RVNAF and US Operational Cooperation and Coordination PDF Download

Author: Quang Truong Ngo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : United States
Languages : en
Pages : 198

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Author: N. Q. Truong
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : United States
Languages : en
Pages : 196

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Book Description
Peculiarities of the Vietnam War made the effort of cooperation and coordination between American and Vietnamese combat forces an unusually complex and challenging, though rewarding, venture. This monograph analyzes the problem areas of operational cooperation and coordination, conceived both as a command and control device to prosecute the common war effort and as a means to improve the combat effectiveness of the RVNAF. It also attempts to evaluate the successes and failures of this combined effort.

Author: Cao Van Vien
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Vietnam War, 1961-1975
Languages : en
Pages : 224

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Author: Jeffrey J. Clarke
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1782899073
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 970

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Book Description
Includes over 75 maps, photos and plans. In Advice and Support: The Final Years the author describes the U.S. Army advisory effort to the South Vietnamese armed forces during the period when the U.S. commitment in Southeast Asia was at its peak. The account encompasses a broad spectrum of activities at several levels, from the physically demanding work of the battalion advisers on the ground to the more sophisticated undertakings of our senior military officers at the highest echelons of the American military assistance command in Saigon. Among critical subjects treated are our command relationships with the South Vietnamese army, our politico-military efforts to help reform both the South Vietnamese military and government, and our implementation of the Vietnamization policy inaugurated in 1969. The result tells us much about the U.S. Army’s role as an agent of national policy in a critical but often neglected arena, and constitutes a major contribution to our understanding of not only the events that occurred in Vietnam but also the decisions and actions that produced them.

Author: Ngoc Lung Hoang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Military intelligence
Languages : en
Pages : 266

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Author: Robert D. Ramsey
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1437923119
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 191

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Book Description
The Army has recently embarked on massive advisory missions with foreign militaries in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere around the globe. This historical study examines three cases in which the U.S. Army has performed this same mission in the last half of the 20th century, In Korea during the 1950s, in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, and in El Salvador in the 1980s. The Army thought it learned: The need for U.S. advisors to have extensive language and cultural training, the lesser importance for them of technical and tactical skills training, and the need to adapt U.S. organizational concepts, training techniques, and tactics to local conditions. These lessons are still important and relevant today. This is a print on demand report.

Author: Michael F. Morris
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
ISBN: 0700636935
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 348

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Book Description
The Vietnam War ended nearly fifty years ago but the central paradox of the struggle endures: how did the world’s strongest nation fail to secure freedom for the Republic of Vietnam? Michael F. Morris addresses this vexing question by focusing on the senior Marine headquarters in the conflict’s most dangerous region. Known as I Corps, the northern five provinces of South Vietnam witnessed the bloodiest fighting of the entire war. I Corps also contained the Viet Cong’s strongest infrastructure, key portions of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and the important political and economic prizes of Hue and Da Nang. For Americans, it was the site of the first major military operation (Operation STARLITE); the Battles of Hue City and Khe Sanh during the 1968 Tet Offensive; and a military innovation known as the Combined Action Platoon (CAP), a counterinsurgency technique designed to secure the region’s villages. The Marine zone served as Saigon’s “canary in the coal mine”—if the war was to be won, allied action must succeed in its most contested region. With such deep significance, I Corps holds many answers to the lasting questions of the Vietnam War. Following the Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF)—the primary US tactical command in I Corps from 1965 to 1970—Corps Competency? provides the first composite analysis of the critical role of the senior Marine headquarters and offers a coherence missing in piecemeal accounts. Despite the critical importance of I Corps, relatively little is known about its overall impact on the war due to disconnected and patchy historical study of the region. In this comprehensive and newly insightful study of the Vietnam War, Michael Morris tells a story that illustrates what can happen when a corps headquarters is not ready for the conflict it encounters and then fights the war it wants to rather than the one it must. The views expressed in this work are those of the author and not the official position of the United States government, Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, or Marine Corps University.

Author: Elwood L. White
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Electronic government information
Languages : en
Pages : 76

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Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Vietnam War, 1961-1975
Languages : en
Pages : 76

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Author: David M. Toczek
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing USA
ISBN: 0313070172
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 225

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Book Description
Toczek provides the first description of the entire battle of Ap Bac and places it in the larger context of the Vietnam War. The study thoroughly examines the January 1963 battle, complete with detailed supporting maps. Ironically, Ap Bac's great importance lies in American policymakers' perception of the battle as unimportant; for all their intelligence and drive, senior American government officials missed the early warning signs of a flawed policy in Southeast Asia by ignoring the lessons of the defeat of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) on 2 January 1963. The outcome of Ap Bac was a direct reflection of how the U.S. Army organized, equipped, and trained the ARVN. With all the ARVN officer corps's shortcomings, the South Vietnamese Army could not successfully conduct an American combined arms operations against a smaller, less well-equipped enemy. American leadership, both military and civilian, failed to draw any connection between ARVN's dismal performance and American policies toward South Vietnam. Although certain tactical changes resulted from the battle, the larger issue of American policy remained unchanged, including the structure of the advisory system.