Author: Lasse Heje PedersenPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Information theory in economics
Languages : en
Pages : 152
Book Description
Repeated Trade Under Asymmetric Information
Author: Lasse Heje PedersenPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Information theory in economics
Languages : en
Pages : 152
Book Description
Asymmetric Information, Repeated Trade, and Asset Prices
Author: James McLoughlinPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 170
Book Description
Financial intermediaries play an important role in the pricing of financial assets. For example, intermediaries may act on behalf of consumers in deciding how their wealth is invested, or they may act as providers of liquidity. This dissertation explores several ways in which intermediaries impact price informativeness, the transaction costs investors incur, and investor welfare. In the first chapter, I examine how prices reveal information when intermediaries are informed. Using a model of repeated trade between a long-lived, informed, price-discriminating market maker and risk averse traders with endogenous hedging demands, I first show that traders are weakly better off trading with an informed dealer, as they may learn something about an asset's value in the process of transacting. Second, while long-term incentives can induce an informed market maker to honestly reveal information and increase risk-sharing, they also enable the market maker to hide her information and extract more rents, reducing price informativeness. This less desirable outcome dominates with respect to both the parameter space and a selection criterion. Finally, measures of market quality, such as the transient component of price volatility (illiquidity), may not accurately reflect welfare. The second chapter discusses how relationships affect prices when intermediaries are concerned about adverse selection. When counter-parties trade in OTC markets, such as those for corporate bonds or derivatives, the lack of anonymity implies that future terms of trade can influence prices today. Using a model of repeated trade between an informed trader and uninformed market makers, I show that information asymmetry can affect the markups charged by dealers in two ways. First, for a given market structure (number of market makers), traders with more private information incur lower trading costs because dealers offer better terms to mitigate adverse selection. Second, even when dealers can not compete directly on price quotes, they compete indirectly by improving the informed trader's outside option, though this competition is imperfect. While repeated trade allows two given counter-parties to ameliorate adverse selection, the maximum number of dealers, and hence the total gains achievable, are limited by information frictions. An empirical implication is that the comparative statics of transaction costs only make sense conditional on market structure. The third chapter considers the effect intermediaries have as financial advisors, and whether measures of their performance as mutual fund managers accurately reflect the value they add to an economy. Relative to the existing literature, I look at how the presence of mutual funds affects the price of the underlying asset in an economy. Once this pricing effect is accounted for, I show that standard measures of mutual fund performance may not accurately reflect whether fund management is welfare improving.
Market Experience and Willingness to Trade
Author: Luke LindsayA Model of Intertemporal Asset Prices Under Asymmetric Information
Author: Jiang WangPublisher: Legare Street Press
ISBN: 9781018159898
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Repeated Trade and Asymmetric Information
Author: Bernard LebrunREPEATED TRADE AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION: A PRINCIPAL-AGENT IN THE AUCTION FRAMEWORK
Author: Bernard LEBRUNTrade Policy Under Asymmetric Information
Author: Harvey LapanContracting for Multiple Goods Under Asymmetric Information
Author: Kazumi HoriPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 14
Book Description
Optimal contracts between a buyer and a seller who trade multiple goods under asymmetric information are considered. The seller makes sequences of unobservable investments, and then realizes the value of the goods. The investment level and value of goods are private information for the seller and the buyer respectively. In this situation, although the parties can write complete contracts, a hold-up problem exists. It is shown that each good is not traded sequentially in the second-best contract, but they are treated independently or as one bundled good. Dynamic contracts cannot solve the hold-up problem.
Ownership and Asymmetric Information Problems in the Corporate Loan Market
Author: Lewis GaulPublisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781505310306
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Book Description
In credit markets, asymmetric information problems arise when borrowers have private information about their creditworthiness that is not observable by lenders. If these informational asymmetries do not negatively affect lenders' profitability, then they are irrelevant to lenders.
The Oxford Handbook of Entrepreneurial Finance
Author: Douglas CummingPublisher: OUP USA
ISBN: 0195391241
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 937
Book Description
Provides a comprehensive picture of issues dealing with different sources of entrepreneurial finance and different issues with financing entrepreneurs. The Handbook comprises contributions from 48 authors based in 12 different countries.