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Author: Gary Richardson Publisher: ISBN: Category : Banks and banking Languages : en Pages : 57
Book Description
During the contraction from 1929 through 1933, the Federal Reserve System tracked changes in the status of all banks operating in the United States and determined the cause of each bank suspension. This essay introduces quarterly series derived from that hitherto dormant data and presents aggregate series constructed from it. The new data series will supplement, and in some cases, supplant the data currently used to study banking panics of the Great Depression, which was published by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors in 1937.
Author: Gary Richardson Publisher: ISBN: Category : Banks and banking Languages : en Pages : 57
Book Description
During the contraction from 1929 through 1933, the Federal Reserve System tracked changes in the status of all banks operating in the United States and determined the cause of each bank suspension. This essay introduces quarterly series derived from that hitherto dormant data and presents aggregate series constructed from it. The new data series will supplement, and in some cases, supplant the data currently used to study banking panics of the Great Depression, which was published by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors in 1937.
Author: Charles W. Calomiris Publisher: ISBN: Category : Bank failures Languages : en Pages : 84
Book Description
This paper provides the first comprehensive econometric analysis of the causes of bank distress during the Depression. We assemble bank-level data for virtually all Fed member banks, and combine those data with county-level, state-level, and national-level economic characteristics to capture cross-sectional and inter-temporal variation in the determinants of bank failure. We construct a model of bank survival duration using these fundamental determinants of bank failure as predictors, and investigate the adequacy of fundamentals for explaining bank failures during alleged episodes of nationwide or regional banking panics. We find that fundamentals explain most of the incidence of bank failure, and argue that contagion' or liquidity crises' were a relatively unimportant influence on bank failure risk prior to 1933. We construct upper-bound measures of the importance of contagion or liquidity crises. At the national level, we find that the first two banking crises identified by Friedman and Schwartz in 1930 and 1931 are not associated with positive unexplained residual failure risk, or with changes in the importance of liquidity measures for forecasting bank failures. The third banking crisis they identify is a more ambiguous case, but even if one views it as a bona fide national liquidity crisis, the size of the contagion effect could not have been very large. The last banking crisis they identify at the beginning of 1933 is associated with important, unexplained increases in bank failure risk. We also investigate the potential role of regional or local contagion and illiquidity crises for promoting bank failure and find some evidence in support of such effects, but these are of small importance in the aggregate. We also investigate the causes of bank distress measured as deposit contraction, using county-level measures of deposits of all commercial banks, and reach similar conclusions about the importance of fundamentals in determining deposit contraction.
Author: Kim Schäfer Publisher: GRIN Verlag ISBN: 3668170002 Category : Social Science Languages : en Pages : 55
Book Description
Bachelor Thesis from the year 2015 in the subject Business economics - Economic and Social History, grade: 1,3, EBS European Business School gGmbH, language: English, abstract: The general structure of the United States’ banking system played an immense role in most of the theories explaining the reasons for the financial crisis and its subsequent banking failures of the Great Depression. Therefore, the paper starts with a brief explanation of the American banking system, its importance and the general structure, in order to prove sound previous knowledge to better understand the following theories. In the third chapter a comprehensive overview of the financial crises during the Great Depression is given, all significant aspects that could have influenced or even triggered the financial crises are explained and defined, and different views of researchers are provided. The financial crisis’ main focus of the Great Depression was on the extraordinary high banking failure rates and therefore the main objective of this paper is to investigate whether it would have been possible to forecast the high failure rates on the basis of the bank’s balance sheets before the Great Depression or not. Therefore, a comprehensive definition, its emergence in connection with the Basel Accords, and different measurement methods are provided. Due to the fact that the economy has to face financial crises again and again it is time to figure out models that might forecast financial crisis. Therefore, characteristics of former financial crisis have to be analysed in a manner that tell whether it would have been possible to forecast banking failures. In this study it will be investigated whether banks’ balance sheet could be a foundation of such theories. For this reason, the study is subdivided into three major parts. First of all, it is tested whether investments of banks influence banking failure rates at all by means of a regression model. In the second part of the study it is investigated whether banks in the United States were more likely to run illiquid or insolvent during the Great Depression. In order to come to a conclusion, the value at risk is compared to equity and working capital. Last but not least the study examines whether there is a “proportional connection” between banking failure rates and the value of risk, depending on the amount the banks invested in the different asset type. The conclusion will summarize all findings and link it to the literature of the paper.
Author: Gary Richardson Publisher: ISBN: Category : Banks and banking Languages : en Pages : 56
Book Description
During the contraction from 1929 through 1933, the Federal Reserve System tracked changes in the status of all banks operating in the United States and determined the cause of each bank suspension. This essay introduces that hitherto dormant data and analyzes chronological patterns in aggregate series constructed from it. The analysis demonstrates both illiquidity and insolvency were substantial sources of bank distress. Contagion (via correspondent networks and bank runs) propagated the initial banking panics. As the depression deepened and asset values declined, insolvency loomed as the principal threat to depository institutions. These patterns corroborate some and question other conjectures concerning the causes and consequences of the financial crisis during the Great Contraction.
Author: Gary Richardson Publisher: ISBN: Category : Banks and banking Languages : en Pages : 30
Book Description
"New data reveals that bank distress peaked in New York City, at the center of the United States money market, in July and August 1931, when the banking crisis peaked in Germany and before Britain abandoned the gold standard. This paper tests competing theories about the causes of New York's banking crisis. The cause appears to have been intensified regulatory scrutiny, which was a delayed reaction to the failure of the Bank of United States, rather than the exposure of money-center banks to events overseas"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
Author: Elmus Wicker Publisher: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 9780521663465 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 196
Book Description
This is the first study of five US banking panics of the Great Depression. Wicker's findings challenge many of the commonly held assumptions about the events of 1930 and 1931, and will be of use to monetary and financial historians and macroeconomists.
Author: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Publisher: ISBN: 9780966180817 Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
Crisis and Response: An FDIC History, 2008¿2013 reviews the experience of the FDIC during a period in which the agency was confronted with two interconnected and overlapping crises¿first, the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, and second, a banking crisis that began in 2008 and continued until 2013. The history examines the FDIC¿s response, contributes to an understanding of what occurred, and shares lessons from the agency¿s experience.
Author: Peter Temin Publisher: MIT Press ISBN: 9780262261197 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 220
Book Description
Lessons from the Great Depression provides an integrated view of the depression, covering the experience in Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. Do events of the 1930s carry a message for the 1990s? Lessons from the Great Depression provides an integrated view of the depression, covering the experience in Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. It describes the causes of the depression, why it was so widespread and prolonged, and what brought about eventual recovery. Peter Temin also finds parallels in recent history, in the relentless deflationary course followed by the U.S. Federal Reserve Board and the British government in the early 1980s, and in the dogged adherence by the Reagan administration to policies generated by a discredited economic theory—supply-side economics.
Author: Gary Richardson Publisher: ISBN: Category : Banks and banking Languages : en Pages : 39
Book Description
During the contraction from 1929 through 1933, the Federal Reserve System tracked changes in the status of all banks operating in the United States and determined the cause of each bank suspension. This essay analyzes chronological patterns in aggregate series constructed from that data. The analysis demonstrates both illiquidity and insolvency were substantial sources of bank distress. Periods of heightened distress were correlated with periods of increased illiquidity. Contagion via correspondent networks and bank runs propagated the initial banking panics. As the depression deepened and asset values declined, insolvency loomed as the principal threat to depository institutions.
Author: Gary Richardson
Author: Gary Richardson
Author: Charles W. Calomiris
Author: Kim Schäfer
Author: Gary Richardson
Author: 
Author: Gary Richardson
Author: Elmus Wicker
Author: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Author: Peter Temin
Author: Gary Richardson