Author: Jennifer Francis
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 11

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Book Description

Author: Jennifer Francis
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Actions and defenses
Languages : en
Pages : 11

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Book Description

Author: William E. Knepper
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Directors of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 1170

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Book Description

Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Actions and defenses
Languages : en
Pages : 410

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Book Description

Author: Hyeesoo Hyun Chung
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 51

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Book Description
Directors' and officers' (D&O) legal liability insurance is commonly provided to corporate executives and directors. Prior literature suggests managers are more willing to engage in opportunistic behaviors when their personal assets are more protected from litigation risk. Therefore, information about D&O policy details is potentially useful in assessing potential managerial opportunism. However, many countries, including the U.S., do not require firms to disclose this information. We provide evidence on whether mandatory D&O disclosures are likely to provide information about managerial opportunism that is incremental to that provided by other sources of information using a sample of Canadian firms, who are required to make D&O disclosures. We examine the association between excess D&O coverage limits and audit fees since auditors have extensive private information about the likelihood of managerial opportunism and strong incentives to incorporate this information into their audit fees. We find a positive association between excess D&O coverage limits and audit fees after controlling for numerous other audit fee determinants, including other proxies for managerial opportunism such as discretionary accruals and corporate governance variables. Additional analyses suggest auditors are more sensitive to potential managerial opportunism when managers are more likely to act on their opportunistic incentives. We also find a positive association between excess D&O coverage limits and the likelihood of future shareholder litigation. Our findings suggest that D&O insurance disclosures convey incremental information to shareholders and other capital market participants. As such, they suggest a beneficial role for mandatory D&O disclosures.

Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Actions and defenses
Languages : en
Pages : 534

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Book Description

Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Subcommittee on Securities
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 924

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Book Description

Author: Irene Y. Kim
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Class actions (Civil procedure)
Languages : en
Pages : 254

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Book Description

Author: Federico Pastre
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 365611854X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 61

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Book Description
Research Paper (undergraduate) from the year 2012 in the subject Business economics - Business Management, Corporate Governance, grade: Honors, Fordham University School of Law, course: Corporations, language: English, abstract: This paper focuses on the issue of whether shareholder litigations brought in the U.S. - namely, derivative suits and securities class actions - and their equivalent in the Italian law system, achieve their principal regulatory goal of deterring corporate directors and officers from engaging in unlawful conduct, in addition to compensating shareholders and investors for the harm they suffered. In the United States, effective derivative suits and securities class actions, contingency fees, and the rule concerning legal expenses, create an entrepreneurial system in which directors and officers are ultimately deterred by the private enforcement of the law. Nevertheless, the presence of other interests not aligned with the public interest in optimal deterrence causes the deterrence effect to suffer peculiar distortions. Indemnification agreements and D&O liability insurance deeply shape the remaining deterrence effect, in particular, D&O liability insurance shifts the risk of losses to a third party that fails to reintroduce it. This paper analyzes possible solutions to this problem that have been receiving scholarly attention. With regard to the Italian legal system, this paper stresses the causes behind the ineffectiveness of the Italian private enforcement system of corporate laws and analyses what solution, if any, may be adopted. The lack of economic incentives for the plaintiff shareholder, the absence of discovery rules and the difficulty of accessing useful information to be used in litigation, impair the effectiveness of the enforcement system and with it the deterrence goal. Lastly, this paper addresses how differing social landscapes and judicial attitudes also play a role in the deterrence effect within the two legal syst

Author: N. Peter Rasmussen
Publisher: Aspen Publishers
ISBN: 9780808025740
Category : Directors of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 380

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Book Description
Responsibilities of Corporate Officers and Directors under FederalSecurities Law alerts board members and management to their personalduties and liabilities under the federal securities laws. From the vast bodyof federal laws, rules, administrative interpretations, and court decisionsdealing with securities offerings and transactions, those of particularinterest to corporate officers and directors as individuals are discussedhere. The materials focus on the Securities Act of 1933 and theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934, as well as pertinent provisions of theInvestment Company Act of 1940.The 2010 -2011 Edition includes new discussion of the following:Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection ActShareholder access to proxiesSEC enforcementRecent case law on fraud liabilityProxy disclosure concerning Chairman-CEO role, hedging arrangements,compensation consultants