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Author: John H. Enns Publisher: ISBN: Category : Bounties, Military Languages : en Pages : 84
Book Description
An extension of the methodology and data used in an earlier Rand study (reported in R-1502-ARPA) which developed and estimated a statistical model of reenlistment supply for the Army, Navy, and Air Force for a single year, FY 1971. The present study analyzes four years of reenlistment data (FY 1971-FY 1974) using two regression models to generate an estimate of a four-year average bonus response. It is concluded that (1) selective reenlistment bonuses have the desired positive effect on first-term reenlistment rates; (2) the bonus elasticity under current bonus policy is likely to about 2.0; (3) differences in bonus response between service branches are not large enough to require separate bonus management policies for each service; (4) the different bonus multiples each produce about the same per dollar effect; and (5) there is no evidence of differences between broadly defined occupational groups in bonus response. (Author).
Author: John H. Enns Publisher: ISBN: Category : Bounties, Military Languages : en Pages : 84
Book Description
An extension of the methodology and data used in an earlier Rand study (reported in R-1502-ARPA) which developed and estimated a statistical model of reenlistment supply for the Army, Navy, and Air Force for a single year, FY 1971. The present study analyzes four years of reenlistment data (FY 1971-FY 1974) using two regression models to generate an estimate of a four-year average bonus response. It is concluded that (1) selective reenlistment bonuses have the desired positive effect on first-term reenlistment rates; (2) the bonus elasticity under current bonus policy is likely to about 2.0; (3) differences in bonus response between service branches are not large enough to require separate bonus management policies for each service; (4) the different bonus multiples each produce about the same per dollar effect; and (5) there is no evidence of differences between broadly defined occupational groups in bonus response. (Author).
Author: David S. Barber Publisher: ISBN: Category : Deployment (Strategy) Languages : en Pages : 143
Book Description
This thesis explores the predictive effects of the Marine Corps Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) on first-term retention while controlling for varying levels of deployment tempo. In order to successfully predict reenlistment decisions in the current era, the model must control for conditions that affect a Marine' choice to reenlist, none being more influential than deployments to Operation Iraqi/Enduring Freedom. Adding deployment tempo variables to the logit prediction model enables Marine Corps manpower planners to properly account for changing conditions in the "Long War." The results of this analysis find the increased deployment tempo in recent years has had a negative affect on reenlistments. To counter this effect the Marine Corps has steadily increased its SRB budget and subsequent SRB offers to all Marines. In order to improve the accuracy of reenlistment predictions, this thesis estimated a model with alternative indicators of deployment tempo. The model developed is parsimonious, yet predicts accurately. Validation results show that if the model was utilized to predict FY07 reenlistment rates, it would have average prediction errors of 12 percent for the 27 high-density MOSs, who make up nearly 61 percent of the first-term population.
Author: Justin Joffrion Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 45
Book Description
The limited lateral entry and rigid pay structure for U.S. military personnel present challenges in retaining skilled individuals who have attractive options in the civilian labor market. One tool the services use to address this challenge is the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB), which offers eligible personnel with particular skills a substantial cash bonus upon reenlistment. However, the sequential nature of the bonus offer and reenlistment process limits the ability to adjust manpower quickly, raising interest in research that estimates the effect of the SRB on retention. While this literature has acknowledged challenges including potential endogeneity of bonus levels, attrition, and reenlistment eligibility, many studies do not address these concerns adequately. This paper uses a comprehensive panel data set on Air Force enlisted personnel to estimate the effect of the SRB on retention rates. We exploit variation in bonus levels within skill groups, control for civilian labor market conditions, and model reenlistment eligibility to avoid common assumptions that lead to biased impact estimates. We find substantial heterogeneity in the effect of the bonus, with the largest effects on first-term service members and those whose skills have not historically received a substantial bonus. We also find evidence that the bonus affects the timing of reenlistment decisions in addition to their frequency.
Author: Robert W. Barry, Jr. Publisher: ISBN: 9781423523772 Category : Languages : en Pages : 126
Book Description
This thesis analyzes the effect of the United States Marine Corps instituting a lump sum Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program on reenlistment decisions of first-term enlisted Marines, Between fiscal year 1982 and fiscal year 2000, Zone A reenlistees were paid 50 percent of their SRB on the date of reenlistment, and the remaining 50 percent was paid in annual installments over the reenlistment contract period. In fiscal year 2001, under the new program Marines received 100 percent of the SRB upon reenlisting The thesis surveys the literature on models of enlisted retention, The thesis empirically examines the impact of personal characteristics, civilian pay, unemployment, and the lump sum bonus on reenlistment decisions, Marine retention probabilities under the lump sum payment program are compared to the probabilities under the standard partial-annuity payment system The results show that the lump sum bonus is associated to a 5,8 percentage point increase in the reenlistment probability, A one-level increase in the SRB multiple during fiscal year 2001 is related to a reenlistment rate increase of 2,6 percentage points,
Author: Aline Quester Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
"First term reenlistment decisions for recommended and eligible Marine in FY 1980 through FY 1990 are analyzed in this research memorandum. Particular attention is given to the retention effects of selective reenlistment bonuses on Marines in different Armed Force Qualification Test (AFQT) score categories. Additionally, reenlistment behavior for marines of different marital statuses, grade, and length of initial enlistment contracts are analyzed. In the recent past, there have been substantial changes in the characteristics of enlisted Marines, as well as change in Marine Corps personal policy. First, enlisted Marines today are both smarter and better educated than they were in the earlier years of the 1980s. Second, although the percentage of recruits who enter the Marine Corps married or with dependents has remained virtually unchanged over time, the Marine Corps has experience substantial increases in the marriage and dependency rate for enlisted personal. Third, first-term enlistment contracted have been lengthened so that marine now average more years of service at the first reenlistment point. Finally, there has been an increase in both time in service (TIS) and time (TIG) for promotions to corporal (Cpl) and sergeant (Sgt). The impact of these changes on reenlistment decisions of first term enlisted personal (zone A decisions) is the subject of this research memorandum."--Abstract
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 126
Book Description
This thesis analyzes the effect of the United States Marine Corps instituting a lump sum Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program on reenlistment decisions of first-term enlisted Marines, Between fiscal year 1982 and fiscal year 2000, Zone A reenlistees were paid 50 percent of their SRB on the date of reenlistment, and the remaining 50 percent was paid in annual installments over the reenlistment contract period. In fiscal year 2001, under the new program Marines received 100 percent of the SRB upon reenlisting The thesis surveys the literature on models of enlisted retention, The thesis empirically examines the impact of personal characteristics, civilian pay, unemployment, and the lump sum bonus on reenlistment decisions, Marine retention probabilities under the lump sum payment program are compared to the probabilities under the standard partial-annuity payment system The results show that the lump sum bonus is associated to a 5,8 percentage point increase in the reenlistment probability, A one-level increase in the SRB multiple during fiscal year 2001 is related to a reenlistment rate increase of 2,6 percentage points,
Author: Justin L. Joffrion Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
The limited lateral entry and rigid pay structure for U.S. military personnel present challenges in retaining skilled individuals who have attractive options in the civilian labor market. One tool the services use to address this challenge is the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB), which offers eligible personnel with particular skills a substantial cash bonus upon reenlistment. However, the sequential nature of the bonus offer and reenlistment process limits the ability to adjust manpower quickly, raising interest in research that estimates the effect of the SRB on retention. While this literature has acknowledged challenges including potential endogeneity of bonus levels, attrition, and reenlistment eligibility, many studies do not address these concerns adequately. This paper uses a comprehensive panel data set on Air Force enlisted personnel to estimate the effect of the SRB on retention rates. We exploit variation in bonus levels within skill groups, control for civilian labor market conditions, and model reenlistment eligibility to avoid common assumptions that lead to biased impact estimates. We find substantial heterogeneity in the effect of the bonus, with the largest effects on first-term service members and those whose skills have not historically received a substantial bonus. We also find evidence that the bonus affects the timing of reenlistment decisions in addition to their frequency.
Author: John H. Enns
Author: John H. Enns
Author: United States. General Accounting Office
Author: Rand Corporation
Author: David S. Barber
Author: United States. Department of the Air Force
Author: Justin Joffrion
Author: Robert W. Barry, Jr.
Author: Aline Quester
Author: 
Author: Justin L. Joffrion