Robust Mechanism Design PDF Download

Author: Dirk Bergemann
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9814374598
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 471

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Book Description
Robust Mechanism Design: the Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs.

Author: Dirk Bergemann
Publisher: Now Pub
ISBN: 9781601986443
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 72

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Book Description
An Introduction to Robust Mechanism Design brings together and presents a number of results on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that the authors have been working on in the past decade. This work examines the implications of relaxing the strong informational assumptions that drive much of the mechanism design literature. The objective is to provide the reader with an overview of the research agenda and present the main results of this research by illustrating it in terms of a common and canonical example -- the single unit auction with interdependent values. In addition, the monograph includes an extended discussion on the role of alternative assumptions about type spaces in the authors' work. It also discusses the literature to explain the common logic of the informational robustness approach that unifies the work that is surveyed in this monograph.

Author: Dirk Bergemann
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 981437458X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 471

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Book Description
Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.

Author: Tilman Borgers
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190244682
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 263

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Book Description
What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.

Author: Takashi Kunimoto
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description
We assess the strength of the different conditions identified in the literature of robust mechanism design. We focus on three conditions: ex post incentive compatibility, robust monotonicity, and robust measurability. Ex post incentive compatibility has been shown to be necessary for any concept of robust implementation, while robust monotonicity and robust measurability have been shown to be necessary for robust (full) exact and virtual implementation, respectively. This paper shows that while violations of ex post incentive compatibility and robust monotonicity do not easily go away, we identify a mild condition on environments in which robust measurability is satisfied by all social choice functions over an open and dense subset of first-order types. We conclude that there is a precise sense in which robust virtual implementation can be significantly more permissive than robust exact implementation. -- robust mechanism design ; ex post incentive compatibility ; robust monotonicity ; robust measurability

Author: Yan Long
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Decision making
Languages : en
Pages : 71

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Book Description

Author: Theodore E. Djaferis
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9780792396178
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 290

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Book Description
To a large extent, our lives on this earth depend on systems that operate auto matically. Manysuchsystems can be found in nature and others are man made. These systems can be biological, electrical, mechanical, chemical, or ecological, to namejust a few categories. Our human body is full ofsystems whose conti nued automatic operation is vital for our existence. On a daily basis we come in contact with man made systems whose automatic operation ensures increa sed productivity, promotes economic development and improves the quality of life. A primary component that is responsible for the automatic operation of a system is a device or mechanism called the controller. In man made systems one must first design and then implement such a controller either as a piece of hardware or as software code in a computer. The safe and efficient automatic operation of such systems is testimony to the success of control theorists and practitioners over the years. This book presents new methods {or controller design. The process ofdeveloping a controller or control strategy can be dramatically improved if one can generate an appropriate dynamic model for the system under consideration. Robust control design deals with the question of how to develop such controllers for system models with uncertainty. In many cases dynamic models can be expressed in terms oflinear, time invariant differential equations or transfer functions.

Author: Rakesh V. Vohra
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139499173
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 185

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Book Description
Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify results from disparate areas of mechanism design. The third is reach: the technique offers the ability to solve problems that appear to be beyond solutions offered by traditional methods. No claim is made that the approach advocated should supplant traditional mathematical machinery. Rather, the approach represents an addition to the tools of the economic theorist who proposes to understand economic phenomena through the lens of mechanism design.

Author: John Benjamin Miller
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 138

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Book Description
The field of mechanism design seeks mechanisms (auction formats, market reg- ulations, labor contracts, insurance policies, and so on) such that participants, acting in their own self-interest, nonetheless arrive at an outcome desired by the mechanism designer. This theory models problems in online advertising, crowdsourcing, cloud computing, matching employers with employees, and many other domains. In order to be of practical use, however, a mechanism must be easy for participants to understand, and must realistically model the tradeoffs participants consider when deciding how to act. This thesis studies the canonical mechanism design problem of maximizing a seller's revenue. Classically, buyers' preferences have been modeled by the axioms of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)'s Expected Utility Theory (EUT). Under the further assumption that buyers are risk-neutral, the optimal mechanism can be characterized as the solution to a linear program. However, this mechanism may be complex, requiring randomness in the outcomes, and is not seen in practice. We therefore pursue two lines of inquiry. In the first, we adopt the classical risk-neutral model, and show that a certain natural and deterministic mechanism suffices to capture a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. In the second, we initiate the study of revenue-optimal mechanisms under behavioral models beyond EUT. We study the Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) model (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), in which a buyer's utility for a randomized outcome does not satisfy linearity. We describe the implications for revenue maximization of this more realistic model, and provide deterministic mechanisms which obtain constant fractions of the optimal revenue.

Author: Y. Narahari
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1848009380
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 274

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Book Description
This monograph focuses on exploring game theoretic modeling and mechanism design for problem solving in Internet and network economics. For the first time, the main theoretical issues and applications of mechanism design are bound together in a single text.