Author: Dilip AbreuPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Games of strategy (Mathematics)
Languages : en
Pages : 50
Book Description
Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games
Author: Dilip AbreuPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 35
Book Description
Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games
Author: Dilip AbreuPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Games of strategy (Mathematics)
Languages : en
Pages : 50
Book Description
Repeated Games and Reputations
Author: George J. MailathPublisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198041217
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 664
Book Description
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Time-consistency and Renegotiation in Policy and Repeated Games
Author: Fai Tong ChungGame Theory
Author: Drew FudenbergPublisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262061414
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 616
Book Description
This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory—including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information—in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises. The theory of noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agent's optimal choice may depend on a forecast of the opponents' choices. "Noncooperative" refers to choices that are based on the participant's perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science. The fourteen chapters are grouped in parts that cover static games of complete information, dynamic games of complete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of incomplete information, and advanced topics.
Game Equilibrium Models II
Author: Reinhard SeltenPublisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 366207365X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 377
Book Description
The four volumes of Game Equilibrium Models present applications of non-cooperative game theory. Problems of strategic interaction arising in biology, economics, political science and the social sciences in general are treated in 42 papers on a wide variety of subjects. Internationally known authors with backgrounds in various disciplines have contributed original research. The reader finds innovative modelling combined with advanced methods of analysis. The four volumes are the outcome of a research year at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the University of Bielefeld. The close interaction of an international interdisciplinary group of researchers has produced an unusual collection of remarkable results of great interest for everybody who wants to be informed on the scope, potential, and future direction of work in applied game theory. Volume II Methods, Morals and Markets contains areas of research which will attract the interest of economists, political scientists, mathematicians and philosophers. The papers deal with the methodology of analysis of games, game theoretic contributions to fundamental ethical questions facing societies and game-theoretic analyses of market environments.
Renegotiation and Symetry in Repeated Games
Author: Dilip AbreuGame Theory and the Social Contract: Just playing
Author: K. G. BinmorePublisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262024440
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 624
Book Description
Written for an interdisciplinary audience, Just Playing offers a panoramic tour through a range of new and disturbing insights that game theory brings to anthropology, biology, economics, philosophy, and psychology.
Rationality and Equilibrium
Author: Charalambos D. AliprantisPublisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 354029578X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 254
Book Description
This book contains a collection of original and state-of-the-art contributions in rational choice and general equilibrium theory. Among the topics are preferences, demand, equilibrium, core allocations, and testable restrictions. The contributing authors are Daniel McFadden, Rosa Matzkin, Emma Moreno-Garcia, Roger Lagunoff, Yakar Kannai, Myrna Wooders, James Moore, Ted Bergstrom, Luca Anderlini, Lin Zhou, Mark Bagnoli, Alexander Kovalenkov, Carlos Herves-Beloso, Michaela Topuzu, Bernard Cornet, Andreu Mas-Colell and Nicholas Yannelis.
Modeling Rationality, Morality, and Evolution
Author: Peter DanielsonPublisher: New York : Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0195125495
Category : Ethics
Languages : en
Pages : 474
Book Description
These essays focus on questions that arise when morality is considered from the perspective of rational choice and evolution. It links questions like ""is it rational to be moral?"" to the evolution of co-operation, and uses models from game theory, evolutionary biology and cognitive science.