resolution. This important new casebook not only makes law and economics accessible to students but also indubitably establishes the importance of law and economics in a globalized world. Highlights of the First Edition: Introduces students to basic tools (e.g., game theory and decision theory) and concepts (e.g., efficiency criteria) using simple and innovative methods Facilitates the understanding of complicated concepts by providing the theoretical backgrounds as well as clear explanations, examples, exercises, and comprehensive comments and notes that do not require any background in math or economics Allows readers to test their understanding by providing practice questions with full answers Carefully selected cases, with discussion emphasizing the economic rationales underlying decisions and demonstrating how these rationales impact decisions Marries the virtues of a textbook (explaining the theoretical underpinning of different economic notions and how they relate to different legal doctrines) to those of a casebook by tying concepts to actual decisions Adopts a modern approach that covers competing theories as they relate to specific decisions and theories Includes methodology chapters where the same methodology (e.g., decision making, game theory, supply and demand) is used to analyze different areas of the law, as well as subject matter chapters in which specific areas of the law (e.g., property) are analyzed using different methodologies A modular structure, allowing the professor to pick and cover materials in almost any order, to skip certain materials and to focus on court decisions, the theory, or both Professors and students will benefit from: The use of alternative intuitive methods to explain theories The use of simple algebra to teach the most complex subjects The artful combination of theory with a practical approach that ties the economic concepts (including game theory and decision theory) to specific subject matters, legal rules and specific decisions In-depth discussion of decisions and how they could they be explained or argued differently in light of the theoretical concepts reviewed The use of summary boxes to recap complicated concepts Fantastic notes and practical questions following cases
Author: Jeonghyun Kim Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper modifies the standard tort model by introducing role-type uncertainty, that is, it is assumed that neither party knows in advance whether she will become the victim or the injurer when an accident occurs. When the standards of care of the two parties are assumed to be set at the socially optimal levels, only pure comparative negligence and the equal division rule guarantee efficiency, while the rules of simple negligence, contributory negligence, and comparative negligence with fixed division (other than a 50:50 split) produce the possibility of inefficient equilibria. Since the pure comparative negligence rule splits liability between negligent parties according to each party's degree of fault, it makes the accident loss division independent of one's role-type. This produces a social efficiency advantage. We also extend the model to the choice of vehicle size, as a factor determining who will be the injurer and who the victim in motor vehicle collisions. In the extension we analyze various negligence-based liability rules, and tax rules, as instruments for mitigating the vehicle size arms race.
Author: Tim Friehe Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 3834981273 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 200
Book Description
Tim Friehe analyzes important aspects for the design of tort law which intends to induce optimal individual choices and possible limitations of workable tort law in varied settings. He highlights the consequences of the consideration of hitherto neglected behavioral dimensions for the conclusions of the economic analysis of tort law.
Book Description
Conflicts of interest arise naturally in all walks of life, particularly in business life. As general and indeed inevitable phenomena, conflicts of interest should not be prohibited but properly managed. This book presents indepth analysis of such management in three areas of corporate governance where the conflict-of-interest problems are particularly acute: executive compensation, financial analysis, and asset management. ""Conflicts of Interest"" presents the results of a two-year-long research project bringing together academics and practitioners in both law and finance from Europe and the.
Author: Oren Bar-Gill Publisher: ISBN: Category : Torts Languages : en Pages : 25
Book Description
In the standard tort case, the injurer-victim interaction results in harm to the victim. In this paper, we identify and analyze a distinct category of cases - beneficial victim cases - in which the injurer-victim interaction, results in both harm to the victim and benefit to the injurer. In other words, the injurer benefits from the presence of the victim. In these beneficial victim cases, which are quite common, standard results about the relative efficiency of different liability rules do not apply. When the benefit to the injurer exceeds the harm to the victim, liability should be imposed, whereas if the harm is larger than the benefit the case for liability becomes much weaker. These conclusions imply, counterintuitively, that it may be more important to impose liability on the non-negligent injurer rather than on the negligent injurer. We study the incentive effects of different liability rules, as well as the restitution rule, in the beneficial victim case. Our analysis also sheds new light on the law of takings.
Author: Sharon Oded Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing ISBN: 1781954755 Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 337
Book Description
How to induce corporate compliance with regulations? Harsh punishments will cause companies to disguise violations, and mild punishments will cause companies to report their violations and make weak efforts to avoid them. In this book, Sharon Oded canvasses the history of thinking about corporate compliance, and he proposes his own candidate for the best law. This is a sophisticated account of legal incentives that will repay any reader interested in corporate compliance. Robert Cooter, University of California, Berkeley, US The effective control of corporate misconduct is a vital but elusive task for regulators, given the complexity of organization structures and the need to find the right balance between deterrent- and cooperative-based enforcement policies. In this powerful and comprehensive study, Sharon Oded argues for combining different approaches and boldly advocates, in particular, the use of third-party independent corporate monitoring firms to implement self-policing strategies. This will be essential reading for those involved in the theory or practice of regulatory corporate enforcement. Anthony Ogus, University of Manchester, UK and University of Rotterdam, The Netherlands This book considers how a regulatory enforcement policy should be designed to efficiently induce proactive corporate compliance. It first explores two major schools of thought regarding law enforcement, both the deterrence and cooperative approaches, and shows that neither of these represents an optimal regulatory enforcement paradigm from a social welfare perspective. It provides a critical analysis of recent developments in US Federal corporate liability regimes, and proposes a generic framework that better tailors sanction schemes and monitoring systems to regulatee performance. The proposed framework efficiently induces corporate proactive compliance, while maintaining an optimal level of deterrence. This insightful book will appeal to academics in law and economics, behavioral economics, criminology, and business, as well as to practitioners and policymakers.
Author: A. Mitchell Polinsky
Author: A. Mitchell Polinsky
Author: 
Author: A. Mitchell Polinsky
Author: Kirst, Philipp
Author: J. Shahar Dillbary
Author: Jeonghyun Kim
Author: Tim Friehe
Author: Luc Thévenoz
Author: Oren Bar-Gill
Author: Sharon Oded