Author: David CardPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 38
Book Description
Rent-sharing, Holup, and Wages
Author: David CardRent-sharing, Holdup, and Wages
Author: David Edward CardPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Profit-sharing
Languages : en
Pages : 38
Book Description
When wage contracts are relatively short-lived, rent sharing may reduce the incentives for investment since some of the returns to sunk capital are captured by workers. In this paper we use a matched worker-firm data set from the Veneto region of Italy that combines Social Security earnings records for employees with detailed financial information for employers to measure the degree of rent sharing and test for holdup. We estimate wage models with job match effects, allowing us to control for any permanent differences in productivity across workers, firms, and job matches. We also compare OLS and instrumental variables specifications that use sales of firms in other regions of the country to instrument value-added per worker. We find strong evidence of rent-sharing, with a "Lester range" of variation in wages between profitable and unprofitable firms of around 10%. On the other hand we find little evidence that bargaining lowers the return to investment. Instead, firm-level bargaining in Veneto appears to split the rents after deducting the full cost of capital. Our findings are consistent with a dynamic bargaining model (Crawford, 1988) in which workers pay up front for the returns to sunk capital they will capture in later periods.
The Rent Sharing Hypothesis and Wages in Relation to Workplace and Company Size
Author: Cushla PaiceWages, Profits and Rent-sharing
Author: David G. BlanchflowerPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporate profits
Languages : en
Pages : 28
Book Description
The paper uses CPS data from 1964 to 1985 to test for the existence of rent-sharing in US tabor markets, Using an unbalanced panel from the manufacturing sector, and random-effects and fixed-effects specifications, the paper finds that changes in wages are explained by movements in lagged levels of profitability and unemployment. The results appear to be consistent with rent-sharing theory (or a labor contract framework with risk-averse firms) and to be inconsistent with the competitive labor market model. The paper estimates the unemployment elasticity of pay at approximately -0.03, and the profit elasticity of pay at between 0.02 and 0.05.
The Extent of Rent Sharing Along the Wage Distribution
Author: Alessia MatanoPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 37
Book Description
The relation between rent sharing and wages has generally been evaluated on average wages. This paper uses a unique employer-employee panel database to investigate the extent of rent sharing along the wage distribution in Italy. We apply quantile regression techniques and control for national level bargaining, unobserved worker and firm heterogeneity and endogeneity. Our findings show that the extent of rent-sharing decreases along the wage distribution, suggesting that unskilled workers benefit most from firms' rents. By applying quantile regressions by occupational categories, we show that the decreasing pattern is mainly driven by blue collar workers, while estimates for white collars are higher and basically constant along the wage distribution. We also provide evidence that unions might represent one of the driver of our findings.
Rent-Sharing, Hold-up, and Wages: Evidence from Matched Panel Data
Author: David CardRent Sharing, Wage Floors, and Development
Author: Joshua BudlenderPublisher:
ISBN: 9789292674403
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Faced with more favourable demand conditions, many firms raise wages. However, we show that firms with labour market power, lower productivity, and binding wage floors will absorb these positive revenue productivity shocks as excess profits instead of increasing wages or employment. Our prediction follows from a simple but novel theoretical insight under a standard framework of monopsonistic competition, and we empirically test this theory in South Africa using firm-level administrative data. We first explain how firm wage-setting behaviour changes at a productivity threshold directly related to the wage floor and then show how the predicted wage, employment, and profit patterns are evident in the cross-section of firms covered by collective bargaining agreements. We then replicate and extend a leading method of identifying rent-sharing elasticities, but estimated separately by firm revenue productivity bins. As predicted by the theory, we find that firms below the threshold increase wages and employment less, and profits more, in response to revenue productivity shocks, and that there is a break at the threshold where wage floors bind. The study complicates the conclusions emerging from the literature on firm rentsharing, and forms part of an explanation for 'stalled' development and 'jobless growth'.
Rent Sharing Before and After the Wage Bill
Author: Pedro Silva MartinsPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporate profits
Languages : en
Pages : 37
Book Description
A Woman Rice Planter
Author: Elizabeth Waties Allston PringlePublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Georgetown County (S.C.)
Languages : en
Pages : 486
Book Description
Author: