Reexamining the Managerial Ownership Effect on Firm Value PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Reexamining the Managerial Ownership Effect on Firm Value PDF full book. Access full book title Reexamining the Managerial Ownership Effect on Firm Value by Bradley W. Benson. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Bradley W. Benson Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 40
Book Description
Whether equity-based compensation and equity ownership aligns the interests of managers with stockholders is an important question in finance. Early studies found an inverted U-shaped relation between managerial ownership and firm value, but later studies using firm fixed effects found no relation. Managerial ownership levels change very slowly over time which may mask an ownership effect on firm value when using a fixed effect model. This is due to a much smaller within firm variation than between firm variation. We demonstrate that using pay-performance semi-elasticity, rather than pay-performance sensitivity as a measure of managerial ownership incentives, results in meaningful variation within firm over time. The greater within firm variation increases the power to detect a relation between managerial ownership and firm value with fixed effect regressions. As in the early research on this issue, we find a significant inverted U-shaped relation between managerial ownership and Tobin's Q in fixed effects regressions and after controlling for endogeneity with both two-stage and three-stage least squares regressions. Our results are consistent with incentive alignment at low levels and risk aversion at high levels of managerial ownership.
Author: Bradley W. Benson Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 40
Book Description
Whether equity-based compensation and equity ownership aligns the interests of managers with stockholders is an important question in finance. Early studies found an inverted U-shaped relation between managerial ownership and firm value, but later studies using firm fixed effects found no relation. Managerial ownership levels change very slowly over time which may mask an ownership effect on firm value when using a fixed effect model. This is due to a much smaller within firm variation than between firm variation. We demonstrate that using pay-performance semi-elasticity, rather than pay-performance sensitivity as a measure of managerial ownership incentives, results in meaningful variation within firm over time. The greater within firm variation increases the power to detect a relation between managerial ownership and firm value with fixed effect regressions. As in the early research on this issue, we find a significant inverted U-shaped relation between managerial ownership and Tobin's Q in fixed effects regressions and after controlling for endogeneity with both two-stage and three-stage least squares regressions. Our results are consistent with incentive alignment at low levels and risk aversion at high levels of managerial ownership.
Author: Bradley Warren Benson Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 452
Book Description
Managerial ownership levels change slowly over time. The slow change masks a significant ownership effect when testing the relation between managerial ownership and firm value using firm fixed effects to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity because of much smaller within variation than between variation. I demonstrate that using pay-performance semi-elasticity as a measure of managerial ownership incentives results in meaningful changes within firm over time. The greater within firm variation amplifies the effect size and increases the power to detect a relation between managerial ownership and firm value in firm fixed effects regressions. Using pay-performance semi-elasticity, I find a significant hump shaped relation between managerial ownership and Tobin's Q in firm fixed effects regressions and two-stage least squares regressions with firm fixed effects to control for endogeneity. My results contradict the results of previous studies which find no relation between managerial ownership and firm value in firm fixed effects regressions.
Author: Rüdiger Fahlenbrach Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 49
Book Description
From 1988 to 2003, the average change in managerial ownership is significantly negative every year for American firms. We find that managers are more likely to significantly decrease their ownership when their firms are performing well and more likely to increase their ownership when their firms become financially constrained. When controlling for past stock returns, we find that large increases in managerial ownership increase q. This result is driven by increases in shares held by officers, while increases in shares held by directors appear unrelated to changes in firm value. There is no evidence that large decreases in ownership have an adverse impact on firm value. We rely on the dynamics of the managerial ownership/firm value relation to mitigate concerns in the literature about the endogeneity of managerial ownership.
Author: Moon H. Song Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
This study explores the relation between managerial ownership and firm value by examining a sample of firms that announce dual class recapitalizations and the insider trading activity that precede these announcements. Insider trading activity, unlike the recapitalization, requires managers to commit their personal wealth and therefore serves as an indicator of the motivation behind the recapitalization. The recapitalization, in effect, allows managers to magnify the increase in vote ownership that results from insider buying and offsets the reduction in vote ownership that results from insider selling. This study adds to our understanding of dual class recapitalizations by linking the wealth effects and changes in ownership concentration with manager-shareholder agency issues that result from the recapitalization and insider trading activity. Results show a positive relation between the change in firm value and ownership for recapitalizations before the 1984 New York Stock Exchange moratorium on delisting dual class firms when ownership was high and control was firmly established. A negative relation exists for recapitalizations since 1984 when ownership levels were lower and voting control not assured. Results support the notion that more recent recapitalizations entrenched managers.
Author: Mara Faccio Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 42
Book Description
We analyze the simultaneous relationship between managerial ownership, board structure, and firm value, using a sample of all UK non-financial listed companies. We test the hypothesis that managers in the UK should become entrenched at a higher level of ownership compared to their US counterparts because of institutional differences across the two markets. We find a strong U-shaped relationship between the level of managerial ownership and the probability that the roles of chairman and CEO are split, that a non-executive director is appointed as chairman, and the proportion of non-executive directors on the board. However, we report a generally weak relationship between firm value and managerial ownership, board structure and the combination of managerial ownership and board structure. Our results cast doubt on the effectiveness of these internal corporate governance mechanisms.
Author: Jayesh Kumar Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 45
Book Description
Corporate Governance deals with the issue of how the suppliers of finance to various corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. Several Studies have examined the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Using different data samples from different countries, most of the studies provide evidence that ownership in uence firm performance. This study examines empirically the effects of ownership structure on the firm performance for a panel of Indian corporate firms, from an 'agency perspective'. We examine the effect of interactions between corporate, foreign, institutional, and managerial ownership on firm performance. Using panel data framework, we show that a large fraction of cross-sectional variation, in firm performance, found in several studies, can be explained by unobserved firm heterogeneity. We also provide some evidence that the shareholding by institutional investors and managers affect firm performance, after controlling for observed firm characteristics and unobserved firm heterogeneity and the effect is non-linear.
Author: Darmawan Napitpulu Publisher: European Alliance for Innovation ISBN: 1631902210 Category : Social Science Languages : en Pages : 312
Book Description
We are delighted to introduce the proceedings of the first edition of the 2019 Annual Conference of Economics, Business and Social Sciences (ACEBISS). This conference has brought researchers, developers and practitioners around the world who are leveraging and developing the great chance of financial inclusion in economics and business also related to the social community toward industry 4.0. The theme of ACEBISS 2019 was “Fintech Effect, The Challenge of Financial Inclusion in Economics and Business”. Within this scope, ACEBISS is intended to provide a unique international forum for researchers from industry and academia, working on financial effect analysis especially Fintech, through qualitative and quantitative method to study phenomenon in social and business entities.
Author: Bradley W. Benson
Author: Bradley W. Benson
Author: Bradley Warren Benson
Author: Rüdiger Fahlenbrach
Author: Rüdiger Fahlenbrach
Author: Shawn David Phelps
Author: Moon H. Song
Author: 
Author: Mara Faccio
Author: Jayesh Kumar
Author: Darmawan Napitpulu