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Author: Jonathan B. Baker Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 59
Book Description
The past forty years have witnessed a remarkable transformation in horizontal merger enforcement in the United States. With no change in the underlying statute, the Clayton Act, the weight given to market concentration by the federal courts and by the federal antitrust agencies has declined dramatically. Instead, increasing weight has been given to three arguments often made by merging firms in their defense: entry, expansion and efficiencies. We document this shift and provide examples where courts have approved highly concentrating mergers based on limited evidence of entry and expansion. We show using merger enforcement data and a survey we conducted of merger practitioners that the decline in antitrust enforcement is ongoing, especially at the current Justice Department. We then argue in favor of reinvigorating horizontal merger enforcement by partially restoring the structural presumption and by requiring strong evidence to overcome the government's prima facie case. We propose several routes by which the government can establish its prima facie case, distinguishing between cases involving coordinated vs. unilateral anti-competitive effects.
Author: Jonathan B. Baker Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 59
Book Description
The past forty years have witnessed a remarkable transformation in horizontal merger enforcement in the United States. With no change in the underlying statute, the Clayton Act, the weight given to market concentration by the federal courts and by the federal antitrust agencies has declined dramatically. Instead, increasing weight has been given to three arguments often made by merging firms in their defense: entry, expansion and efficiencies. We document this shift and provide examples where courts have approved highly concentrating mergers based on limited evidence of entry and expansion. We show using merger enforcement data and a survey we conducted of merger practitioners that the decline in antitrust enforcement is ongoing, especially at the current Justice Department. We then argue in favor of reinvigorating horizontal merger enforcement by partially restoring the structural presumption and by requiring strong evidence to overcome the government's prima facie case. We propose several routes by which the government can establish its prima facie case, distinguishing between cases involving coordinated vs. unilateral anti-competitive effects.
Author: American Bar Association. Section of Antitrust Law Publisher: American Bar Association ISBN: 9780897077644 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 72
Author: U. S. Department U.S. Department of Justice Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform ISBN: 9781544654577 Category : Languages : en Pages : 38
Book Description
These Guidelines outline the principal analytical techniques, practices, and the enforcement policy of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (the "Agencies") with respect to mergers and acquisitions involving actual or potential competitors ("horizontal mergers") under the federal antitrust laws. The relevant statutory provisions include Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18, Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45. Most particularly, Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers if "in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." The Agencies seek to identify and challenge competitively harmful mergers while avoiding unnecessary interference with mergers that are either competitively beneficial or neutral. Most merger analysis is necessarily predictive, requiring an assessment of what will likely happen if a merger proceeds as compared to what will likely happen if it does not. Given this inherent need for prediction, these Guidelines reflect the congressional intent that merger enforcement should interdict competitive problems in their incipiency and that certainty about anticompetitive effect is seldom possible and not required for a merger to be illegal.
Author: Thomas Jeffrey Horton Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This article reviews the new Horizontal Merger Guidelines released on August 19, 2010, by the United States Department of Justice, through its Antitrust Division, and the Federal Trade Commission. The United States' New Horizontal Merger Guidelines converge towards and closely mimic their European counterparts. Indeed, the New Guidelines differ dramatically from their 1992 predecessors, and signal an American competition theory counterrevolution. First, they reveal a commitment towards more aggressive horizontal merger enforcement driven by a renewed emphasis on the incipiency standard. Second, they set out a less formulaic and rigid review methodology, which the Agencies hope will prove to be more litigation friendly, as they pursue enforcement cases in American courts. And third, they indicate heightened concerns about potential unilateral effects, including exclusionary conduct, and impacts on non-price competition such as quality, variety, and innovation. When the New Guidelines are systematically compared side by side to the EC's, the resemblances are striking. Indeed, the New Guidelines more closely resemble the EC's than they do their 1992 predecessors. It can be fairly concluded that the New Guidelines' drafters were heavily influenced by, and paid close attention to, the EC's guidelines. However, it is unclear whether the New Guidelines will survive a conservative administration, or how they will be accepted and interpreted by the American courts.
Author: Justin Alan Henderson Publisher: ISBN: 9781124600468 Category : Languages : en Pages : 37
Book Description
All government agencies are affected by a broad number of factors that determine how they do their job. It is particularly important for regulatory agencies in the area of consumer protection, that they complete their tasks in a way that is both fair and beneficial for consumers. In this paper, I attempt to assess the effect of a variety of political, economic, and budgetary factors on the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regarding their role in horizontal merger enforcement. I use three simple regression models with the dependent variable of the number of mergers challenged by the DOJ, FTC, and combined. The independent variables assessed are the total number of mergers filed, party of the President, ideological measurements of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, S & P 500 growth, the unemployment rate, and the budgets of the two agencies. I find that the political variables have no significant effect in any of the three regressions. The number of mergers filed is significantly and positively correlated in all three regressions. S & P 500 growth and unemployment both have a significant effect on the number of merger challenges by the DOJ but not the FTC. Both the FTC and DOJ are significantly affected by the size of their respective budgets. In the overall regression, I find that unemployment, S & P 500 growth, and budgets have a significant impact on the total number of mergers challenged. The differential effect of the economic factors on the DOJ and FTC can help to show policymakers the strengths and weaknesses of the two agencies as well as show what factors might contribute to an agency's ability to equitably and effectively complete is job.
Author: Jonathan B. Baker
Author: Jonathan B. Baker
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary
Author: Thomas Matthew Wilson
Author: American Bar Association. Section of Antitrust Law
Author: David B. Audretsch
Author: U. S. Department U.S. Department of Justice
Author: Thomas Jeffrey Horton
Author: Justin Alan Henderson
Author: 
Author: National Association of Attorneys General