Author: Pedro Silva Martins
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporate profits
Languages : en
Pages : 37
Book Description
Rent Sharing Before and After the Wage Bill
Author: Pedro Silva Martins
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporate profits
Languages : en
Pages : 37
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporate profits
Languages : en
Pages : 37
Book Description
Rent Sharing Before and After the Wage Bill
Author: Pedro Martins
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Abstract: Many biases plague the analysis of whether employers share rents with their employees, unlike what is predicted by the competitive labour market model. Using a Portuguese matched employer-employee panel, this paper is one of the first to address these biases in three complementary ways: 1) Controlling directly for the fact that firms that share more rents will, ceteris paribus, have lower net-of-wages profits. 2) Instrumenting profits via interactions between the exchange rate and the share of exports in firms' total sales. 3) Considering firm or firm/worker spell fixed effects and highlighting the role of downward wage rigidity. These approaches clarify conflicting findings in the literature and result, in our preferred specifications, in significant evidence of rent sharing (a Lester range of pay dispersion of 56%), also shown to be robust to a number of competitive interpretations
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Abstract: Many biases plague the analysis of whether employers share rents with their employees, unlike what is predicted by the competitive labour market model. Using a Portuguese matched employer-employee panel, this paper is one of the first to address these biases in three complementary ways: 1) Controlling directly for the fact that firms that share more rents will, ceteris paribus, have lower net-of-wages profits. 2) Instrumenting profits via interactions between the exchange rate and the share of exports in firms' total sales. 3) Considering firm or firm/worker spell fixed effects and highlighting the role of downward wage rigidity. These approaches clarify conflicting findings in the literature and result, in our preferred specifications, in significant evidence of rent sharing (a Lester range of pay dispersion of 56%), also shown to be robust to a number of competitive interpretations
Public Choice Concepts and Applications in Law
Author: Maxwell L. Stearns
Publisher: West Academic Publishing
ISBN:
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 676
Book Description
Stearns and Zywicki's Public Choice Concepts and Applications in Law is the only course book specifically designed to instruct law students in the discipline of public choice. The book provides a comprehensive but nontechnical overview of interest group theory, social choice theory, game theory, and elementary price theory. It ties these concepts to a wide range of topics in both public and private law. The book contains chapters devoted to each set of methodological tools and specific institutional settings: legislatures, courts, executive branch and bureaus, and constitutions.
Publisher: West Academic Publishing
ISBN:
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 676
Book Description
Stearns and Zywicki's Public Choice Concepts and Applications in Law is the only course book specifically designed to instruct law students in the discipline of public choice. The book provides a comprehensive but nontechnical overview of interest group theory, social choice theory, game theory, and elementary price theory. It ties these concepts to a wide range of topics in both public and private law. The book contains chapters devoted to each set of methodological tools and specific institutional settings: legislatures, courts, executive branch and bureaus, and constitutions.
Rent-sharing, Holdup, and Wages
Author: David Edward Card
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Profit-sharing
Languages : en
Pages : 38
Book Description
When wage contracts are relatively short-lived, rent sharing may reduce the incentives for investment since some of the returns to sunk capital are captured by workers. In this paper we use a matched worker-firm data set from the Veneto region of Italy that combines Social Security earnings records for employees with detailed financial information for employers to measure the degree of rent sharing and test for holdup. We estimate wage models with job match effects, allowing us to control for any permanent differences in productivity across workers, firms, and job matches. We also compare OLS and instrumental variables specifications that use sales of firms in other regions of the country to instrument value-added per worker. We find strong evidence of rent-sharing, with a "Lester range" of variation in wages between profitable and unprofitable firms of around 10%. On the other hand we find little evidence that bargaining lowers the return to investment. Instead, firm-level bargaining in Veneto appears to split the rents after deducting the full cost of capital. Our findings are consistent with a dynamic bargaining model (Crawford, 1988) in which workers pay up front for the returns to sunk capital they will capture in later periods.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Profit-sharing
Languages : en
Pages : 38
Book Description
When wage contracts are relatively short-lived, rent sharing may reduce the incentives for investment since some of the returns to sunk capital are captured by workers. In this paper we use a matched worker-firm data set from the Veneto region of Italy that combines Social Security earnings records for employees with detailed financial information for employers to measure the degree of rent sharing and test for holdup. We estimate wage models with job match effects, allowing us to control for any permanent differences in productivity across workers, firms, and job matches. We also compare OLS and instrumental variables specifications that use sales of firms in other regions of the country to instrument value-added per worker. We find strong evidence of rent-sharing, with a "Lester range" of variation in wages between profitable and unprofitable firms of around 10%. On the other hand we find little evidence that bargaining lowers the return to investment. Instead, firm-level bargaining in Veneto appears to split the rents after deducting the full cost of capital. Our findings are consistent with a dynamic bargaining model (Crawford, 1988) in which workers pay up front for the returns to sunk capital they will capture in later periods.
Rent-sharing and Wages
Author: Andrew K. G. Hildreth
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business enterprises
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business enterprises
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Book Description
Wages and International Rent Sharing in Multinational Firms
Author: John W. Budd, Jozef Konings and Matthew J. Slaughter
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 37
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 37
Book Description
Increase by Wages for Printers, Pressmen and Bookbinders. Hearing Before the Committee ... 66th Congress, 1st Session on H.R. 1393, 4768, 4773, 5138, 5418, 5641, 5811, and 5823 ... June 20, 1919. Washington, Govt. Print. Off., 1919
Author: United States. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on printing
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 30
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 30
Book Description
Rent-sharing, Holup, and Wages
Minimum Wage-hour Legislation
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Education and Labor
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Minimum wage
Languages : en
Pages : 1624
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Minimum wage
Languages : en
Pages : 1624
Book Description
The Federal Salary and Fringe Benefits Act of 1966, Hearings....89-2, on H.R. 14122, April 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, and 27, 1966
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Post Office and Civil Service
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 328
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 328
Book Description