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Author: Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 26
Book Description
The economic analysis of regulation raises fundamental questions about how society assigns value to different outcomes and states of the world, how conflict over law and public policy is resolved, and how institutional realities affect -- in ways both planned and unplanned -- forms of societal decision-making that are meant to incorporate ideals of technical rigor, administrability, and responsiveness. In countries like the United States, the conduct of such analysis has implications for environmental protection, communications and technology policy, public health, immigration, national security, and other areas affecting risk and welfare in society. This paper covers only a portion of the territory necessary to understand those implications, focusing on the following essential topics: First, what do we mean by “economic analysis” and what do we mean by “regulation”? Second, why has this topic become an important one, not only the United States, but in most advanced democracies? Third, why is economic analysis and regulation a contested, even contentious, aspect of modern regulatory activity? Finally, and most important, how is economic analysis structured into regulatory decision-making, and how might existing arrangements evolve over time? As we address these questions, we explain why a familiarity with both the promise and the limits of economic analysis is crucial to any serious understanding of regulation -- whether prescriptive or descriptive -- in advanced economies. In practice, the aspirations of economic analysis in the regulatory state must be reconciled with various administrative and legal arrangements necessary to advance values, such as adjudicatory fairness or political responsiveness, that are often in tension with the technical rigor to which economic analysis of regulation aspires.
Author: Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 26
Book Description
The economic analysis of regulation raises fundamental questions about how society assigns value to different outcomes and states of the world, how conflict over law and public policy is resolved, and how institutional realities affect -- in ways both planned and unplanned -- forms of societal decision-making that are meant to incorporate ideals of technical rigor, administrability, and responsiveness. In countries like the United States, the conduct of such analysis has implications for environmental protection, communications and technology policy, public health, immigration, national security, and other areas affecting risk and welfare in society. This paper covers only a portion of the territory necessary to understand those implications, focusing on the following essential topics: First, what do we mean by “economic analysis” and what do we mean by “regulation”? Second, why has this topic become an important one, not only the United States, but in most advanced democracies? Third, why is economic analysis and regulation a contested, even contentious, aspect of modern regulatory activity? Finally, and most important, how is economic analysis structured into regulatory decision-making, and how might existing arrangements evolve over time? As we address these questions, we explain why a familiarity with both the promise and the limits of economic analysis is crucial to any serious understanding of regulation -- whether prescriptive or descriptive -- in advanced economies. In practice, the aspirations of economic analysis in the regulatory state must be reconciled with various administrative and legal arrangements necessary to advance values, such as adjudicatory fairness or political responsiveness, that are often in tension with the technical rigor to which economic analysis of regulation aspires.
Author: Robert W. Hahn Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
In response to the increasing impact of regulation, several governments have introduced economic analysis as a way of trying to improve regulatory policy. This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of government-supported economic analysis of regulation. We find that there is growing interest in the use of economic tools, such as benefit-cost analysis; however, the quality of analysis in the U.S. and European Union frequently fails to meet widely accepted guidelines. Furthermore, the relationship between analysis and policy decisions is tenuous. To address this situation, we recommend pursuing an agenda that allows economics to play a more central role in regulatory decision making. In addition, we suggest that prediction markets could help improve regulatory policy and improve measurement of the impact of regulation.
Author: Lorna Sarah Schrefler Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
It is conventional to argue that the autonomy and reputation of regulatory agencies depend on their expertise. Yet the studies on how independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) create and deploy their knowledge capacity are few and far apart. Normatively, the justification for delegating decision-making powers to IRAs is that they operate by using technical analysis and expertise rather than political considerations. But yet again, although delegation has been discussed as a design principle, systematic evidence on the conditions under which IRAs make use of knowledge and how is still scarce. The literature on knowledge utilization portrays a rather complex link between expertise and policy, where relevant knowledge is not always reflected in policy outcomes and plays several functions besides facilitating the solution of policy problems. Unfortunately, scholars of IRAs have not exploited the insights of this literature yet. This dissertation addresses the under-explored question of the usage of economic knowledge by IRAs. We identify four possible uses of expertise: instrumental (i.e., to solve problems); strategic (e.g. to advocate a position); symbolic (e.g., to gain legitimacy), and non-use. Our aim is to explain under which conditions a certain usage is more likely to occur. To do so, we draw on the methodological device of explanatory typologies (Elman 2005). Specifically, we select two explanatory dimensions that reflect both the context and the content of policy: the level of conflict in the policy arena, and the degree problem tractability. We use different combinations of these two dimensions to derive four hypotheses on the possible uses of expertise mentioned above. The elusive nature of knowledge utilization makes the identification and measurement of these different usages highly dependent on an in-depth understanding of the institutional, organisational, and political context in which a regulatory decision is taken. We have thus opted for a qualitative approach based on case studies and process tracing (Bennett 2010; Brady 2010; Freedman 2010) to appraise the four hypotheses. Empirically, we performed three case studies on regulatory policy decisions taken by the UK Office of Communications (Ofcom) between 2005 and 2010. We find that, given certain scope conditions, the prevalent use of economic analysis is instrumental - a finding that contradicts previous research that labelled instrumental learning as extremely rare, if not a sort of technocratic utopia. Other uses still exist however, and given other scope conditions regulators can be strategic and symbolic in their approach to knowledge and expertise. This is not surprising if we accept the notion that regulators operate in a policy environment that is eminently but not exclusively technical: to survive in a (at least partially) political environment, regulators have to deploy usages of knowledge that deviate from the instrumental type.
Author: United States. Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management Publisher: ISBN: Category : Administrative agencies Languages : en Pages : 238
Author: Wesley Magat Publisher: Routledge ISBN: 1135998698 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 274
Book Description
Rules in the Making represents an attempt to revolutionize ways of thinking about regulatory decision-making. The book tries to show that statistical methodologies can be used to determine what factors are important in the establishment of government regulation by developing a mathematical model of the regulatory process and agency behavior. The model is then tested using a case study of the Environmental Protection Agency's setting of effluent discharge standards under the Clean Water Act. Originally published in 1986
Author: United States. Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management Publisher: ISBN: Category : Administrative agencies Languages : en Pages : 236
Author: Lunn Pete Publisher: OECD Publishing ISBN: 9264207856 Category : Languages : en Pages : 74
Book Description
This study offers an international review of the initial applications of behavioural economics to policy, with a particular focus on regulatory policy.
Author: Robert W. Hahn Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
Several scholars are highly skeptical of the use of cost-benefit analysis and other economic tools in regulatory decision making. Recently, these critics have focused on debunking economic summaries of regulatory activity, sometimes referred to as regulatory scorecards. The critics generally support less quantitative economic analysis of regulations. This monograph addresses the analytical concerns raised by the critics. It makes four points: First, summary measures of the impact of regulations have made important contributions to our understanding of the regulatory process, a point often overlooked by the critics; second, many of the critics' concerns could be addressed by making refinements to scorecards rather than wholly rejecting them as an analytical tool; third, some of the suggestions made by the critics are legitimate, but many are not; and finally, the solution to legitimate concerns raised by the critics is not to eliminate quantitative economic analysis but to gain a deeper understanding of its strengths and weaknesses and to use it wisely.
Author: Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar
Author: Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar
Author: Commission on Risk Assessment and risk Management
Author: Robert W. Hahn
Author: Lorna Sarah Schrefler
Author: United States. Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management
Author: Wesley Magat
Author: United States. Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management
Author: Lunn Pete
Author: Robert W. Hahn
Author: Michael E. Porter