Author: Huiyan QiuPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 272
Book Description
Role of Financial Contracts and Managerial Compensation in Resolving Agency Problems
Author: Huiyan QiuAgency Problems and Financial Contracting
Author: Amir BarneaPublisher: Prentice Hall
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 184
Book Description
Pay Without Performance
Author: Lucian A. BebchukPublisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 9780674020634
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 308
Book Description
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
A Financial-agency Analysis of Privatization
Author: John S. WalkerPublisher: Lehigh University Press
ISBN: 9780934223447
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 276
Book Description
The authors argue that resolution of the CEO selection and financial-contracting problems can accelerate efficiency gains realized by the enterprise.
Handbook of the Economics of Finance
Author: G. ConstantinidesPublisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 9780444513632
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 698
Book Description
Arbitrage, State Prices and Portfolio Theory / Philip h. Dybvig and Stephen a. Ross / - Intertemporal Asset Pricing Theory / Darrell Duffle / - Tests of Multifactor Pricing Models, Volatility Bounds and Portfolio Performance / Wayne E. Ferson / - Consumption-Based Asset Pricing / John y Campbell / - The Equity Premium in Retrospect / Rainish Mehra and Edward c. Prescott / - Anomalies and Market Efficiency / William Schwert / - Are Financial Assets Priced Locally or Globally? / G. Andrew Karolyi and Rene M. Stuli / - Microstructure and Asset Pricing / David Easley and Maureen O'hara / - A Survey of Behavioral Finance / Nicholas Barberis and Richard Thaler / - Derivatives / Robert E. Whaley / - Fixed-Income Pricing / Qiang Dai and Kenneth J. Singleton.
Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
Author: Lucian A. BebchukPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Agency (Law)
Languages : en
Pages : 44
Book Description
This paper provides an overview of the main theoretical elements and empirical underpinnings of a managerial power' approach to executive compensation. Under this approach, the design of executive compensation is viewed not only as an instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself. Boards of publicly traded companies with dispersed ownership, we argue, cannot be expected to bargain at arm's length with managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers' performance. We show that the managerial power approach can explain many features of the executive compensation landscape, including ones that many researchers have long viewed as puzzling. Among other things, we discuss option plan design, stealth compensation, executive loans, payments to departing executives, retirement benefits, the use of compensation consultants, and the observed relationship between CEO power and pay. We also explain how managerial influence might lead to substantially inefficient arrangements that produce weak or even perverse incentives.
Agency Theory and Executive Pay
Author: Alexander PepperPublisher: Springer
ISBN: 3319999699
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 140
Book Description
This new book examines the relationship between agency theory and executive pay. It argues that while Jensen and Meckling (1976) were right in their analysis of the agency problem in public corporations they were wrong about the proposed solutions. Drawing on ideas from economics, psychology, sociology and the philosophy of science, the author explains how standard agency theory has contributed to the problem of executive pay rather than solved it. The book explores why companies should be regarded as real entities not legal fictions, how executive pay in public corporations can be conceptualised as a collective action problem and how behavioral science can help in the design of optimal incentive arrangements. An insightful and revolutionary read for those researching corporate governance, HRM and organisation theory, this useful book offers potential solutions to some of the problems with executive pay and the standard model of agency.
Managerial Compensation and the Agency Costs of Debt Finance
Author: Brander, James APublisher: Montréal : Dép. de science économique, Université de Montréal
ISBN: 9782893820002
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 27
Book Description
Handbook of Empirical Corporate Finance SET
Author: Bjørn Espen EckboPublisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0080559565
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 1137
Book Description
This two-volume set summarizes recent research on corporate decision-making. The first volume covers measurement and theoretical subjects as well as sources of capital, including banks, public offerings, and private investors. In the second volume, contributors focus on the ways corporations are structured and the practices through which they can be bought and sold. Thus, its major subjects include dividends, capital structure, financial distress, takeovers, restructurings, and managerial incentives. Takes stock of the main empirical findings to date across an unprecedented spectrum of corporate finance issues Discusses everything from econometric methodology, to raising capital and capital structure choice, and to managerial incentives and corporate investment behavior Contributors are leading empirical researchers that remain active in their respective areas of expertise Writing style makes the chapters accessible to industry practitioners
Author: Jun Qian