Author: Xiangkang YinPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 28
Book Description
Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes
Author: Xiangkang YinPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 28
Book Description
Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes
Author: Xiangkang YinPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Using a simple model of two-stage duopoly game, this paper shows that Bertrand-like price competition on a differentiated goods market, following a simultaneous endogenous choice of production capacity, yields the Cournot-like outcomes.
Cournot Pre-commitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes
Author: David M. KrepsPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Oligopolies
Languages : en
Pages : 20
Book Description
Quality Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes
Author: Xiangkang YinA Comment on Yin, Xiangkang and Yew-kwang Ng
Author: Norbert SchulzCapacity Precommitment and Price Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes
Author: Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition
Author: Philipp RennerPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
In this paper we look at a new way to combine both quantity precommitment and price competition in a dynamic games framework. In each period players choose to invest in production capacities for the next period and also engage in a price competition. Production is free up to capacity and has steeply increasing costs if exceeded. The demand is allocated according to a quadratic utility function, which allows for product differentiation. This way we avoid rationing rules, that are frequently used in these kind of models. We use real algebraic geometry to explicitly solve the subgames played each period. This information allows us to guess that the value function is piecewise quadratic. Our results are that if costs for exceeding production capacity go to infinity, then the equilibrium converges to an extreme case, where production is free up to capacity and excess has infinite marginal cost. This limiting approach allows us to compare our model to the ones with homogeneous goods and rationing. We also construct a similar Cournot like model as a benchmark. Computational experiments show that, in the limit, the outcome of the price competition with quantity precommitment equals the one in the Cournot case. This extends a similar result for static two stage games. However if we move away from the limit case, i.e. to a case where marginal costs are finite, the two models no longer agree.
Oligopoly Theory
Author: James FriedmanPublisher: CUP Archive
ISBN: 9780521282444
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 262
Book Description
James Friedman provides a thorough survey of oligopoly theory using numerical examples and careful verbal explanations to make the ideas clear and accessible. While the earlier ideas of Cournot, Hotelling, and Chamberlin are presented, the larger part of the book is devoted to the modern work on oligopoly that has resulted from the application of dynamic techniques and game theory to this area of economics. The book begins with static oligopoly theory. Cournot's model and its more recent elaborations are covered in the first substantive chapter. Then the Chamberlinian analysis of product differentiation, spatial competition, and characteristics space is set out. The subsequent chapters on modern work deal with reaction functions, advertising, oligopoly with capital, entry, and oligopoly using noncooperative game theory. A large bibliography is provided.
Cournot Oligopoly
Author: Andrew F. DaughetyPublisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521361761
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 455
Book Description
This volume focuses on the properties and uses of Cournot's model of competition among the few.
Author: