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Author: David Edward Card Publisher: ISBN: Category : Profit-sharing Languages : en Pages : 38
Book Description
When wage contracts are relatively short-lived, rent sharing may reduce the incentives for investment since some of the returns to sunk capital are captured by workers. In this paper we use a matched worker-firm data set from the Veneto region of Italy that combines Social Security earnings records for employees with detailed financial information for employers to measure the degree of rent sharing and test for holdup. We estimate wage models with job match effects, allowing us to control for any permanent differences in productivity across workers, firms, and job matches. We also compare OLS and instrumental variables specifications that use sales of firms in other regions of the country to instrument value-added per worker. We find strong evidence of rent-sharing, with a "Lester range" of variation in wages between profitable and unprofitable firms of around 10%. On the other hand we find little evidence that bargaining lowers the return to investment. Instead, firm-level bargaining in Veneto appears to split the rents after deducting the full cost of capital. Our findings are consistent with a dynamic bargaining model (Crawford, 1988) in which workers pay up front for the returns to sunk capital they will capture in later periods.
Author: David Edward Card Publisher: ISBN: Category : Profit-sharing Languages : en Pages : 38
Book Description
When wage contracts are relatively short-lived, rent sharing may reduce the incentives for investment since some of the returns to sunk capital are captured by workers. In this paper we use a matched worker-firm data set from the Veneto region of Italy that combines Social Security earnings records for employees with detailed financial information for employers to measure the degree of rent sharing and test for holdup. We estimate wage models with job match effects, allowing us to control for any permanent differences in productivity across workers, firms, and job matches. We also compare OLS and instrumental variables specifications that use sales of firms in other regions of the country to instrument value-added per worker. We find strong evidence of rent-sharing, with a "Lester range" of variation in wages between profitable and unprofitable firms of around 10%. On the other hand we find little evidence that bargaining lowers the return to investment. Instead, firm-level bargaining in Veneto appears to split the rents after deducting the full cost of capital. Our findings are consistent with a dynamic bargaining model (Crawford, 1988) in which workers pay up front for the returns to sunk capital they will capture in later periods.
Author: Jean-Paul Azam Publisher: World Bank Publications ISBN: Category : Corporate profits Languages : en Pages : 30
Book Description
Labor costs in Francophone Africa are considered high by the standards of low-income countries, at least in the formal sector. Workers appear to have some bargaining power and, in Côte d'Ivoire, can force renegotiation of labor contracts in response to new investments.
Author: Alessia Matano Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 37
Book Description
The relation between rent sharing and wages has generally been evaluated on average wages. This paper uses a unique employer-employee panel database to investigate the extent of rent sharing along the wage distribution in Italy. We apply quantile regression techniques and control for national level bargaining, unobserved worker and firm heterogeneity and endogeneity. Our findings show that the extent of rent-sharing decreases along the wage distribution, suggesting that unskilled workers benefit most from firms' rents. By applying quantile regressions by occupational categories, we show that the decreasing pattern is mainly driven by blue collar workers, while estimates for white collars are higher and basically constant along the wage distribution. We also provide evidence that unions might represent one of the driver of our findings.
Author: David G. Blanchflower Publisher: ISBN: Category : Corporate profits Languages : en Pages : 28
Book Description
The paper uses CPS data from 1964 to 1985 to test for the existence of rent-sharing in US tabor markets, Using an unbalanced panel from the manufacturing sector, and random-effects and fixed-effects specifications, the paper finds that changes in wages are explained by movements in lagged levels of profitability and unemployment. The results appear to be consistent with rent-sharing theory (or a labor contract framework with risk-averse firms) and to be inconsistent with the competitive labor market model. The paper estimates the unemployment elasticity of pay at approximately -0.03, and the profit elasticity of pay at between 0.02 and 0.05.
Author: Sabien Dobbelaere Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
Empirical labor economists have resorted to estimating the responsiveness of workers wages on firms ability to pay to assess the extent to which employers share rents with their employees. This paper compares this labor economics approach with two other approaches that rely on standard micro production data only the productivity approach for which estimates of the output elasticities of labor and materials and data on the respective revenue shares are needed and the accounting approach which boils down to directly computing the extent of rent sharing from firm accounting information. Using matched employer-employee data on 60,294 employees working in 9,849 firms over the period 1984-2001 in France, we quantify industry differences in rent-sharing parameters derived from the three approaches. We find a median absolute extent of rent sharing of about 0.30 using either the productivity or the accounting approach. Only exploiting firm-level information brings this median rent-sharing parameter down to 0.16 using the labor economics approach. Controlling for unobserved worker ability further reduces the median absolute extent of rent sharing to 0.08. Our analysis makes clear that the three different approaches face important trade-offs. Hence, empirical economists interested in establishing that profits are shared should select the appropriate approach based on the particular research question and on the data at hand.
Author: Nicole Gürtzgen Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper analyses whether wages in Germany respond to firm-specific profitability conditions. Particular emphasis lies on the question of whether the extent of rent-sharing varies across different systems of wage determination. Those may be categorised into sector-specific wage agreements, firm-specific wage agreements and wage determination without any bargaining coverage. To derive testable hypotheses, we set up a theoretical model that analyses the sensitivity of wages to firm-specific conditions under different wage setting structures. The hypotheses are tested using an establishment-level panel data set from the mining and manufacturing sector. The results of the empirical analysis generally suggest that rent-sharing is present in Germany. However, the extent of rent-sharing is found to be significantly lower in establishments that are subject to a collective wage agreement - irrespective of whether the agreement is industry- or firm-specific. While pooled OLS estimates yield positive estimates of the rent-sharing coefficient in establishments that are covered by a collective contract, SYS-GMM-estimates accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity of rents point to a rent-sharing coefficient of zero.
Author: Sabien Dobbelaere Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 44
Book Description
Researchers contributing to the empirical rent-sharing literature have typically resorted to estimating the responsiveness of workers' wages on firms' ability to pay in order to assess the extent to which employers share rents with their employees. This paper compares rent-sharing estimates using such a wage determination regression with estimates based on a productivity regression that relies on standard firm-level input and output data. We view these two regressions as reduced-form equations stemming from, or at least compatible with, a variety of underlying theoretical structural models.Using a large matched firm-worker panel data sample for French manufacturing, we find that the industry distributions of the rent-sharing estimates based on them are significantly different on average, even if they slightly overlap and are correlated. Precisely, if we only rely on the firm-level information, we find that the median of the relative and absolute extent of rent-sharing parameters amount roughly to 0.40 and 0.30 for the productivity regression and to 0.20 and 0.16 for the wage determination regression. When we also take advantage of the worker-level information to control for unobserved worker ability in the model of wage determination, we find that these parameters further reduce as expected and have a median value of only about 0.10.
Author: David Edward Card
Author: David Edward Card
Author: David Card
Author: Jean-Paul Azam
Author: David Card
Author: Alessia Matano
Author: Andrew K. G. Hildreth
Author: David G. Blanchflower
Author: Sabien Dobbelaere
Author: Nicole Gürtzgen
Author: Sabien Dobbelaere