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Author: John F. Horty Publisher: OUP USA ISBN: 0199744076 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 276
Book Description
In this volume, John Horty brings to bear his work in logic to present a framework that allows for answers to key questions about reasons and reasoning, namely: What are reasons, and how do they support actions or conclusions?
Author: John F. Horty Publisher: OUP USA ISBN: 0199744076 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 276
Book Description
In this volume, John Horty brings to bear his work in logic to present a framework that allows for answers to key questions about reasons and reasoning, namely: What are reasons, and how do they support actions or conclusions?
Author: John F. Horty Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0199909660 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 276
Book Description
Although the study of reasons plays an important role in both epistemology and moral philosophy, little attention has been devoted to the question of how, exactly, reasons interact to support the actions or conclusions they do. In this book, John F. Horty attempts to answer this question by providing a precise, concrete account of reasons and their interaction, based on the logic of default reasoning. The book begins with an intuitive, accessible introduction to default logic itself, and then argues that this logic can be adapted to serve as a foundation for a concrete theory of reasons. Horty then shows that the resulting theory helps to explain how the interplay among reasons can determine what we ought to do by developing two different deontic logics, capturing two different intuitions about moral conflicts. In the central part of the book, Horty elaborates the basic theory to account for reasoning about the strength of our own reasons, and also about the related concepts of undercutting defeaters and exclusionary reasons. The theory is illustrated with an application to particularist arguments concerning the role of principles in moral theory. The book concludes by introducing a pair of issues new to the philosophical literature: the problem of determining the epistemic status of conclusions supported by separate but conflicting reasons, and the problem of drawing conclusions from sets of reasons that can vary arbitrarily in strength, or importance.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 276
Book Description
Although the study of reasons plays an important role in both epistemology and moral philosophy, little attention has been devoted to the question of how, exactly, reasons interact to support the actions or conclusions they do. In this book, John F. Horty attempts to answer this question by providing a precise, concrete account of reasons and their interaction, based on the logic of default reasoning. The book begins with an intuitive, accessible introduction to default logic itself, and then argues that this logic can be adapted to serve as a foundation for a concrete theory of reasons. Horty then shows that the resulting theory helps to explain how the interplay among reasons can determine what we ought to do by developing two different deontic logics, capturing two different intuitions about moral conflicts. In the central part of the book, Horty elaborates the basic theory to account for reasoning about the strength of our own reasons, and also about the related concepts of undercutting defeaters and exclusionary reasons. The theory is illustrated with an application to particularist arguments concerning the role of principles in moral theory. The book concludes by introducing a pair of issues new to the philosophical literature: the problem of determining the epistemic status of conclusions supported by separate but conflicting reasons, and the problem of drawing conclusions from sets of reasons that can vary arbitrarily in strength, or importance."This is a beautiful, elegant book. It should be required reading for anyone serious about thinking rigorously about ethics. Over the last half century or more, moral philosophy has become increasingly concerned with reasons for action - considerations which favor or disfavor some course of action, but not conclusively. According to a now-orthodox conception, what we ought to do is a product of the interaction of our reasons for different options. But very little serious work has been done on how reasons come together to determine what we ought to do, and much of that has been nae. In this fascinating and deep book, Horty shows how to use the resources of default logic to think rigorously about how reasons interact in order to determine what we ought to do. In the course of doing so, it sheds bright light on a range of murky topics ranging from the possibility of all-things-considered moral conflicts to the mechanics of exclusionary reasons to the role of principles in moral theory. And even more excitingly, it poses sharp and difficult questions whose shape would not be visible if not for the clarity offered by the framework of the book."--Mark Schroeder, University of Southern California.
Author: Mark Schroeder Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0192638696 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 288
Book Description
In the last five decades, ethical theory has been preoccupied by a turn to reasons. The vocabulary of reasons has become a common currency not only in ethics, but in epistemology, action theory, and many related areas. It is now common, for example, to see central theses such as evidentialism in epistemology and egalitarianism in political philosophy formulated in terms of reasons. And some have even claimed that the vocabulary of reasons is so useful precisely because reasons have analytical and explanatory priority over other normative concepts-that reasons in that sense come first. Reasons First systematically explores both the benefits and burdens of the hypothesis that reasons do indeed come first in normative theory, against the conjecture that theorizing in both ethics and epistemology can only be hampered by neglect of the other. Bringing two decades of work on reasons in both ethics and epistemology to bear, Mark Schroeder argues that some of the most important challenges to the idea that reasons could come first are themselves the source of some of the most obstinate puzzles in epistemology: about how perceptual experience could provide evidence about the world, and about what can make evidence sufficient to justify belief. Schroeder shows that, along with moral worth, one of the very best cases for the fundamental explanatory power of reasons in normative theory actually comes from knowledge.
Author: Errol Lord Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0190613866 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 313
Book Description
In recent decades normative reasons-considerations that count in favor of one thing or another-have come to the theoretical fore in ethics and epistemology. A major attraction of normative reasons is that they have weight or strength. Reasons are particular considerations that count in favor of actions or attitudes to some degree. This feature is attractive to theorists who want to explain more complex normative phenomena in terms of a notion that is weighted. This volume aims to provide the beginnings for a theory of weight. The fourteen new essays fall into three groups. One set of essays addresses questions about the nature of weight. Topics include the relations between reasons and conditions and modifiers, between reasons and other weighted notions such as commitments, and different models of the interaction of reasons. A second set of essays addresses substantive questions: questions about weight relevant to value-first, desire-first, evidence-first and other normative research programs. A third set of essays applies issues in the theory of weight to broader ethical debates. The book thus not only makes novel contributions to debates in ethics and epistemology about the nature of normative reasons and their weight, it also makes a strong case for the theoretical fruitfulness of the ideology of normative reasons.
Author: Shweta Desiraju Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
Defaults are powerful tools for nudging individuals towards potentially beneficial options. However, defaults typically guide all decision-makers towards the same option, and consequently, may misguide individuals with minority interests. We test whether presenting defaults with information about heterogeneity can help individuals with minority interests select alternative options, and dub this intervention a “reason default.” Reason defaults pre-select the option that is best for most individuals (like standard defaults), but also explain 1) why the default was selected and 2) who should opt for an alternative. In five preregistered studies using online convenience samples of adults (N=4,210) we find that reason defaults can improve decision-makers' outcomes over standard defaults and forced choices by guiding most individuals towards the default option, while helping individuals with minority interests select an alternative. Further, participants reported that reason defaults enhance transparency, decision ease, and understanding of the choice relative to standard defaults and forced choices.
Author: Bryan R. Weaver Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0192568841 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 176
Book Description
Semantics for Reasons is a book about what we mean when we talk about reasons. It not only brings together the theory of reasons and natural language semantics in original ways but also sketches out a litany of implications for metaethics and the philosophy of normativity. In their account of how the language of reasons works, Bryan R. Weaver and Kevin Scharp propose and defend a view called Question Under Discussion (QUD) Reasons Contextualism. They use this view to argue for a series of novel positions on the ontology of reasons, indexical facts, the reasons-to-be- rational debate, moral reasons, and the reasons-first approach.
Author: Hans C.M. van Trijp Publisher: Psychology Press ISBN: 113649636X Category : Psychology Languages : en Pages : 272
Book Description
Increasingly it is being recognized that consumer behavior may be a key trigger in the march toward sustainable development. Several lines of psychological theory and approaches have been developed relatively independently, each of which may provide major implications and action points on how consumers might be moved toward more sustainable behavior. This book is the first that brings together this variety of perspectives and theoretical angles around the common ambition of sustainable development. The contributors are all leading social scientists in the field of consumer behavior who met the challenge to sketch out their theoretical perspectives, but also to go beyond their normal theorizing and think out of the box in order to show how these theoretical perspectives might be made actionable in terms of key managerial and policy perspectives toward sustainable development. The result is a book that shows a wealth of information and approaches the question of how to encourage sustainable behavior from a myriad of divergent perspectives. This should stimulate scientists and policy-makers alike to find similarities, differences, and synergies between state-of-the-art psychological thinking about how to most effectively stimulate sustainable consumer behavior.
Author: Errol Lord Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0192546740 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 278
Book Description
The Importance of Being Rational systematically defends a novel reasons-based account of rationality. The book's central thesis is that what it is for one to be rational is to correctly respond to the normative reasons one possesses. Errol Lord defends novel views about what it is to possess reasons and what it is to correctly respond to reasons. He shows that these views not only help to support the book's main thesis, they also help to resolve several important problems that are independent of rationality. The account of possession provides novel contributions to debates about what determines what we ought to do, and the account of correctly responding to reasons provides novel contributions to debates about causal theories of reacting for reasons. After defending views about possession and correctly responding, Lord shows that the account of rationality can solve two difficult problems about rationality. The first is the New Evil Demon problem. The book argues that the account has the resources to show that internal duplicates necessarily have the same rational status. The second problem concerns the deontic significance of rationality. Recently it has been doubted whether we ought to be rational. The ultimate conclusion of the book is that the requirements of rationality are the requirements that we ultimately ought to comply with. If this is right, then rationality is of fundamental importance to our deliberative lives.
Author: John F. Horty
Author: John F. Horty
Author: John F. Horty
Author: 
Author: Mark Schroeder
Author: Errol Lord
Author: Artūrs Logins
Author: Shweta Desiraju
Author: Bryan R. Weaver
Author: Hans C.M. van Trijp
Author: Errol Lord